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PREFACE 
In 1984, the author, with Professor George P. Chen, published 
the book Taiwan's Elections: Political Development and Democratiza-
tion in the Republic of China. We assessed Taiwan's political system 
as it related to election politics, early local elections, national supple-
mentary elections beginning in 1969, and the watershed competitive 
national election in 1980--which inaugurated democratic politics in 
Taiwan at the national level. That work also included a chapter on the 
1983 national election, which proved to many observers that the 1980 
election had not been just a show offered during an "election holiday" 
or a temporary democratic event. 
The present volume covers the elections since 1983. Included are 
the nationwide national election in 1985, the first two-party election in 
Taiwan's history (or for that matter ever in a Chinese nation) in 1986, 
and the "dual" 1989 election-which many observers perceived to be 
another breakthrough-perhaps the final step in routinizing a compet-
itive election process that will serve as the foundation for a fully demo-
cratic system. 
Hence, three different kinds of elections are assessed in this work: 
an election of local officials, a national election of both of the major 
elective bodies (the Legislative Yuan and the National Assembly), and 
a "combination" election of the Legislative Yuan and local offices. 
All, however, were national and of lasting influence. 
During the period covered, a number of events occurred that 
changed the electoral processes and profoundly influenced politics in 
the Republic of China. Most were calculated; some were not. Several 
were formalized in legislative acts. These changes are discussed in 
Chapter 1. 
It is almost axiomatic to say that elections have been a major 
contributing force behind the democratization process in Taiwan. The 
discussions in the chapters 2, 3, and 4 will so indicate. The analyses of 
these elections reflect, in the opinion of the author, that the Republic 
of China is a transformed nation: from authoritarianism to near or 
perhaps even full democracy. That transition has been rapid. It may 
have been faster than the democratization process in any nation in 
recent history where violence and upheaval have not been a part of the 
process. For that reason Taiwan may be a unique model of political 
modernization. 
(1) 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCfiON 
POLITICAL CHANGE AND TAIWAN'S ELECTIONS-
1985-89 
Taiwan, or the Republic of China, is a nation that has clearly 
experienced profound and broad political change in recent years. It 
has probably experienced political modernization at a faster rate of 
speed than any other nation in the world, at least among those that did 
not self-destruct or fail in an effort to democratize. Certainly few 
would disagree that political change in Taiwan has been phenomenal 
and has changed electoral politics in that country. 
However, this writer can only attempt in cursory fashion to re-
late elections to political development in general. This was done in 
some detail in the previous volume on Taiwan's elections. 1 Suffice it to 
say in the way of background that the two are intimately related, and 
they are related not only by chance, but also by design: Sun Yat-sen, 
the father of Republican China, put election politics in a central place 
in his teachings about political modernization and democracy. His 
plan, most would say, has been largely fulfilled; at least it is proceeding 
quickly along that path. 
In this work the author will discuss other more specific relation-
ships: between recent elections and past elections; the role of new 
political parties, especially the Democratic Progressive Party; the im-
pact of terminating martial law; other important political reforms; the 
effect of Chiang Ching-kuo's death; Nationalist Party or Kuomintang 
(KMT) internal reform; efforts to retire elder parliamentary delegates; 
a new election law; and finally, primary elections. These developments 
or events have influenced electoral politics during the period when the 
elections that are assessed below took place. 
There is much to say about the importance of the elections of 
1985, 1986, and 1989. This will be done in the next three chapters. 
These elections reveal profound changes in electoral politics in Taiwan 
and offer proof regarding how far the democratization process has 
I. For a general discussion, see John F. Copper with George P. Chen, Taiwan's Elec-
tions: Political Development and Democratization in the Republic of China (Baltimore: 
University of Maryland School of Law, 1984.) 
(3) 
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gone. Some estimates of the impact of these elections and the election 
process itself will be made in the concluding chapter. 
Prior Elections 
Scholars who assess elections in any nation where elections are 
meaningful political contests try to put any one election in perspective 
by examining previous elections. There are always trends. There are 
unresolved issues. Electoral politics evolve. Looking briefly at Tai-
wan's elections from 1950 to 1983 will aid the reader in putting the 
elections treated here in proper context and help them make sense. 
Considering these earlier elections is especially useful in gaining an 
understanding of several important trends: the development of a com-
petitive party system, the evolution of freer and more competitive elec-
tions, and progressively refined election strategies and tactics. 
The history of elections in Taiwan, if one defines elections as 
something other than efforts to create some kind of barely representa-
tive bodies under a colonial government, began in 1950. Only one 
year after the Nationalists moved to Taiwan following their defeat on 
the mainland, they held island-wide local elections. Nationalist lead-
ers realized that they had failed in the war with the Communists; that 
they had to reform the Party and government of which they were a 
part; and do a better job in putting Sun Yat-sen's teachings about 
political development and democracy into practice. 
So they engineered election politics in local government in Tai-
wan. This did not overly upset those in the Nationalist government 
who had an authoritarian bent and/or distrusted the local population. 
Nor could they use the argument of an external threat to delay the 
process. They had long contended that there needed to be a secure 
environment before the democracy-building effort could proceed. A 
secure environment was provided: the U.S. had neutralized the Tai-
wan Strait in mid-1950, and Taiwan was protected from the threat of 
Mao's army, which soon became involved in the Korean War 
anyway. 
They did not trust the local population. But Nationalist leaders 
could, after a fashion, assume the role officials played in ancient China 
and exert authority, even control, in local politics by serving as in-
termediaries. Local politics in Taiwan was infused with centrifugal 
forces; factional rivalries, in fact, threatened the fabric of local politics. 
Taiwanese leaders have since denied that local politics was so faction-
alized and contend that they knew how to practice democracy better 
than the Nationalists. They have argued Taiwan would have democ-
racy from the "bottom up." As time passed this disagreement served 
TAIWAN'S RECENT ELECTIONS 5 
to cause the two to compete, but not in a hostile way, rather to make 
democracy more functional and less an object of contention between 
the two groups. 2 
Throughout the 1950s and 1960s there were meaningful local 
elections in Taiwan. They served as the foundation for democratic 
politics in Taiwan. Officials were chosen by the people. Many of these 
democratically-elected officials subsequently rose to become national 
figures. (In Taiwan, local office serves as a better stepping stone to 
national politics than in most nations.) 
Local officials early on felt that successful elections below the na-
tional level proved that Taiwan would become democratic through a 
"seeping up" process. But they also accepted the reality that ethnic 
tensions between the Mainlander Chinese and the locally-born Chi-
nese, or Taiwanese, was an impediment to democracy from above. 
Likewise they were cognizant of the fact that the U.S. and many other 
nations in the international community espoused a one-China policy 
(at first favoring Taipei but later Beijing); this meant that Taiwan 
could not repudiate its claim to represent "greater China" justifying 
systemic political links with a territory and people not under the gov-
ernment's jurisdiction. That kept Taiwan's elected bodies of govern-
ment unrepresentative of the population actually under its control of 
the government and hence not representative or democratic. Most 
Taiwanese and the majority of advocates of faster democratization did 
not like this. But at least they understood it. 
In 1969 Taiwan held a "supplementary" national election. The 
government increased the number of seats in the National Assembly 
and the Legislative Yuan (both of which represented "greater China"); 
the new seats all represented Taiwan. In other words, Taiwan became 
"overrepresented" in these bodies of government. Some observers 
have seen this as the beginning of democracy in national politics in 
Taiwan. Others say it was tokenism and was almost meaningless in 
terms of putting democracy into practice. Still others contend it 
marks the beginning or starting point of both the separation of Taiwan 
from the mainland in terms of election politics and the beginning of 
truly representative government and democracy in Taiwan. In any 
case, there were subsequent supplementary elections in 1972, 1973, 
and in 1975. In all of these elections districts in Taiwan was given 
more seats. Subsequent elections were even more "supplementary."3 
In 1978 a "watershed" election was scheduled. Taiwan "prov-
2. See Ibid, pp. 44-45. 
3. See Ibid, chapter 4. 
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ince" was to be allocated even more seats. However, this election was 
cancelled when President Jimmy Carter announced in December that 
the United States would derecognize the Republic of China and would 
establish formal diplomatic relations with the government of the Peo-
ple's Republic of China. Taiwan was stunned, even though both its 
leaders and its population had expected this to happen eventually. 
There was no proximate warning. The U.S. decision seriously delegi-
timized the government in the minds of the public, or at least a mean-
ingful segment thereof. It made Beijing's threats against Taiwan loom 
much larger. Opponents of democracy became stronger and more uni-
fied, but so did the proponents of democratization and immediate 
political change. To the latter, democracy was a way of winning inter-
national support for Taiwan, or so they argued. 
Thus, 1979 was a year of tension between pro-democracy forces 
and the government. Political polarization increased. Democracy ad-
vocates were soon led (on the streets at least) by anti-government 
forces, even though there was increasing pressure within the ruling 
Nationalist Party and the government to reform the system and use 
elections to promote democracy. Months of heated debate ended with 
the Kaohsiung Incident in December 1979, when the two forces 
collided. 
Up to that time the public had generally favored the advocates of 
democracy. Most felt the nation had to take decisive action in view of 
the diplomatic crisis. However, when the advocates of quick democ-
racy provoked violent confrontation with the government, many be-
gan to fear political instability and chaos. In any event, in 1980 the 
two sides, both pressured by the public, worked out some of their dif-
ferences. A new election law was written. Compromises were made. 
Gentlemen's agreements were reached.4 
As a result, Taiwan had its first competitive election in 1980. Op-
position politicians organized. They became collectively known as 
tangwai, or outside the party (meaning outside the Nationalist Party, 
which was the only serious political party in Taiwan). They estab-
lished a campaign platform; they worked on strategy and tactics and 
helped each other. They became in many respects a political party-
though forming new political parties was still illegal. 5 
Taiwan's citizenry was exposed to electioneering of the kind it 
4. See John F. Copper, "Taiwan in 1980: Entering a New Decade," Asian Survey, 
January 1981 for further details. 
5. See John F. Copper, "Taiwan's Recent Election: Progress Toward a Democratic 
System," Asian Survey, October 1981, pp. 1032-33. 
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had never witnessed before. Many were flabbergasted at the charges 
tangwai candidates levelled against the government and the National-
ist Party or Kuomintang (KMT): corrupt, stupid (for not preventing 
the crises caused by the loss of U.N. representation in 1971 and U.S. 
diplomatic recognition in 1979), abuse of human rights, dictatorial, 
inflexible, old-fashioned, etc. It seemed like a free-for-all; but it also 
had the trappings of democracy. It was the first competitive national 
election in Taiwan's history. 
Still, many described the event afterwards as an "election holi-
day." In other words, it was presumed to have been an election staged 
for the benefit of the U.S. and other foreign countries and designed to 
give the appearance of democracy. Or it was described as a one-time 
affair. There had to be another, or perhaps several more, competitive 
national elections to prove this was not true. 6 
The 1983 election proved that 1980 had not just been a fluke or 
an election holiday granted by the government: Taiwan had a second 
competitive national election. Still another election law had been writ-
ten; or the earlier law was revised thoroughly, depending upon one's 
interpretation. The tangwai had more time to organize. Some new 
election strategies and tactics were tested by both sides. Many began 
to think in terms of a loyal opposition; in short, a two-party system 
was evolving. The KMT began to think in terms of winning elections 
in a system that allowed free and fair competition. Clearly a competi-
tive election system was being routinized. 7 
The Democratic Progressive Party 
Taiwan's electoral politics have been strongly impacted in recent 
years by the development of a new and real opposition party-the 
Democratic Progressive Party (DPP). In 1986, DPP competition with 
the ruling Nationalist Party made the national election that year a 
two-party contest-the first ever in a Chinese nation. At the time 
some observers said that a two-party system had evolved. Others felt 
this was probably an incorrect or at least premature statement. In any 
event the same statement was heard later, in the wake of the 1989 
election. Many have since credited the DPP with transforming Tai-
wan's political system from a one-party dictatorship to a democracy. 8 
6. Ibid. 
7. Copper with Chen, Taiwan's Elections, chapter 7. 
8. See Hung-mao Tien, The Great Transition: Political and Social Change in the Re-
public of China (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1989) 
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Clearly the DPP has played a central role in creating genuine party 
and electoral competition in Taiwan. 
The Democratic Progressive Party was founded on September 28, 
1986. President Chiang Ching-kuo had, a few months earlier, prom-
ised that the ban on forming new political parties would be lifted. 
However, before that was formally done, tangwai leaders held a meet-
ing at the Grand Hotel in Taipei and, after the gathering, announced 
the formation of the DPP. Neither the KMT nor the government 
took action to repress the new party. Both allowed the DPP to do 
what political parties do in democratic nations, including organizing 
and campaigning for its candidates in the national election three 
months later. The DPP was thus christened! 
What was the DPP? The DPP evolved out of new competitive 
politics of the 1970s and the growing need for competitive, open de-
mocracy resulting from Taiwan's two decades of miracle economic 
growth and vast social change. In this context political participation 
became more important and more desired. Democracy seemed to 
many a sine qua non of further economic and social modernization. It 
was also viewed as inevitable, something that the government had 
promised, and a necessary progression to change Taiwan's image 
abroad and strengthen its diplomacy. 
As noted above, tangwai leaders were mostly "independent" poli-
ticians who opposed the Nationalist Party's monopoly on political 
power and disagreed with the ban against forming new parties. They 
felt strongly that Taiwan needed a serious opposition party if it were to 
democratize. They called themselves tangwai, or outside the party, 
emphasizing that they had no connection with the KMT. Thus, they 
regarded themselves as an opposition. They also suggested that they 
sought to win political power in democratic elections; in other words, 
as democracy flowered so would they. 
In the 1980s they began to behave more and more like a political 
party. The 1980 election campaign was a catalyst. But, when they 
were tested at the polls, they did not do very well. They had to learn 
some valuable lessons. They found that they needed to avoid extreme 
positions. They had to be more pragmatic and less ideological. Above 
all, they discovered their need for better organization and discipline. 
In 1982 they formed a "common political demand." In 1983 they 
created a hou yuan hui, or campaign committee. More radical mem-
bers formed the Association of Tangwai Writers and Editors. In 1984 
tangwai leaders formed the Association of Tangwai Elected Officials to 
bridge some of the gaps, heal disagreements and foster unity. This 
organization later became the Association of Public Policies Studies. 
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In 1985 a Tangwai Election Campaign Committee was formed to 
nominate official candidates. The label tangwai was openly used in the 
1985 nationwide local elections. The government did not take any 
legal action against the tangwai in spite of what was clearly a new 
political "party" on the scene, campaigning in an election. (Forming a 
new political party at this time was still illegal.) In fact, many KMT 
leaders and candidates welcomed the competition. 
In 1986 the tangwai began forming local branches. The tangwai, 
in fact, seemed to be a political party in every respect except name. 
Tangwai candidates, throughout the Spring and Summer, were pre-
paring a common "party" program or platform for the December 
1986 national election. They were organizing to help each other. 
Thus, in the fall of 1986, when the tangwai became the DPP, it was 
ready to compete in an election. 9 
On November 10, 1986, the DPP held its first party congress. 
The party adopted a party constitution and a platform. It elected a 
31-member Central Executive Committee and an eleven-member Cen-
tral Advisory Committee. Ironically, the DPP, which had been criti-
cal of the KMT's Leninist organization, adopted the same control and 
communication structure as the KMT. 
The DPP's platform included calls for revamping and democra-
tizing Taiwan's political system, particularly through reforming the 
elected bodies of government. In short, the DPP demanded faster 
political change in the direction of democracy-though this was to be 
accomplished within the framework of the constitution. The DPP in 
fact became in some ways a stronger advocate than the KMT of con-
stitutionality (which to the DPP meant fulfilling the constitutional 
provisions for democracy that were nullified by the "Temporary Pro-
visions" and martial law). Its economic and social policies were de-
scribed as socialist or at least liberal: more welfare, health care, social 
services, etc. The platform also cited a more flexible foreign policy, 
including efforts to regain membership in the United Nations. 
Though its foreign policy pronouncements sounded good, few consid-
ered them realistic. 
The DPP had to deal with two controversial issues: communism 
and Taiwan independence. DPP leaders were not sympathetic to com-
munism, nor were its supporters attracted to communism, either in 
form or doctrine. However, DPP leaders did not want to be restricted 
in the political ideas they might advocate. Moreover, they did not 
want to copy the KMT's anti-communist position. After some debate 
9. See Ibid, especially chapter 4, for further details. 
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the DPP put an anti-communist provision into its platform. Indepen-
dence was an issue even more difficult to deal with because many DPP 
supporters felt so strongly about the issue. It was at once both a unify-
ing and a divisive issue. The party resolved its conundrum by calling 
for self-determination-which was somewhat vague and not very 
provocative. 10 
The DPP's less than stellar performance in the 1986 national 
election seemed to indicate that it might not remain the only opposi-
tion party in Taiwan. Several other political parties were formed. The 
Labor Party was the most serious contender. Inaugurated in Decem-
ber 1987, it sought support from Taiwan's nearly eight million indus-
trial workers. In so doing it threatened to take a critical base of 
support away from the DPP. Six other parties announced in 1987. 
By the end of March 1989 twenty-five parties had registered. 11 
The termination of martial law in June 1987 and the death of 
President Chiang Ching-kuo also adversely affected DPP appeal. Ter-
minating martial law removed an issue. It also split the DPP. Some 
members contended that martial law had not really ended, and, there-
fore, the decision was not a meaningful one. Others said it had ended, 
and, to generate enthusiasm, labelled the event significant and called 
for efforts to realize a DPP-led "Taiwanese government." 12 
In 1989 it appeared to many that the DPP would not perform 
very well in the national election in December. The party suffered 
from factionalism over the Taiwan independence issue. Its leaders 
seemed to be interested in their own careers more than the party's 
fortune. The DPP had an image of attracting thugs and lower class 
elements. It also had a reputation for leading demonstrations on the 
street rather than talking sensibly about policy issues. Recruitment 
was less successful than DPP leaders had hoped. 
The party was not split as seriously as it seemed. Its hoodlum 
image was to some degree replaced by an image of commonman poli-
tics. The electorate demanded democracy, and many perceived that 
support for the opposition was the way to promote democratization. 
Then, during the 1989 election campaign the DPP cleverly used the 
10. Some KMT leaders replied that self-determination meant nothing since the Repub-
lic of China already possessed sovereignty and therefore self-determination was realized. 
Some DPP politicians equated self-determination with ridding Taiwan of KMT rule; others 
found it something to attract attention and never defined it. 
11. These parties are named and discussed in more detail below. Also see mention of 
them in Chapter 4. 
12. See John F. Copper, "Ending Martial Law in Taiwan: Problems and Prospects," 
Journal of Northeast Asian Studies, Summer 1988, pp. 3-19. 
TAIWAN'S RECENT ELECTIONS 11 
Tiananmen Massacre issue to its advantage. Helping also were dra-
matic changes in Eastern Europe-which made DPP demands for de-
mocracy, formerly thought to be radical, seem quite moderate. As a 
result, the DPP did so well that even the KMT called their perform-
ance a victory. 
Lifting Martial Law 
The lifting of martial law in Taiwan and the adjacent islands (but 
not Quemoy and Matsu) in July 1987, marked, to many observers, the 
success of democratic politics and a turning point in Taiwan's political 
history. The event has since been associated with the growth of mass 
politics and an active political opposition. Certainly it had considera-
ble impact. 
Martial law was declared in 1934, when the government of the 
Republic of China ruled the mainland. Shortly after the Nationalists 
fled to Taiwan in December 1949, the Executive Yuan designated Tai-
wan a combat area, and in January 1950, President Chiang Kai-shek 
issued an emergency decree that activated martial law. Martial law 
was subsequently implemented, a decision that justified the imminent 
threat of invasion by the People's Republic of China. 13 However, the 
U.S. military presence in the region after June 1950 when President 
Truman ordered the 7th Fleet to protect Taiwan from an invasion and 
the U.S.-Republic of China Defense Treaty signed in 1954 reduced the 
seriousness of that threat. 
Martial law gave the military extra-constitutional powers. In 
1950, the Taiwan Garrison Command was created to enforce martial 
law provisions. It was subsequently authorized to control travel 
abroad; monitor entry into Taiwan; approve meetings, parades, and 
rallies; and review and censor newspapers, magazines, books, movies, 
and other forms of communications. Many thought of the Garrison 
Command as an agency of repression. Most thought it at minimum 
was a trapping of authoritarian government. 
The Garrison Command, however, never used all of the powers 
granted to it. And its powers, or use of them, declined long before 
martial law was terminated. In August 1950 the government enacted 
provisions to prevent unwarranted search and seizure, even though 
this was allowed under martial law. Revisions of martial law power 
were made in 1951, 1952, and 1953. Civilian courts were given juris-
diction over all cases not involving the military except treason. Provi-
13. Ibid. 
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sions were made for habeas corpus and for providing legal assistance 
for people who could not afford an attorney. 
Martial law did not prohibit the formation of political parties as is 
sometimes thought; that prohibition was in the Temporary Provisions, 
which were added to the Constitution in 1948. 14 Nevertheless, as de-
mocracy began to evolve, martial law became the subject of debate and 
often intense controversy. There were two sides to the issue. . . 
Some (particularity the KMT and its supporters) argued that Tai-
wan did not really have martial law: the term chieh yen fa, meaning 
"stringent measures law," had been misinterpreted. The fact that Tai-
wan had no curfew and civilian rule prevailed was evidence for this 
view. They also argued that since opinion polls reflected that the pub-
lic did not object to "martial law" and even supported keeping it, it 
would be undemocratic to abolish martial law. Also, martial law was 
used by the police to keep a check on rising crime rates, and the public 
supported this. 
Others (notably the opposition), however, contended that it 
blocked the full application of the constitution and had a negative psy-
chological effect upon the growth of democratic politics. They were 
particularly critical of the use of military courts to try civilians and 
were often incensed when the term "treason" was applied to political 
actions that seemed part of the process of electoral politics. With mar-
tiallaw in force, they said, party competition is stifled. 15 
In 1980 participants in the Kaohsiung Incident were tried on 
charges of treason and given long jail sentences. This underscored 
both the positive and negative sides of martial law. It could be used to 
maintain political stability, and it could indeed prevent anarchy; but it 
also stymied legitimate protest. Thus, it seemed to be a major obstacle 
to democracy. In the eyes of the Western media, the Kaohsiung Inci-
dent signified that Taiwan had made little progress in democratizing, 
and it was frequently used to criticize the government of Taiwan. 
In the spring of 1986, President Chiang Ching-kuo called for the 
study of certain reforms, including the termination of martial law. 
According to those close to him, he was most concerned about the 
bad image created abroad and the psychological effects martial law 
had on free and open party competition. It thus seemed to be only a 
matter of time before martial law would be ended. In fact, President 
14. See Han Lih-wu, Taiwan Today (Taipei: Cheng Chung Book Company, 1986), pp. 
34-35. 
15. See footnote #12. 
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Chiang announced his intentions and for the next several months the 
government made preparations to terminate martial law. 
On July 15, 1987, when the government suspended the martial 
law decree, the Western media hailed the decision and called it a 
landmark move and a watershed event in Taiwan's evolution toward 
democracy. But government officials were in a dilemma as to how to 
speak about martial law. Many had long taken the view that Taiwan 
did not have martial law and that the "emergency decree," as they 
called it, was popular and should not be abolished. However, some 
government agencies, especially the Government Information Office, 
wanted to take advantage of the good publicity and concentrate on the 
"fact" that Taiwan had taken a big step forward on the road to 
democracy. 
The opposition was also perplexed as to how to interpret the an-
nouncement that martial law was gone. Some declared that martial 
law was still in effect. They maintained that the new National Secur-
ity Law was simply martial law in disguise, or as they put it "old wine 
in new bottles." Others wanted to rally support for their party by 
saying that the end of martial law meant more freedom and that it 
constituted an opportunity. Some DPP leaders hailed it as a chance to 
recruit and called the party to action. 
In terms of tangible effects, the lifting of martial law did several 
things. It brought an end to the use of military courts in trying civil-
ian cases. It thus forced the development of a new and more in-
dependent legal system and different modes of legal practice. This 
effect, however, was not immediate; it was long-term. This aspect of 
the termination of martial law, in fact, is still evolving. 
Ending martial law also affected the politics of protest and dem-
onstrations. Control over marches and street protest was transferred 
to local police. This transfer helped democratize the political process 
by giving local governments jurisdiction. It did not, however, mark 
the beginning of street politics. There were more than three hundred 
protest demonstrations-more than two per day-in the first five 
months of 1987. The DPP and other opposition parties were already 
using demonstrations to attract attention and support. Ending martial 
law simply formalized this a bit. 
After martial law ended, press control became the responsibility 
of the Government Information Office, which was more lenient and 
democratic-minded than the Garrison Command. Things did not, 
however, change that much-particulary as concerned electoral poli-
tics. The opposition continued to complain of government and KMT 
control of the media. Months later a new press law gave additional 
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freedoms to the newspapers, including the right for new newspapers to 
open and for all newspapers to print more. This had a considerable 
effect on democratic politics, particularly by helping the opposition 
present its message. 
The termination of martial law, on the other hand, also impacted 
the organization of workers. Strikes were banned under the Tempo-
rary Provisions, not martial law. But, workers were not able to organ-
ize easily because of martial law, and, just as important, they perceived 
martial law as intimidating. Moreover, the termination of martial law 
coincided with public debate concerning ending restrictions on strikes 
and other labor movements. At the time it seemed that ending martial 
law might mark the beginning of a role for labor in politics, through 
its own party or via support of an opposition party. 16 
As mentioned above, ending martial law did not legalize the for-
mation of new political parties; but both issues were discussed in tan-
dem. At that time, the ban on new parties was to be cancelled soon 
and a new law regulating civic organizations was going to be written. 
Thus, in the minds of many, the termination of martial law was seen as 
a necessary prior action that was linked to the formation of new, legal 
political parties. In fact, just before martial law was suspended, the 
Chinese Liberty Party formed. Two months later the Democratic 
Freedom Party was announced. Several other parties formed in the 
ensuing months. 
Nationalist Party Reform 
One of the major, but less known, factors that has furthered the 
cause of democracy in Taiwan is reform in (or of) the ruling National-
ist Party or Kuomintang (KMT). As the ruling party and the major-
ity party, and what some believe will be the dominant political party in 
Taiwan for some time, changes in rules and procedures to make the 
KMT more democratic have had a positive effect on the political sys-
tem, electoral politics, and party competition. The significance of 
changes, in fact, are quite instructive in terms of the evolution of dem-
ocratic politics in Taiwan. 
The Nationalist Party underwent far-reaching reform when it 
moved to Taiwan in 1949 after defeat on the mainland. Efforts were 
made to make the party more efficient, to get rid of factions and substi-
tute party loyalty for personal loyalty, to eliminate corruption, and to 
make the party popular. Only small efforts were made, however, to 
democratize the party. Party leaders generally perceived that the 
16. Ibid. 
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party had to maintain discipline and deal with external threats; thus 
democratic rules and procedures had to wait. 17 Some also pointed out 
that many political parties in Western democracies perceived they had 
no obligation to operate by democratic rules, and many did not do so. 
In the 1970s Chiang Ching-kuo made serious new efforts to re-
form the KMT. Most of these efforts took the form of getting rid of 
corruption and nepotism and bringing locally-born Chinese or 
Taiwanese into the Party. Steps were also taken to make the KMT 
more efficient in carrying out public policy. And Chiang Ching-kuo 
endeavored to make the party responsive to public demands and 
concerns. 18 
Chiang Ching-kuo's hopes to see the KMT compete democrati-
cally were fulfilled to some degree as the party began to compete in 
elections in the 1970s. A giant step forward was made during the 1980 
campaign. KMT election strategists realized its candidates had to be 
innovative and energetic-and democratic-minded. As a result, 
younger, more progressive leaders were brought into positions of 
power and importance. The strength of the opposition challenge dur-
ing subsequent elections compelled the KMT not to reverse these 
changes. The KMT made reforms of rules and procedures and less 
attention was paid to ideology. The party began polling more, and it 
began to pay more attention to popular, critical issues. Problem solv-
ing grew as a method of conducting business. 
However, it was not until 1988, at the Party's 13th Congress, that 
democratic rules as well as democratic thinking really "broke out" 
inside the ruling Nationalist Party. Chiang Ching-kuo had just died. 
In his will he had asked for continued reform- .including party re-
form. Those in the KMT who respected him, including most party 
leaders, sought to carry out his wishes. Meanwhile, more democratic 
procedures had been adopted by local party organizations. By the 
time the Congress convened, more than half (around 60 percent) of 
the delegates were chosen by U.S.-style primaries and caucuses. 19 
At the Congress, these delegates, and many others in the name of 
Chiang Ching-kuo, submitted a list of candidates for Party Central 
17. See Richard L. Walker, "Taiwan's Movement into Political Modernity," in Paul 
K.T. Sih (ed.) Taiwan in Modern Times (New York: St. John's University Press, 1973), pp. 
367-70. 
18. See Ralph N. Clough, Island China (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1978), 
pp. 61-62. 
19. See John F. Copper, "The KMT's 13th Party Congress: Reform, Renovation, New 
Blood, New Policies," in Cynthia Chenault (ed.), Modernizing East Asia: Economic and 
Cultural Dimensions of Political Change (New York: St. John's University Press, 1989) 
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Committee seats. They did not accept the leadership's list of candi-
dates. The results were : the average age of the new Central Commit-
tee dropped by more than a decade, to 58.7 compared to 69.8 for the 
previous Committee, sixty percent of the members were newly drafted; 
forty percent were college or university graduates, nearly a fourth with 
a PhD degree, and nearly 40 percent were Taiwanese. 
The party leadership, pressed by popularly elected delegates, pub-
lished a list of the number of votes received by Central Committee 
members, reflecting members' popularity. Knowing in advance that 
this would happen, many party members engaged in strenuous efforts 
to win delegates' support. This favored those with charisma and en-
ergy and those who advocated democracy, both in the Party and for 
the nation as a whole. 
The Central Committee then selected a Standing Committee-the 
powerful decision body of the party. It was a majority Taiwanese for 
the first time. A woman was chosen for the first time. More impor-
tant, most of its members favored democratization at a faster pace. 
Because of the new members and the pervasive desire to reform 
the KMT, on the top of the agenda of the party's new policies to be 
delineated at the meeting was democratic reform. The party vowed to 
"continue the drive for democracy." More specifically, the KMT 
pledged to make the elective bodies of government more representa-
tive. No specific actions were taken in this respect because delegates 
and leaders both deferred to President Lee Teng-hui, who had already 
promised to seek measures to make the National Assembly, the Legis-
lative Yuan, and the Control Yuan represent only Taiwan. But the 
party demonstrated that it supported democratic reform of the system 
on this all-important issue of representation. In fact, it made commit-
ments to make the elected bodies of government more democratic that 
were realized during 1989, and which impacted the December 1989 
election. 
The KMT's platform also cited a need for stability and law and 
order as a milieu in which democracy could grow. Many KMT lead-
ers believed too much democracy was dangerous because it engen-
dered chaos. Thus, there was a need for balance. The platform 
discussed policies toward the mainland that reflected the notion that 
Taiwan was going to be a beacon or model of democracy for Chinese 
there and around the world. This, according to some observers, put 
the move for democratic reforms in perspective and made it transcend 
Taiwan's shores while it answered the call by the KMT's opposition 
parties regarding Taiwan independence. Party reform was explained 
as something to help all Chinese, thus giving it a universal character. 
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Other tenets of policy that were discussed and put into the plat-
form reflected both national needs and public opinion. Many issues 
were translated into specific agenda items. Most of the party goals or 
objectives cited might have been campaign issues. Clearly the party 
seemed to be preparing for an election. 
Most party leaders, when asked about the scope of democratiza-
tion, answered that the KMT expected to be the ruling party in Tai-
wan for some time, and for that reason it had to democratize in order 
to make the nation democratic. Many also mentioned that the Taiwan 
government, including the party in power, had to be a model for 
China. Some noted, even boasted, that KMT rules and procedures 
were democratized beyond those of many, perhaps most, political par-
ties in Western democracies. The party evinced an attitude of accom-
plishment in the reforms-many noting that it helped make Taiwan a 
model of democratic political change which other nations might 
emulate. 
The mood of the Congress also reflected confidence that the 
KMT could compete in a fair election with an "even playing field." In 
short, the Nationalist Party was getting ready for the election in 1989 
and planned to win in a truly fair and open competitive contest. Ob-
servers both at this time and later referred to the 13th Party Congress 
as a watershed event in the democratization process of Taiwan. The 
mode of conducting business in the nation's ruling party previously 
had not been affected much by democratization; now it was. Clearly 
the decisions made at this Congress paved the way for moves to have 
party primaries and to revise the election laws so as to rejuvenate the 
elected bodies of government, as happened in coming months. 
A New Election Law 
In 1980, preparatory to the December election, the government 
invited scholars, lawyers, elder statesmen, and representatives of the 
Nationalist Party and opposition groups to participate in drafting a 
new election law. The Election and Recall Law of 1980 laid the 
groundwork for the competitive election that year. For the most part 
the law worked quite well; there were, however, certain defects. In 
ensuing years both the Nationalist Party and the opposition (after 
1986, mainly the Democratic Progressive Party) complained about 
these defects. 20 
These complaints were heard during the 1983 election campaign 
and the 1986 campaign. The most frequently voiced criticisms from 
20. See Copper and Chen, footnote 1, for further details. 
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the opposition were that the campaign period was too short and that 
too many restrictions hampered the activities of candidates, especially 
during the second half of the campaign when rallies were sponsored by 
the government. They also protested that political advertisements 
were not allowed on television. The reply was: Taiwan has more elec-
tions than most countries and for that reason the election campaigns 
have to be shorter in duration and restricted, and that public opinion 
polls reflected strong support for keeping political advertisements off 
of television. 
Another complaint about the Election and Recall Law was that it 
failed to control "money politics." Numerous proposals were made to 
resolve this problem, but due to Taiwan's prosperity the role money 
played in elections seemed difficult to change. It was generally per-
ceived that laws could be enforced to check blatant vote-buying but 
that other uses of money could not be stopped. Opposition politicians 
criticized KMT candidates for spending so much money that they 
were in effect buying elective office. Yet opposition spending was also 
a problem, and it was growing considerably faster than the spending of 
Nationalist Party candidates. 
In 1986 the Election and Recall Law was amended to change the 
procedure for electing members of the Control Yuan-the oversight 
branch of government in Taiwan. Neither the KMT nor the DPP, 
however, pushed strongly for further change. More far-reaching 
changes in the law were discussed in 1988. And in early 1989, know-
ing of the coming December election, both sides took up the issue 
again. There was considerable public debate. Officials and politicians 
bickered; they also compromised. 
In January 1989, the Legislative Yuan enacted a new Law of 
Election and Recall of Public Officials, though it was in reality a revi-
sion of the previous law. (See Appendix I) This updated law took into 
account the end of martial law and the transfer of controls over elec-
tion campaigns from military to civilian organizations. It also re-
flected the passage of the Civic Organizations Law. Finally, it sought 
to accomodate expanded political participation, while giving govern-
ment officials more authority to crack down on certain abuses of the 
electoral system, especially in the area of vote fraud. 
The KMT viewed the new law as liberalizing the rules of 
campaigning, thus making elections more competitive. In other 
words, it created a "level playing field." KMT leaders did not view 
the new law as advantageous to their party. Some KMT hardliners 
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opposed the new law, characterizing it as unnecessary. 21 
The DPP described most of the revisions or new provisions in the 
law as concessions. However, DPP leaders note that it added more 
restrictions in some realms, and most important, maintained a host of 
laws handicapping any opposition party. DPP spokespersons com-
plained that limits on the number of campaign meetings, campaign 
assistants, offices, and sound trucks remained almost unchanged. 
They remonstrated about many regulations: the prohibition on joint 
headquarters, restrictions on parades, and limits on places where cam-
paign speeches could be given. The law against students serving as 
campaign aides, guidelines on placing campaign posters (too limiting), 
and the requirement that only registered helpers could speak for a can-
didate (while barring other workers from saying anything for a candi-
date or even presenting video or audio tapes) were also condemned. 
DPP officials regarded all of these regulations as discriminating 
against the opposition while benefitting the KMT. 
DPP leaders blasted provisions in the law banning political adver-
tising on television. They characterized this restriction as an unveiled 
effort to give the KMT monopoly-control over political advertising of 
an important kind, since the KMT owned or controlled the television 
networks. They did not accept the argument that public opinion 
surveys reflected majority support for the ban or that it kept campaign 
costs down. Opposition candidates also universally attacked the lim-
ited campaign period and the Election Commission's constraining 
hold over campaigning during the last days of the campaign period. 
They further protested that only a few campaign activities were legal 
and that campaign spending was too limited. KMT candidates said 
little about most of these issues, but did agree with the DPP that cam-
paign spending was too restricted. 
Other provisions in the new law were controversial but did not 
seem to favor the KMT or the DPP. These included a lowering of the 
filing fee by fifty percent for party candidates (to discourage "whimsi-
cal candidates" (meaning independent or non-party candidates) and a 
change allowing united campaign headquarters. Both hurt independ-
ent candidates and discouraged candidates from running without 
party approval, thereby favoring a two-party system. 
A public financing provision in the revised law was new. Candi-
dates receiving three-fourths or more of the vote needed to win would 
receive N.T.$10 (39 cents) per vote under the new law. Campaign 
donations were also made tax deductible, but were limited to 
21. See Chapter 3 for further discussion of this point. 
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N.T.$20,000 for a candidate and N.T.$200,000 for a party per individ-
ual (not to exceed twenty percent of that person's pre-tax income), and 
N.T.$300,000 and N.T.$3,000,000 respectively for businesses.22 This 
was intended to reduce the growing problem of "money politics," 
though many observers thought it would have little effect. Moreover, 
it seemed likely to increase the problem of interest group politics. 
Finally the new election law limited the membership of the Cen-
tral Election Commission so that no more than half of the Commis-
sions could come from one political party. By election time, however, 
the DPP had not nominated a representative to the Commission. 
Changes in the law also reduced the number of votes members of the 
Taiwan Provincial Assembly and the Taipei and Kaohsiung city coun-
cils could cast for Control Yuan seats from one-half to one-third of the 
seats. The DPP agreed with this change. DPP legislators, on the 
other hand, protested a change that shortened from two years to six 
months the period between electoral rezonings. While they agreed 
with rezoning to accommodate population shifts, they accused the 
KMT of trying to gerrymander and make changes too close to election 
time. 
Legalizing New Political Parties 
The Republic of China, technically speaking, had a multi-party 
system before the formation of the Democratic Progressive Party. The 
Young China Party, formed in 1923, moved to Taiwan in 1949 and 
sponsored candidates for various elections after that. In 1946, prior to 
the 1948 election when the government of the Republic of China gov-
erned both sides of the Taiwan Strait, the China Democratic Socialist 
Party formed to promote a platform supporting constitutional gov-
ernment. This party also moved to Taiwan and fielded candidates in 
subsequent elections. However, both parties were regarded by most as 
something between loyal opposition parties and adjuncts of the KMT, 
but closer to the latter. Neither were considered serious contenders 
for political power. Neither helped make electoral politics 
competitive. 
Some observers had thought these two parties might change and 
win broad support in a milieu of promised party competition. They 
were already legal and had an edge. But this was not to be the case. 
Meanwhile, critics of the government and the ruling party in Tai-
wan and supporters of democratic reform had complained that Tai-
wan did not have a true opposition party and the reason for this was 
22. See Chapter 4 for further details. 
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that the formation of new political parties was prohibited by the Tem-
porary Provisions of the Constitution. Opposition politicians con-
tended, in fact, that this made democratization in any genuine sense 
impossible. Many Nationalist Party members agreed. 
As noted above, the formation of the tangwai in the 1970s recti-
fied this situation to some extent, but it was not a completely success-
ful palliative. More was needed. In 1986, President Chiang Ching-
kuo announced that the ban on new parties would be lifted, constitut-
ing another major step in the development of a two-party or multi-
party system. Subsequently the Democratic Progressive Party an-
nounced its formation, and Taiwan had a genuine opposition party. 
The DPP, however, had to compete in the 1986 election without being 
technically a legal party. This, critics contended, was a handicap. 
Others argued that it was simply a matter of time before that situation 
would be rectified and that the DPP was treated during and after the 
election campaign as a political party. 
However, at this juncture it was unclear whether the DPP would 
become the sole or major opposition party, or whether there would be 
many contending new parties. The pundits were uncertain. 
The lifting of martial law in July 1987 served as a signal for new 
political parties to form. By the end of March of the next year nine 
new political parties had announced: the China Liberty Party in July 
1987; the Democratic Liberty Party and the Labor Party in September 
1987; the China Democratic Justice Party in October; the China Peo-
ple's Party and the Neo-Socialist Party in November; the United Dem-
ocratic Party, the Chinese Republican Party, and the China 
Unification Party in March 1988. These parties were of various polit-
ical stripe, right and left on the political spectrum. Three other parties 
were in the process of organizing: the China Patriotic Party, the Wo-
men's Party, and the Fanners' Party. 
By late 1988 it appeared that the formation of so many political 
parties might fragment the opposition and sap the Democratic Pro-
gressive Party's base of support. The Labor Party seemed to be a spe-
cial threat to the DPP's dominant status as the opposition. The 
chairman of the Labor Party had been a member of the DPP and was 
elected to the Legislative Yuan. He appeared to have considerable 
union respect and a base of support among Taiwan's nearly nine mil-
lion industrial workers. The Labor Party was at odds with the DPP 
over labor reform, the independence issue, and a number of other 
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matters. 23 
Meanwhile the DPP declined to register with the government and 
remained split over the issue of Taiwan independence. Throughout 
1988, three Democratic Progressive Party factions struggled over in-
dependence and related issues. The Kang Ning-hsiang faction advo-
cated democratic reform as its main objective. The New Tide group 
advocated independence. The Formosa Faction opposed making the 
independence issue a part of the DPP's platform. The DPP seemed 
able to raise funds; yet membership, by mid-1988, had increased only 
from seven thousand to ten thousand-far short of its goal. 24 
On January 20, 1989, the Legislative Yuan passed into law the 
revised Civic Organization Law. (See Appendix II) This law in es-
sence formalized what already existed: party competition. However, 
it also encouraged still more new parties to form, and by mid-year 
Taiwan had over thirty political parties. A multi-party system seemed 
to be evolving, or at least many observers so speculated. Others 
opined that most, perhaps all, of the new parties would have little or 
no impact on the election and that party competition would involve 
the KMT and the DPP only-in essence a two-party election.25 Tai-
wan's party system seemed to be in the process of evolving in an un-
certain direction. 
Besides encouraging new political parties to form and legalizing 
the DPP, the new law restated provisions in the National Security 
Law that political parties must not violate the constitution, advocate 
communism, or advocate secessionism. The law also declared that 
parties must organize and function in accordance with democratic 
principles. This implied both, that the KMT must continue the inter-
nal reform launched in the summer of 1988 at the KMT 13th Party 
Congress, and that the DPP must focus on electoral politics instead of 
protest politics. 
DPP leaders did not like references in the law to the 1987 Na-
tional Security Law. The New Tide faction of the DPP, which was 
more radical and more vocal, promised to keep the independence issue 
(which could be construed to mean secessionism) issue in their plat-
form and vowed to talk about it during the campaign. The Formosa 
Faction disagreed. The issue threatened to cause the DPP to split. 
23. Shim Jae Hoon, "Clarion Call to Workers," Far Eastern Economic Review, January 
21, 1988, pp. 18 -19. 
24. Shim Jae Hoon, "Divided But Growing," Far Eastern Economic Review, June 23, 
1988, p. 33. 
25. See John F. Copper, "The Evolution of Political Parties in Taiwan," Asian Affairs, 
Spring 1989, pp. 3-12. 
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KMT leaders, or at least most of them, did not like the provision in 
the law which gave equal access to the media for all political parties 
and did not give any sign of willingly abandoning their advantages in 
this regard. Some complained of the law's mandate to continue to 
democratize the KMT from within. They felt democracy had already 
influenced the party's mode of carrying on business enough. 
Looking beyond the complaints, the new law changed Taiwan's 
political system from a one-party system (if one recognizes that the 
two older minor parties were not competing parties) to a multiparty 
system. It made fully legal the formation of not only parties, but 
party-related organizations. It also set guidelines for and formalized 
political party activity. This, of course, had a major impact on Tai-
wan: polity and on the democratization process. 
Furthermore, the new law made the 1989 election a genuine and 
legal multiparty contest, the first ever in Taiwan. Because new political 
parties were legal, the scope of their activities increased, as did their 
prestige, based on a new and important legitimacy. However, the effect 
of this on electoral politics remained to be seen even after the 1989 
election. 
The Voluntary Retirement of Senior Parliamentarians 
Inasmuch as the government of the Republic of China on Taiwan 
claims jurisdiction over the mainland of China as well as Taiwan and 
its official policy is to recapture the mainland, it is a kind of govern-
ment-in-exile. This explains (among other reasons) why it has kept in 
office members of those governmental bodies elected when the govern-
ment ruled the mainland. 
As years have passed this has meant that a large number of the 
representatives of the elected organs of government-the democrati-
cally chosen ones-became seen as holdovers from a past era. They 
represented a dream of reconquering the mainland, a dream that had 
faded. Opposition politicians and supporters of democracy alike com-
plained that the aging parliamentarians did not represent an electorate 
in Taiwan and were thus an obstacle to democracy. They also mocked 
them for their inability to do legislative work and for their resistance 
to change. 
In 1969, through supplementary elections, seats were added to 
represent Taiwan. More followed. In addition, the system became 
more representative of the electorate under the jurisdiction of the gov-
ernment, and, therefore, more democratic, because of the attrition of 
the older parliamentarians. In fact, this seemed to be solving the prob-
lem. Many observers looked at the actuarial charts which indicated 
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that the elder parliamentarians' influence would soon be a thing of the 
past and argued that nothing needed to be done: time would solve the 
problem. 
However, the speed of democratization in Taiwan was so fast that 
attrition was not enough and something had to be done to solve the 
problem. The "old guard" had become seen as the last bastion of an 
autocratic system. The unelected (in Taiwan) parliamentarians thus 
became the focus of opposition attacks on the system, and an embar-
rassment to the country because the issue was so frequently cited by 
the Western media. As a result, in 1986 President Chiang Ching-kuo 
included resolving this situation among his recommended (or prom-
ised) "important reforms." 
The promise of reforms raised expectations. Subsequently the is-
sue became more controversial and opposition politicians, particularly 
DPP leaders, began to criticize the government and the ruling KMT 
even more harshly on this matter. The issue became very contentious 
and polarizing. 
The KMT responded: offering a plan, later approved by the Na-
tional Security Council, to give the three elected bodies of government 
a membership of 579: 375 for the National Assembly, 150 for the Leg-
islative Yuan, 54 for the Control Yuan. All would be locally elected, 
or chosen to represent professional groups or the Overseas Chinese. 
The National Assembly would be so constituted after the 1989 elec-
tion. The Legislative Yuan would reach 150 in 1992, after growing 
from 98 to 130 following the December 1989 election. The Control 
Yuan would reach its maximum size after the 1992 election. This pro-
posal assumed, of course, a bill to retire senior parliamentarians.26 
Supporters of the KMT's approach to the problem of getting rid 
of officials elected when the government was in China, and those ap-
pointed as replacements for these officials, said that phasing out the 
older representatives was the only proper way to handle the issue 
given the Chinese respect for age. They also argued it was the consti-
tutional way because the older delegates were elected (though they 
were later frozen in office) or had legally replaced an elected represen-
tative. Similarly they contended that the changes cited above would 
create bodies of government of optimum size to be effective in the 
functions for which they are responsible. (Scholars had long main-
tained that the Legislative Yuan was too large to carry out intelligent 
debate.) Finally, KMT leaders asserted that change should be gradual 
so as not to give the impression that Taipei was adopting a two-China 
26. See Chapter 4. 
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policy, which might provoke Beijing to take military action against 
Taiwan. (Proposals were also made to retain some token mainland 
representatives, though this was not given much consideration inas-
much as this might be accomplished through the Overseas Chinese 
representation at a later time.) 
While the DPP basically agreed with the plan, most DPP and 
other opposition leaders remained critical, in fact highly critical. 
They also saw it as an issue which allowed them to make political 
capital. Thus, they demanded that all of the old parliamentarians step 
down immediately. They also denounced the size of the severance pay 
proposed by the KMT, which they said was outrageous considering 
the size of military retirement pay and the fact the delegates had done 
very little work. 
In March 1988, the DPP organized a demonstration parade in the 
suburban city of Neihu, where many of the elder parliamentarians 
lived. The DPP hoped to get some of the members of the Legislative 
Yuan to retire before the December 1989 election so as to bring up for 
election more seats for which the DPP might compete. Led by Ju 
Gao-jeng, the DPP's "Rambo," the march became violent and several 
people were injured. Ju subsequently published a list of the telephone 
numbers of the elder parliamentarians, which he called the "old 
thieves," and called on the public to telephone them and ask them to 
step down from office so that democracy might prevail. Many senior 
legislators reported receiving large numbers of harassing telephone 
calls as a result. 
At the end of 1988, at the time legislation was being debated in 
the Legislative Yuan to deal with this problem, the average age of the 
non-Taiwan representatives was 80. They held two-thirds of the seats 
of the Legislative Yuan and the Control Yuan. They held an even 
larger percentage of the National Assembly, which elects the Presi-
dent. Yet they were dying or becoming inactive at the rate of nearly 
one a week. 
But the DPP could not wait. Its delegates in the Legislative Yuan 
tried to filibuster to force legislation which would deal with the prob-
lem immediately, and DPP spokesmen demanded that all seats be 
elected from Taiwan only. The DPP perceived that the public sup-
ported their cause and kept up the pressure. Violence in the Legisla-
tive Yuan ensued. Finally the bill got through the committees.27 
In February 1989 the Voluntary Retirement of Senior Parliamen-
27. See "Taiwan" in Asia 1990 Yearbook (Hong Kong: Far Eastern Economic Review, 
Ltd., 1989), p.227. 
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tarians Act was passed by the Legislative Yuan. (See Appendix III) 
The KMT (though not many hardliners) and the DPP supported the 
Act. The KMT said it would make the system truly democratic. DPP 
politicians, however, noted that, because of the presence of the old 
parliamentarians, they still could not rule the country even if their 
party won a landslide election. The problem was not yet resolved and 
would not be resolved before the December 1989 election. 
CHAPTER 2 
TAIWAN'S 1985 NATIONWIDE LOCAL ELECTIONS 
Background 
On November 16, 1985, voters in Taiwan went to the polls to 
elect candidates to four categories of local office: 21 city mayors and 
county magistrates (5 and 16, respectively), 77 members of the Taiwan 
Provincial Assembly, 51 members of the Taipei City Council, and 42 
members of the Kaohsiung City Council-a total of 191 posts. 1 Elec-
tions to these positions have regularly been held every four years since 
1951 or before. It was the tenth election for the Taiwan Provincial 
Assembly and the eleventh for the other offices. 
This series of local elections was also the second of its type since 
the "watershed" election of 1980 (to elect the National Assembly and 
the Legislative Yuan, or the legislative branch of government) when 
party competition between the Nationalist party, or Kuomintang, and 
the nonparty, or tangwai, candidates reflected marked political 
change, democratization, and what some perceived as an evolving two-
party system in the Republic of China. These elections were also con-
ducted with participants cognizant of the fact that violence had 
erupted during elections eight years before. Finally, this series of elec-
tions was held in the context of what some regarded as a "crisis of 
confidence" for the Kuomintang, due to a number of unfortunate 
events and scandals over the previous year or two that had hurt its 
image. In addition, the opposition was viewed as factionalized and 
unable to overcome internal strife. 2 
This series of local elections is important to the political process 
in Taiwan for a number of reasons. 3 First, the elections are not really 
local inasmuch as the entire nation goes to the polls at the same time. 
Hence they might properly be called unified, or nationwide, local elec-
tions. Furthermore, the elections are national in the sense that the 
I. For background on Taiwan's previous elections, see John F. Copper, with George 
P. Chen (1984), Taiwan's Elections: Democratization and Political Development in theRe-
public of China (Baltimore: Univ. of Maryland School of Law, 1984). 
2. See C. Goldstein "Testing Confidence: The KMT Seeks a New Mandate After a 
Year of Scandals," Far Eastern Economic Review, November 21, 1985, p. 20. 
3. See Copper, note I pp. 77-78. 
(27) 
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Republic of China is now seen by many as synonymous or cotermi-
nous with Taiwan plus some small outlying islands under its control, 
and all its territory and citizens were involved in these elections. The 
Taiwan Provincial Assembly is a national organ of government in that 
it represents all the citizens of the nation. Moreover, the entire Pro-
vincial Assembly is elected every election, making it more sensitive to 
changes in public opinion than the National Assembly and the Legis-
lative Yuan. 
Second, the Taiwan Provincial Assembly has legislative power 
(although it is not considerable) that in some ways is vital to the polit-
ical process in Taiwan; while the magistrates, mayors, and city coun-
cils have both considerable legislative and executive power at the local 
level. Candidates elected to the latter offices control substantial budg-
ets and render decisions on important administrative matters that af-
fect their district as well as the nation as a whole. 
Third, unlike Japan and some other countries in the region, those 
elected to positions of local government in Taiwan are the future lead-
ers ofthe country. As they have in the past, they will inevitably rise to 
assume important positions in the national government. 
Fourth, prior to this election the Republic of China's election 
laws had been revamped, and changes in them needed to be tried and 
tested. The previous laws had proven faulty in a number of ways, and 
their intent (and in some senses their legality) had been tested and 
questioned in the elections four years before. Thus the new set of laws 
would be tested in this election. 
Finally, many observers pondered what kind of strategy the Kuo-
mintang would adopt in this election in light of a number of mistakes 
and examples of poor leadership to which critics pointed and could 
cite as evidence of needed changes. On the other hand, many others 
were uncertain as to whether the Kuomintang's mistakes could be de-
fined (in the minds of the electorate) as incompetence or poor perform-
ance, as opposed to circumstances or bad luck. Similarly, observers 
wondered if the opposition, which seemed to be fragmented and un-
able to offer a credible alternative agenda, could do any better than it 
had in the past. The opposition candidates seemed to have the oppor-
tunity; but could they capitalize on it? 
The Campaign and Its Issues 
Included in the Election and Recall Law was a provision (un-
changed from the old laws) which limited the duration of the cam-
paign to ten days prior to the election. The campaign was held in two 
parts: first, a five day privately managed campaign period, followed by 
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a public period that lasted another five days and was run by the Elec-
tion Commission. Though the campaign period is short by most stan-
dards, it is almost identical to the way elections have been run in the 
past and resembles those conducted in a number of parliamentary sys-
tems. (Taiwan's political system is both parliamentary and 
presidential.) 
New provisions in the Election and Recall Law restricted each 
candidate from holding more than six forums per day during the pri-
vate campaign period; none of these forums could last more than two 
hours. As in the past, candidates were not allowed to use radio and 
television advertisements, even though many had complained about 
this ban. Many compared Taiwan's polity in this regard to the political 
systems of Western democracies throughout the world. Opposition 
candidates also charged it was a much greater disadvantage for them 
than for Kuomintang candidates, though in view of the costs involved 
and the number of KMT candidates, many say that this is not true. 4 
In any event, the Election Commission had the support of public opin-
ion on this issue and would not rescind its ban. Tighter restrictions 
were also placed on the use of campaign vehicles or sound trucks (each 
candidate allowed only three), campaign posters (which were not al-
lowed in public places except those designated), campaign handouts 
(restricted in size and in some other ways), and campaign spending 
(limited, though few had any confidence that this rule could be 
enforced). 
Those critical of the new election rules argued that they would 
reduce public interest, participation in the campaign, and voter turn-
out. Many candidates complained that certain restrictions singled 
them out and did not hurt their opposition-though these charges were 
made by so many candidates from both sides that unfairness was not, 
in the final analysis, a very credible charge. Those who favored the 
stricter new election rules said that they made the campaign more or-
derly and less disruptive of life during the campaign period. They also 
contended that the rules reduced the chances of people being hurt dur-
ing the elections by firecrackers (which were banned) and rowdiness, 
and reflected the "maturing" of democracy in Taiwan. 
Positions to be filled by the choice of the electorate totaled 191, 
with 357 candidates entering the race-including 157 Kuomintang can-
didates (18 for mayors and magistrates, 60 for Provincial Assembly 
4. SeeM. Shao, "Taiwan Voting May Highlight KMT's Setbacks,"Asian Wall Street 
Journal, November 6, 1989: p 1; C. Goldstein, "Chipping Away at the KMT," Far Eastern 
Economic Review, November 28, 1989: pp. 13-14. 
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seats, 44 for Taipei City Council and 35 for Kaohsiung City Council), 
45 "unauthorized" Kuomintang candidates, 2 Young China Party 
candidates, 44 tangwai candidates (7 for mayors and magistrates, 18 
for Provincial Assembly, 11 for Taipei City Council, and 8 for Kaohsi-
ung City Council), and over 100 "others" or independents. The 
number of candidates declined slightly before the election as several 
candidates dropped out. The number of candidates per elective posi-
tion was down slightly, at less than two candidates per post. 5 
In August a core of tangwai candidates met and formed the Can-
didates Aid Group. In September this organization produced a slate 
of unified candidates and endeavored to write a party platform. The 
Candidate Aid Group also attempted to find an acceptable way of 
choosing among competing tangwai candidates in each election dis-
trict so that they would not compete with each other and waste voting 
strength, as had happened in past elections. 6 Tangwai leaders and offi-
cial candidates also sought to avoid the polarization between radical 
and moderate groups which had occurred in the last election, resulting 
in a less effective appeal to the electorate. 
Tangwai and other opposition politicians harped on a number of 
issues that related to Kuomintang mistakes or "misgovernance" and a 
higher level of uncertainty about the future of the country; these is-
sues collectively produced what they said was a crisis of confidence. 
Among the charges of mishandling governmental affairs, the opposi-
tion frequently cited the case of Henry Liu. Henry Liu was a San 
Francisco-based writer and businessman who had been killed by the 
Bamboo Union gang at the behest of the head of Military Intelligence 
in Taiwan. The incident strained relations with the United States and 
provoked a subsequent Congressional inquiry that linked the murder 
to continued U.S. arms sales to Taiwan. Also mentioned were 1)the 
scandal concerning the Tenth Credit Cooperative (a credit society that 
collapsed, resulting in individual financial losses reportedly in the bil-
lions of dollars that affected the economic stability of the country); 
2)two serious coal mine disasters; 3)a case of poisoned wine marketed 
by the government wine and tobacco monopoly; and 4)the arrest of a 
Los Angeles-based newspaper owner and a naturalized U.S. citizen on 
S. See "The ROC's Local Elections Draw 357 Registered candidates,'' Free China 
Journal, October 21-27,1985, p.l. 
6. The tangwai originally planned to field 62 candidates, but decided on a lower 
number in order to prevent their candidates from competing with each other. SeeP. Liu, 
"Candidates Vie for Hearts of Electorate, Work Long Hours Visiting Constituents," Free 
China Journal, October 21-27, 1985, p. 2. 
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sedition charges for publishing pro-Communist propaganda. 7 
Related to these problems was the fact that there was no apparent 
successor to the president, although according to the Constitution 
Vice President Lee Teng-hui would become president in the event of 
the death or disability of the president. Vice President Lee, however, 
was new in his job, and his rank in the party suggested that others 
would make important decisions if he were to become president. Per-
haps even more important than the president's age was talk about Pre-
mier Yu Kuo-hua's alleged inability to serve in that important office 
and his involvement in the Tenth Credit Union affair. In short, the 
issue of succession at the top had never existed before; nor had it trou-
bled so many people. 
Opposition candidates also blamed the government and the ruling 
party for the downturn in the economy and the increased rate of un-
employment. (Economic growth in the fourth quarter was 4.1 per-
cent, compared to 10.5 percent in 1984. Unemployment was slightly 
higher: 2.46 percent in the second quarter, compared to 2.44 percent 
in 1985.)8 The opposition related these two problems to the previously 
mentioned issues. 
The opposition also complained that the Kuomintang was an "of-
ficial" party in a system where political parties were banned, and they 
made the connection in terms of government malfeasance and mis-
takes. Similarly, they remonstrated that opposition candidates were 
not allowed to form a political party and were thus at a serious disad-
vantage in the campaign. 9 Related to the latter complaint, tangwai 
candidates charged that the Kuomintang had control of the media and 
used it to its advantage in the campaign, while almost all tangwai pub-
lications were banned by the government. They similarly railed 
against the system that allowed the appointment-rather than the elec-
tion-of the mayors of Taipei and Kaohsiung, and the governor of Tai-
wan, as well as a number of other important posts. 
The Kuomintang's rebuttal was that the Henry Liu case occurred 
because of the actions of two or three overzealous government offi-
cials, such actions could and did take place in every government in the 
world, and such behavior should not discredit either the government 
or the Nationalist party. As far as the Tenth Credit Cooperative scan-
7. See Goldstein, note 2; and Shao, note 4. 
8. For these and other recent economic statistics on Taiwan, see Free China Journal 
October 21-27, 1985, p. 4. ' 
9. While it is true that the formation of "new" political parties is forbidden by Jaw in 
Taiwan, according to most observers the tangwai is a political party or has all the trap-
pings. It had a "party" platform. a campaign, a flag, and a budget. 
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dal was concerned, it had ended in the punishment of responsible offi-
cials: both the Minister of Finance and the Minister of Economic 
Affairs had stepped down. Off the record, they averred that such 
problems occur in a free market economy, that there is no public sup-
port for any other economic system, and that Kuomintang manage-
ment of the economy had been excellent in the past according to some 
accounts, based on GNP growth, the best in the world in 1984. The 
coal mine disasters, the wine poisoning, and the Los Angeles newspa-
per owner's arrest were called minor accidents or mistakes. 
Regarding the precipitous drop in economic growth and the rise 
in unemployment, Kuomintang candidates said that Taiwan's eco-
nomic problems were a product of "fundamental" problems in the 
world economy and that Taiwan was doing better economically than 
most other nations, notwithstanding the slump. They pointed out that 
Singapore, a nation frequently likened to Taiwan as one of the miracle-
growth nations and one that had also experienced outstanding eco-
nomic performance in 1984, had in recent months experienced an eco-
nomic decline much more serious than Taiwan's. The KMT 
maintained that the rise in unemployment was negligible, and unem-
ployment was in any event extremely low by world standards. 
Kuomintang party officials and candidates alike sought to stress 
their record of achievement in terms of economic growth and political 
stability. They also boasted of political development and democracy 
and defended Taiwan's political system as one that had been markedly 
improved and was supported by the large majority of the population in 
its present form. Informally, they countered the opposition charges of 
control of the media and the use of the government agencies for party 
purposes, saying that opposition publications were banned because 
tangwai owners of these publications wanted them banned so as to 
make a charge of censorship. They also pointed out that despite bans 
they were readily available to anyone who wanted to read them. 10 Re-
garding government-Kuomintang complicity, they replied that the 
government had the right to publicize its accomplishments and that 
the Kuomintang's so-called media blitz was simply a well-organized 
campaign effort that used Taiwan's successes as the basis of campaign 
slogans and the publicizing of Kuomintang candidates' records. 
It is doubtful whether these contentions were really major issues 
in terms of affecting the voters' decisions regarding different candi-
10. This writer was in Taiwan during the campaign and the election and was able to 
purchase banned tangwai publications simply by asking for them. In some cases they were 
openly displayed in bookstores. In fact, the author was unaware at the time that the 
magazines had been banned. 
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dates. In late October 1985, less than a month before the election, the 
China Times (one of Taiwan's largest newspapers) conducted a survey 
of candidates' views on election issues. This poll indicated that the 
major concerns of the electorate (as viewed by the candidates) varied 
significantly from the Jist of errors and mismanagement attributed to 
the Kuomintang by the opposition cited above. 11 At the top of the list 
of issues was improving traffic. In fact, this was the leading issue as 
seen by the candidates overall as well as in all categories of candidates 
except those running for Taipei and Kaohsiung City Council seats. In 
Taipei the major issue was strengthening the national police force and 
keeping public order, and in Kaohsiung it was eliminating public 
hazards. In all categories of candidates, preventing public hazards 
and strengthening the national police while keeping social order were 
number two and three in terms of popularity. Other popular issues in 
a descending order of rank were administrative renovation; adminis-
trative efficiency; labor rights and welfare; tourism; increased pay for 
military personnel, government workers, and schoolteachers; better 
education; and stronger social welfare. 
According to this same survey, candidates from metropolitan ar-
eas reflected concerns quite different from candidates in rural areas: 
metropolitan candidates stressed social welfare and local (economic) 
development; rural candidates focused on ideology and administrative 
change, principles of self-government, political prisoners, and tempo-
rary emergency laws. 
Another discrepancy existed between voters' concerns and the 
content of campaign speeches in that candidates did not focus on the 
issues the polls said the voters were most concerned about; instead 
campaign speeches focused much more on environmental problems, 
sanitation, and water control. In fact, these three topics seemed to be 
on the minds of almost all candidates, Kuomintang and tangwai alike, 
judging from campaign speeches during the Election Commission-
sponsored debates. 12 In short, there was a big difference between what 
both the KMT and the opposition candidates said in their platforms 
and how they perceived issues and felt they could get elected. As is 
true in all democratic elections, this had characterized Taiwan's past 
elections. The gap, however, seemed a bit larger this time. 
According to law, candidates could not advocate communism or 
independence-i.e., abandoning the One China ideal. Everything else 
11. Cited in Donegal's Yu-ching, "Traffic Problems Listed Top Campaign Issue," Free 
China Journal, November 2-9, 1985, p 2. 
12. This is based on personal observations as well as those of another observer of the 
elections and the answers given when a number of other observers were queried about this. 
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seemed to be within bounds. Since communism has almost no appeal 
in Taiwan to any segment of the electorate, few candidates even 
touched on the issue in any way. Those who did seemed to do so only 
as a means of attracting attention, after which they dropped the issue 
or clarified their anti-communist position. A large number of opposi-
tion candidates, however, spoke of self-determination, which many 
government officials and Kuomintang candidates interpreted to mean 
Taiwanese independence and therefore cried foul. 13 In this sense the 
election laws and gentlemen's agreements that had been hammered 
out before the election failed to work during the campaign. Neverthe-
less, government officials chose not to push the issue, while Kuomin-
tang candidates tried to defuse it by claiming that self-determination 
applies only to people who do not have a nation. Some even targetted 
the independence issue, announcing that they did not advocate it inas-
much as the country (meaning the Republic of China) was already 
sovereign and, therefore, independent; or some simply made a joke of 
the issue. 
Some opposition candidates brought up foreign policy problems, 
especially the government's failure to maintain diplomatic relations 
with a larger number of nations and with important international or-
ganizations, and Taiwan's hackneyed responses to Beijing's overture 
to negotiate reunification. Some broached the matter of martial law 
and extraconstitutional provisions that validate or rationalize special 
security measures. However, these issues were not very effective in 
winning voter attention or support. 
During the campaign, opposition candidates claimed government 
harassment in the form of videotaping candidates' speeches and 
photographing audiences at campaign rallies and the like. The Elec-
tion Commission claimed that this was the same right or freedom that 
the media or any individual might exercise, though it admitted that 
tapes and photographs would be used after the election as legal evi-
dence in the event that election law violations resulted in charges being 
brought against any candidate. While there were accusations back 
and forth about this during the election, it seemed fairly clear that it 
would not escalate into a serious controversy. 
Campaign activities, while noisy and boisterous, were somewhat 
more subdued than in the past. This was especially true in Taipei. 
The campaign, however, was not lacking in antics and sensationalism. 
One candidate campaigned on horseback. Another wore a surgical 
13. According to one observer, self-determination was mentioned less frequently than 
in past elections. See Shao, note 4. 
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mask and military equipment, trying to underscore his major cam-
paign issue-the battle against pollution. Another was carried to sev-
eral rallies and sometimes to the podium on a stretcher, claiming he 
had been poisoned by his opponents. 14 While making campaign 
promises, a number of candidates decapitated chickens (an ancient 
Buddhist ritual somewhat comparable to the Western practice of tak-
ing an oath with one hand on the Bible). Many made speeches in 
Buddhist temples concerning vital issues on their agenda. Most 
charged other candidates with mudslinging, and several threatened to 
sue for slander. 15 Both sides fielded candidates with name recognition 
and public appeal: the Kuomintang ran a basketball player, a TV host, 
and a computer wizard (who programmed his responses to a number 
of campaign issues); the tangwai used film stars and singers both on 
their ticket and as helpers in their campaign. 
The campaign was conducted in a more orderly fashion than 
usual-though it is uncertain how much of this should be attributed to 
new election rules as opposed to the maturing of the democratic 
processes in Taiwan. There was some tension in the air between Kuo-
mintang candidates and tangwai candidates; yet it was obvious that 
the former had come to accept the latter as legitimate opponents (even 
though forming a new party remained technically illegal), and the lat-
ter regarded themselves as a loyal opposition and the conscience of the 
ruling party. When Kuomintang candidates and government officials 
were asked about the illegal status of the tangwai, their general re-
sponse was that the tangwai's technical status does not reflect its true 
situation. They further stated that it was perhaps wise that it remain 
formally illegal, inasmuch as something unexpected might occur and 
the law might need to be enforced-though they did not seem to think 
such an event was very likely. When asked if they wanted to unseat 
the Kuomintang, opposition candidates spoke more of themselves as 
being a check on the power of the Kuomintang, promoters of democ-
racy, and winners of an election in the distant future. 
Several months prior to November many observers had predicted 
that the Kuomintang would do poorly at the polls. A poor perform-
ance had been anticipated because of the crisis of confidence and the 
fact that the KMT supposedly could not match its performance in 
previous elections from the point of view of superior strategy (not only 
because its leaders had been innovative in past elections, but also be-
14. This charge was made by a tangwai candidate against the KMT. He was later 
examined and found in good health. See D. Southerland, "Taiwan's Ruling Party Wins in 
Local Elections," Washington Post, November 17,1985, p. A-20. 
15. See "Election Tidbits," China Post, November 15, 1985, p. 4. 
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cause the tangwai had either copied the KMT's campaign tactics or 
had acted to offset them). As the election grew closer, it looked more 
and more as if the Kuomintang would not do badly, perhaps even 
matching its performance four years earlier. 
The Election and Its Results 
Voting took place on Saturday, November 16, without any major 
problems or incidents. Tangwai campaign workers published what 
they said was proof that some ballots were available before election 
day, suggesting that either government officials or the Kuomintang 
candidates had tried to fix the election in one district. 16 But little was 
made of this as the ballots were counted, either because the vote tally-
ing did not substantiate the charge or because those with the evidence 
chose to take the issue to court later. Thinking that the election might 
have been rigged, tangwai supporters in the city of Chung Li turned 
over a car and threw rocks when they learned that their candidate had 
lost by a very narrow margin. The candidate, however, asked his sup-
porters not to engage in violence, advising them that a recount would 
settle the matter. In the vicinity of Taipei a candidate was threatened 
with a knife during his victory parade, but he instructed his supporters 
not to attempt retaliation, thereby defusing that incident. 17 
Notwithstanding some light showers on election day and a pre-
dicted lower turnout because of more stringent election laws that 
somewhat dampened the carnival atmosphere of earlier elections, 
voter turnout was higher than usual and higher than in the unified 
local elections four years previous. Ballots were cast by 71.7 percent 
(8.1 million) of the eligible voters. As usual the turnout was higher in 
the countryside than in the cities, with the lowest turnout in Taipei. 
(The turnout for the Taiwan Provincial Assembly was 72.8 percent, 
slightly higher than in 1981. For the Taipei and Kaohsiung City 
Council it was 65.5 percent and 75.7 percent, respectively-both lower 
than in 1981.)18 
Overall, voter turnover was not only up; it actually reversed a 
decade-long slow decline. Observers, in fact, were puzzled by the 
higher turnout. More debate about issues directly relevant to the 
16. This observer received a copy of the tangwai documentation of the alleged vote 
fraud. According to several tangwai supporters, it consisted of a xeroxed copy of a ballot 
that had been available to military personnel before the election. 
17. China Post, November 15, 1985, p. 8. 
18. "Kuomintang Remains in Firm Control of Local Politics," China News, November 
17' 1985, p. 8. 
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voter, good election strategies on both sides, and an increased aware-
ness of party competition are probably the best explanations. 
Kuomintang candidates won 146 of the 191 contested seats (76.84 
percent), including 59 seats (out of 77) in the Provincial Assembly, 17 
(out of 21) mayor and magistrate races, 38 seats (out of 51) on the 
Taipei City Council, and 32 seats (out of 42) on the Kaohsiung City 
Council. 19 Considering the expectation that Kuomintang candidates 
would not fare well due to problems the party faced during the year 
and the crisis of confidence in government attributed to party leader-
ship, the Kuomintang could claim a major, or at least unexpected, 
victory. 
On the basis of electing 26 of its 44 candidates (winning 13.61 
percent of the open seats) and winning some major races, the tangwai 
also claimed victory. (Ten independent candidates won the rest of the 
seats, except one winner from the Young China party-which supports 
the KMT.) Although it still suffered from considerable factionalism 
locally, the tangwai had clearly put in office a good percentage of its 
candidates and had campaigned without splitting its ranks. Compared 
to 1981, when 19 of 31 "official" candidates won elective office, the 
tangwai's performance was much improved, having profited from its 
previous experience. 
On the basis of the total number of seats won in the previous 
election, the election was inconclusive in terms of analysts trying to 
proclaim a victor. The Kuomintang ended up with one more seat, 
though there were two more seats contested. The percentage of the 
popular vote won by the Kuomintang (71 percent) and the opposition 
(29 percent) was virtually the same as in the 1981 election. In terms of 
leadership changes at the top, the word was "keep the incumbent": the 
speaker of the Provincial Assembly, the speaker of the Taipei City 
Council, and the speaker of the Kaohsiung City Council all won. 
Overall, incumbents did better than in past elections, which suggests 
that the electorate was generally happy with the conditions of the 
country and the performance of the government. 
In the mayoral and magistrate races, the Kuomintang won 17 of 
21 races for a gain of one seat over the previous election total. Offset-
ting this gain, Tsai Ming-yao, the incumbent Kuomintang county 
chief in Kaohsiung, lost to Mrs. Yu Chen Yue-ying-one of the most 
vocal and well-known tangwai candidates. This was a hotly contested 
election, and according to some observers the defeat embarrassed the 
19. "KMT Scores High in 1985 Local Elections," Free China Journal, November 10-
17, 1985, p. 1. 
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KMT.20 Yu had lost the election to Tsai in 1981 by only 3,000 votes, 
or one-half of one percent of those ballots cast. This time she won by 
28,000 votes.21 The fact that the KMT won the magistracy race in 
nearby Pingtung County, however, suggests this was more a personal 
victory for Mrs. Yu than a KMT problem in the Kaohsiung area. 
This view is further substantiated by the fact that Yu did not have 
close ties with other tangwai candidates, and many of them criticized 
her "personal" campaign. 
In the Kaohsiung City Council race the KMT gained one seat, 
winning 38 of 51 seats in contention-or 74.5 percent of the seats.22 
Moreover, the Speaker, a Kuomintang candidate, won against a very 
vocal opposition candidate who had sued the Speaker before the elec-
tion and had lost the suit. 
In terms of change or unexpected results, the Taipei City Council 
race was the biggest. Although KMT Speaker Clement Chang was re-
elected, all eleven tangwai candidates won. Two independent candi-
dates also won. In all, the Kuomintang lost three seats. Moreover, 
most of the winning tangwai candidates were either adamant critics of 
the Kuomintang and the government or were controversial figures, or 
in some cases were both. 
For example, one of the winners was Lan Mei-chi, wife of Huang 
Tien-fu, a highly vocal opponent of the government widely known as 
the brother of one of the activists jailed following the Kaohsiung riots 
in 1979. One of the biggest vote getters was Hsieh Chang-ting, a 
young lawyer who built a reputation for opposing martial law and sup-
porting consumer rights. Another successful candidate was Li Ting-
chung, the wife of Lei Yu-chi, who was in jail over a libel suit against a 
high Kuomintang official. 23 It thus seemed that for the next four years 
the opposition would have a significant voice on this 51-member coun-
cil that runs the nation's capital city. 
The Taipei City Council race has still other implications. If one 
accepts the position that "as the capital goes, so goes the nation," then 
the Taipei City Council race should be considered portentous for the 
Kuomintang. Some observers credited the opposition's victory in 
Taipei to the voters' higher level of education and political awareness 
and a significant number of younger voters. A more studied interpre-
20. "Nationalists Sweep Taiwan Polls, But Lose Key Area,'' Japan Times, November 
18, 1985, p. 4. 
21. Goldstein, note 4, p.14. 
22. China News Agency, November 18, 1985 in Foreign Broadcasting Information Serv-
ices, November 21, 1985, p. 2. 
23. For a complete list of names of winners and their "party" affiliations, see ibid. 
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tation suggests that the voters were more strongly influenced than the 
rest of the country by Kuomintang problems and the crisis of confi-
dence. For all intents and purposes, the collapse of the Tenth Credit 
Cooperative affected the residents of the Taipei area; the scandal had 
hardly any impact elsewhere. The voters of Taipei were also much 
more aware of a leadership vacuum in regard to President Chiang 
Ching-kuo's successor; and they were more concerned about problems 
the nation faced in dealing with Beijing, the United States, and other 
foreign policy issues. 
An alternative explanation is that the tangwai was much better 
organized in Taipei than elsewhere and it managed to formulate a bet-
ter campaign strategy (especially to prevent its candidates from com-
peting against each other) than in the past. How much it accounts for 
the tangwai victory in Taipei is difficult to say. In any case, the KMT 
had cause for concern. 
On the other hand, the KMT lost only 3 seats. The party, more-
over, fielded 38 successful candidates out of 49. This is a 77.5 percent 
record of winning candidates, better than the KMT did elsewhere. 24 
Also, the percentage of votes for the KMT in Taipei equaled its record 
elsewhere. In short, KMT organizers ostensibly were familiar with 
the situation in Taipei, and the outcome was not a surprise. In fact, it 
may have been in part facilitated by the fact that the KMT diverted its 
energies elsewhere, knowing its limitations in Taipei and predicting 
defeat. This being the case, the KMT could be expected to recoup its 
losses in the next election. 
The Kuomintang's defeat in Taipei may also suggest that its strat-
egy of nominating younger, better-educated candidates, not only to 
project an image of a party keeping up with the trends but also to 
offset charges of "money politics," did not work. Before the election 
the party boasted that the average age of its candidates in the Taipei 
race was slightly over forty-three years. It claimed that more than 68 
percent had completed university education-over 20 percent of them 
had graduate degrees-and around 25 percent were new (with an aver-
age age of thirty-five). During the campaign many candidates were 
described as being specialists in law, the media, public administration, 
etc. The public seemed to be less concerned about qualifications than 
they had been in the past. It is more probable that the KMT's policy 
of advertising candidates' qualifications, especially educational and 
professional, did not have the impact the party anticipated because the 
24. Ibid. 
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public did not regard it as novel, having been exposed to it in the pre-
vious election. Furthermore, this time the opposition used it as well. 
The perception of the Kuomintang's performance outside Taipei 
was certainly better. The Tenth Credit Cooperative scandal was not a 
big issue outside Taipei, and the Henry Liu case and foreign policy 
issues generally seemed of less concern to voters in areas distant from 
the capital. In the countryside, KMT candidates appealed to con-
servative voters more effectively and showed a better understanding of 
local issues than their competition. Similarly, outside Taipei the Kuo-
mintang was able to split the opposition and/or exploit factionalism 
within opposition ranks with considerable ease. 
Unlike the Taipei City Council contest, the Taipei county magis-
trate race was not a case of the KMT faltering or losing. You Ching-a 
German-trained lawyer and an outspoken critic of the KMT who 
earned national fame for defending several of the best known defend-
ants in the Kaohsiung riot trials in 1980-lost to KMT -incumbent Lin 
Feng-cheng by more than 250,000 votes out of one million cast. Ana-
lysts said that his slogan of "recovering Taipei county" (which sati-
rized the government's policy of recovering the mainland) and his talk 
of self-determination and the need to form a new political party-both 
considered illegal or on the fringes-seemed to do little to ingratiate him 
with the electorate. Tangwai supporters, however, said that You's 
performance showed that the tangwai had made inroads into an area 
that was formerly KMT turf. Thus they claimed his defeat should not 
necessarily be seen as a loss.25 Plainly, it was one of the most visible 
and controversial contests. 
In contrast to the above, most of the contests for Taiwan Provin-
cial Assembly seats were not hotly or strongly contested. A partial 
explanation is that the tangwai saw better opportunities elsewhere for 
winning or taking positions whereby they could proclaim their views, 
even though the Provincial Assembly has traditionally been domi-
nated by Taiwanese and some have perceived that it could eventually 
be controlled by the opposition. In short, the Taiwan Provincial As-
sembly contest was the least exciting part of the election. Further-
more, the results were less meaningful in terms of either proclaiming a 
victory for one side or the other or in terms of assessing the nation's 
political future. 
Vote buying was, as always, a serious problem, but not noticeably 
worse than in previous elections. The major cause was Taiwan's pros-
perity-certainly not to be condemned. Perhaps vote buying can be 
25. See Goldstein, note 4. 
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kept in check through legal means and by publicizing campaign spend-
ing. No one seemed to have a better solution. 
Compared with previous elections, there were noticeably fewer 
voters influenced by candidates who appealed to their sympathies. 
This must be regarded as a positive factor, reflecting a more educated 
and objective electorate. The elected candidates' age and level of edu-
cation and experience clearly reflect the rational choices made by Tai-
wan's electorate. The winning candidates, younger and better 
educated than ever, could boast of more experience in government or 
in positions related to the offices they sought. They also boasted of 
sufficient energy to do the job, and the electorate listened. More than 
half of the winning candidates (51.8 percent) were in their forties. 
Only 13 victorious candidates were over sixty; three were in their 
twenties. 
As far as education is concerned, 68.6 percent were college edu-
cated, 73.2 percent if military institutes are counted. No victorious 
candidate had less than a high-school education. All new mayors and 
magistrates bad a college education. Of special note is the large 
number of female candidates elected: 9 of 51 ( 17.6 percent) winners of 
seats on the Taipei City Council; 6 of 42 (14.3 percent) victors in the 
Kaohsiung City Council race; and 13 of 77 (16.9 percent) elected to 
the Taiwan Provincial Assembly. On the other hand, female candi-
dates did not do exceedingly well in the magistrate and mayoral races, 
where only two women were elected. 26 
Conclusions 
The obvious conclusion to draw from the November 1985 "na-
tional" local elections is that Taiwan continued to experience signifi-
cant and meaningful political development of a democratic kind. One 
might say that this election offered more proof of democracy than 
most, since it was conducted in the context of problems and adversity. 
Because of these difficulties it would have been easy for the Kuomin-
tang to resort to authoritarian practices and induce the government to 
prohibit many of the opposition's activities. On the contrary, the 
KMT demonstrated more tolerance and patience toward the opposi-
tion than in previous elections. Similarly, the opposition could have 
26. "Backgrounds of Elected Mayors (1985), Magistrates, Provincial Assemblymen 
and City Councilmen," China Post, November 18, 1985, p. 2. Even the percentage of wo-
men (10 percent plus) who won in mayor and magistrate races is high compared to elec-
tions in most Western countries. Of the victorious female candidates 9, 6, and 13, 
respectively, were KMT. The two victorious women in mayor and magistrate races were 
independents. 
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been harder on the KMT during the campaign for its failures and 
could have been much more critical than they were. 
In terms of concluding who won the election, the only reasonable 
bottom line is that both sides won, that the country won, and that the 
process of political development won. In terms of a contest between 
the KMT and tangwai, the results plainly suggest a draw. In one 
sense, it is possible to say that both won. There were fewer defectors 
from either camp. Moreover, moderation generally prevailed in both 
camps in terms of views and election campaigning. 
If one wants to argue that the KMT won the election, the figures 
do suggest that conclusion-even though it was the narrowest of victo-
ries (one seat). The KMT also "won" in view of the predictions that it 
would lose. Several months before the campaign, most newspaper edi-
torials were pessimistic about the fate of the KMT at the polls. The 
ruling party seemed to be in considerable trouble because of the vari-
ous problems mentioned above. The KMT in some senses suffered a 
crisis of confidence. Knowing that the fate of political parties tends to 
wax and wane, with victories often resulting in overconfidence and 
defeats making the opposition work even harder, the KMT should 
have expected losses, even significant losses, in this election. But it did 
not. 
The tangwai could certainly celebrate and even claim victory be-
cause of the fact that the "party" suffered less from factionalism than 
it had in the past. It was also less split along ideological lines, and its 
election strategy was much improved. Tangwai candidates gained 
savvy from previous elections and used it in this election. One might 
also cite the fact that the tangwai did better in the most strongly con-
tested races-for mayors and magistrates. Tangwai leaders could in 
particular rejoice in the Taipei City Council victory and even claim 
that it was a bellwether. It is no doubt significant that in Taipei more 
than half of the electorate was under the age of thirty, and m.ost of 
them did not identify with the KMT in terms of party affiliation. 
There was clearly a message here regarding the tangwai's potential in 
terms of election opportunities. 
On the other hand, during this election the tangwai said much 
less than was expected about its future as a political party-even though 
it behaved more like a party than it had in the past. It rarely com-
plained that it was not allowed to become a legal party. One might 
conclude that the tangwai had become resigned to the fact that this 
was not going to happen. In other words, the KMT would not allow 
it to happen. More likely, tangwai leaders realized that it would mat-
ter very little, since the tangwai was still too divided for party status to 
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benefit its candidates. Thus, tangwai leaders looked more toward the 
distant future when they considered a legal party and a two-party sys-
tem evolving. 
The system would likely be a one-party-dominant one for the im-
mediate future. The tangwai would play the role of a pressure group 
or the conscience of the KMT and the advocates of democracy rather 
than a true opposition party in a two-party system. Alternatively, the 
tangwai was already so much a political party-a fact both it and the 
KMT perceived-that there was little reason for discussion. 
Similarly, tangwai candidates said much less of substance about 
self-determination than in the past, using the issue only to draw atten-
tion to their campaign. Whereas the polls showed it was not a good 
campaign issue, this had also been true in previous elections. Appar-
ently less was said about self-determination because it was taken for 
granted or because the candidates themselves, possibly influenced by 
their perception of the electorate's view, did not want to antagonize 
top officials in the national government. Holding an election itself was 
proof of national sovereignty, and KMT candidates were saying much 
the same thing about independence as the tangwai (the KMT simply 
used different logic: that Taiwan is synonymous with the Republic of 
China and that it is sovereign and will remain sovereign). 
The fact that there was less identification among the voters with 
ethnic differences was a good sign. As in past local elections, the large 
majority of KMT candidates were Taiwanese. In this sense the KMT 
had become a Taiwanese party. In contrast, the tangwai, which some 
saw as evolving into a Taiwanese party some years ago, was not a 
Taiwanese party, or at least did not seem so in this election. Ethnic 
differences were less important than in previous elections and less a 
factor than many observers expected. 
Based on this election, labeling the KMT as a conservative party 
and the tangwai as a liberal or progressive party was not easy to de-
fend. It seemed to be more accurate to call the KMT a progressive-
conservative party. The tangwai's platform entitled the progressive 
adjective, but liberalism was not a party theme (perhaps because so 
few in Taiwan understand its meaning or because liberals have not 
done well in the United States or Japan, where the populace of Taiwan 
looks for political lessons). The same is true of capitalism (KMT) and 
socialism (tangwai). This dichotomy was much more blurred in this 
election. Taiwan's capitalistic development strategy had worked so 
well that it could not be challenged, and the KMT had been so aggres-
sive in adopting social welfare programs that the tangwai could not 
make this a good campaign issue. In the past their candidates talked a 
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lot about equality and poverty. A number of tangwai candidates, in 
fact, advocated lower taxes and a more capitalistic economic system. 
Thus, there was some switching sides on economic issues. 
Some observers have argued that Taiwan has had too many elec-
tions and that the electorate had become bored, thus explaining the 
declining voter turnout. This seems to have been disproved by the 
results of this election. In fact, Taiwan in 1985 witnessed a reversal in 
the decline of voter turnout during several of the last elections. More-
over, an even lower turnout had been predicted. Apparently the 
bored-voter thesis or the voter-alienation theory was wrong. Voter 
turnout was apparently higher because more voters perceived that it 
was their duty to vote and more could identify issues as affecting them 
directly. One might also say that democracy had matured in Taiwan, 
and the individual voter felt more a participant inasmuch as he or she 
had become accustomed to the democratic process of electing politi-
cians who actually represent the people in governing. 
One may conclude that this election was competitive and interest-
ing and that if the future was to be predicted on the basis of this elec-
tion, future contests would be even more instrumental in the 
operation of Taiwan's political system. Its system would then con-
tinue to become democratic at a high rate of speed, without the diffi-
culties many nations have experienced in institutionalizing democracy. 
In that sense, Taiwan is a model. 
CHAPTER 3 
TAIWAN'S 1986 NATIONAL ELECI'ION: TRANSITION 
TO DEMOCRACY 
Introduction 
On December 6, 1986 voters went to the polls throughout Taiwan 
in what many have since called a watershed election. Some said it 
pushed forward the political modernization process in this island re-
public by perhaps a decade or more. Other observers declared the 
election was proof that Taiwan had made the transition from an au-
thoritarian political system to a democracy. Clearly politics, espe-
cially electoral politics, changed as a result of this election and its 
campaign. 
This was the 68th major election held in Taiwan over the past 
three decades. It was the first, however, in which the competition was 
organized in the form of a legally constituted party-even though this 
was still partly unfinished business. The newly formed Democratic 
Progressive Party (DPP) nominated candidates that ran as "party" 
candidates, while their predecessors ran as a group of non-party or 
independent opposition candidates. They carried green and white 
"party" flags. The media and the electorate referred to the DPP as a 
political party. Hence this election was dubbed the first two-party 
election in Chinese history. 
The 1986 election must also be seen in relation to events during 
1986, particularly announcements by President Chiang Ching-Kuo 
that the government in the not-too-distant future would end martial 
law and allow the formation of new political parties. 1986 was clearly 
a time of significant political change in Taiwan. This was especially 
true of the few months preceding December 6, 1986. 1 
The Political Context of the Election 
During the early half to two-thirds of 1985 the government and 
the ruling Party in Taiwan passed through what might be called a 
period of malaise. A number of trends were less than positive-in-
cluding economic growth (compared to the past) and unemployment 
1. For further details, see John F. Copper "Political Developments in Taiwan in 
1986," China News Analysis, January 15, 1987, pp. 1-9. 
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(increasing, though still low compared to other countries). The coun-
try also faced some rather serious problems or crises. Early in the year 
the Henry Liu case (the murder of a San Francisco businessman) 
broke, implicating top political intelligence officials in Taipei. The for-
eign media interpreted the case as one of the .KMT killing a U.S. citi-
zen because he had written something uncomplimentary about 
Taiwan's government, and in particular about President Chiang 
Ching-kuo. A number of U.S. newspapers harshly criticized the gov-
ernment and implicated other officials by association. The subcom-
mittee on Asia of the House Foreign Affairs Committee of the U.S. 
Congress held hearings during which several noted Congressmen 
sought to use the event as a reason to end arms sales to Taiwan. 2 
The collapse of the Tenth Credit Union, the second largest finan-
cial conglomerate in Taiwan, further undermined the credibility of the 
government and the ruling KMT. It was monumental in terms of its 
size and the number of businesses and investors affected-involving 
more than 100 companies collectively worth more than 3.5 billion U.S. 
dollars. The collapse gave the impression that the government was not 
properly managing the economy and that corruption and malfeasance 
were serious problems. 
On top of these problems the country witnessed a number of 
highly publicized accidents that many blamed on the government-
two coal mine disasters and poisoned wine (from the government's 
wine and tobacco monopoly) that was sold to consumers. And there 
was unfavorable press over the arrest of a Taiwan-born (but with U.S. 
citizenship) Los Angeles newspaper owner. There were also rumors 
about President Chiang Ching-kuo's health and increased speculation 
about the problem of his successor. Some, especially opposition politi-
cians, opined that he did not have a successor. 
Mid-year 1986 the KMT seemed to be heading for an election 
defeat in November. However, past problems and crises were not as 
important as they appeared, or were handled deftly. In any case, an 
election loss was averted. The Henry Liu case by this time was seen 
by most of Taiwan's voters as a case of one or two officials acting on 
their own against a double or triple agent (who had done intelligence 
work for Washington, Taipei and Beijing). The Tenth Credit scandal 
was in part put to rest by officials, including two cabinet members, 
stepping down and taking responsibility. That issue also became seen 
as one resulting from insufficient government regulation rather than 
2. For details, see John F. Copper, "Taiwan: New Challenges to Development," Cur-
rent History, April 1986, pp.l68-171. 
TAIWAN'S RECENT ELECTIONS 47 
corruption. The public, moreover, was unsure it wanted more regula-
tion in view of the fact that a free and open market (although maybe 
too free) had given Taiwan its miracle economic development. The 
other problems as well seemed to pass so that, by November, they 
were no longer seen as terribly important. The nation's most serious 
"problem" was its growing foreign exchange position, resultant of a 
huge trade surplus. Some observers commenting about the problem 
said that it was one that most developing nations wish they had. 3 
The ruling Nationalist Party also appeared to be taking the com-
ing elections seriously and showed its willingness to adjust to new 
political realities in order to help its candidates to electoral victory. In 
March the KMT held its third plenary session of the Party's 12th Cen-
tral Committee. At that meeting several new members were appointed 
to the important and powerful Central Standing Committee. The new 
appointments mirrored progressive changes in the direction of 
Taiwanization, democratization, and a younger leadership of the 
Party. Some even speculated that the older, less flexible and more au-
thoritarian-minded leaders of the Party no longer held the balance of 
power in top Party decision making bodies.4 
A few months later President Chiang Ching-kuo (also Chairman 
of the KMT) ordered the formation of a twelve-member committee to 
study the status of martial law and the ban on the formation of new 
parties; the committee was also to examine the problem of an aging 
National Assembly and means of improving local government. The 
first two "tasks" were by far the most important. What was meant by 
"studying" martial law and the ban of new parties was, in essence, 
finding a way to get rid of both and figure out how the system could 
best be pushed ahead on the road to further democratization without 
evoking political chaos or instability. 
On the subject of legalizing new parties, tangwai leaders proposed 
that they be allowed to have permanent offices countrywide in the 
form of their Tangwai Research Association for Public Policy 
(TRAPP). TRAPP would serve as a permanent national "party" or-
ganization that could coordinate "party" activities during periods 
when elections were not pending. This would help give the tangwai 
3. See John F. Copper, "Taiwan in 1986: Back on Top Again," Asian Survey, January 
1987, pp.89-90. 
4. See "ROC Sets a Model for All Chinese, Chiang Says,'' Free China Journal, 
March 31, 1986, p. 1. For a comparison with the previous Central Standing Comittee, see 
Edwin A. Winckler, "After the Chiangs: The Coming Political Succession on Taiwan" in 
Richard C. Bush (ed.), China Briefing, 1982 (Boulder CO: Westview Press, 1983), pp. 103-
121. 
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the status of a real political party-even though it had been so labeled 
during previous election campaigns. It did have a platform, "party" 
funds, and a unified campaign. In May, the government, upon the 
recommendation and support of President Chiang, decided in the 
affirmative. 
Additional meetings (that included tangwai officials as well as 
scholars and others) were held to discuss the proposals to abolish mar-
tial law and allow (formally) new political parties to form. The issue 
was not whether to carry out these decisions; that was seen as inevita-
ble. Nor were there any really intractable issues between the two sides 
relative to implementing the proposals. 
The substance of national security legislation that would replace 
martial law was an issue, but not a divisive one. The public did not 
consider martial law offensive or bothersome (according to public 
opinion polls), but it did see the abolishment of martial law as neces-
sary to fulfilling the goal of democratizing the system. Notwithstand-
ing the public's support of martial law, on May 19 (the 38th 
anniversary of its enactment) demonstrators organized to protest 
what they considered "unfair and undemocratic impediments to free-
doms guaranteed in the Constitution."5 
The formation of new parties was not as hot an issue as some 
thought because the tangwai was already in most respects a political 
party. Older KMT officials opposed giving it legal status for various 
reasons, including the fact that allowing the tangwai to operate as a 
party, but one without legal status, seemed to be the most cautious 
means of allowing party competition to develop. Moreover, a signifi-
cant number of tangwai and opposition politicians were not enthusias-
tic about the offer of legal status-since the tangwai was in large part a 
protest party and winning legal status, some perceived, would be a 
liability rather than an asset in the coming election campaign. The 
tangwai lacked a base of support in the sense parties in Western coun-
tries can identify a region, social class, or other segment of the popula-
tion that supports the party and renders it various kinds of help; thus 
the protest vote was viewed as crucial. 
In early June four members of the opposition were jailed for libel. 
Opposition leaders viewed the court action as an attempt to prevent 
their candidates from running in the December election, charging that 
the decision was influenced by the KMT. On June 9th 5,000 demon-
strators protested the eight-month sentence meted out to one tangwai 
politician (for libeling a university professor in an article in Neo-For-
5. Facts on File, October 24, 1986, p.799. 
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mosa magazine). It was described as the largest demonstration since 
the 1979 "Kaohsiung Incident."6 
In August TRAPP organized a rally at an elementary school in 
Taipei, attracting 50,000 participants and onlookers. The gathering 
was attended by the executive director of the U.S. National Demo-
cratic Institute for International Affairs, giving the impression that the 
U.S. supported TRAPP and an end to the ban on political parties. In 
fact, some perceived this as a sign of U.S. pressure on the government 
to "open up" the coming election.7 
In early September, Taipei City Councilman Lin Cheng-chieh 
(also publisher of the opposition magazine Progress Monthly) was sen-
tenced to eighteen months in jail on the same charge as the others: 
libel. Lin somehow evaded the police for a while. He then appeared 
at the steps of the Presidential Office Building, and in front of a large 
crowd, smashed a clock (the word for clock being a homonym of end 
or final)-signifying his "had it" attitude with the government. This 
provoked (or at least became the cause of) several days of protest 
demonstrations in Taipei and other large cities in Taiwan that at-
tracted large numbers (thousands at times) of people.8 
On September 9 protestors in Taipei formed a large street 
march-the first led by the opposition since the "Kaohsiung Incident" 
several years earlier. The march attracted even more participants and 
spectators and seemed to inject both unity and enthusiasm into the 
opposition movement. It also appeared to enhance public support for 
tangwai politicians. Meanwhile, the government's contention that the 
court decisions against tangwai notables were not influenced by any 
other branch of the government or the ruling Nationalist Party, 
though true, was not very convincing. 9 This fueled "demonstration 
fever." On September 28-without further consultations with the 
KMT, the government, or Chiang Ching-kuo's committee--135 
tangwai politicians, after a meeting at the Grand Hotel in Taipei, an-
nounced that they had decided to form the Democratic Progressive 
Party. The announcement was provocative inasmuch as it was still 
illegal to form a new political party. Yet it seemed apparent to almost 
everyone that the ban on new parties would be lifted and that the 
DPP's "crime" was one of simply acting prematurely-which was not 
6. Ibid. 
7. Agency France Press, August 15, 1986 in Foreign Broadcasting Information Ser-
vice, August 18, 1986, p.V2. 
8. Paul Mooney, "Opposition in the Streets," Far Eastern Economic Review, Septem-
ber 25, 1986, p.l8. 
9. Ibid. 
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very serious. It was also obvious that the tangwai made this move 
(rather than continuing discussions with the committee) in order to 
avoid the perception that it was a creation of the KMT or was born 
out of tangwai -KMT cooperation. 
A few days later President Chiang, in a meeting with Katherine 
Graham, owner of the Washington Post, affirmed that martial law 
would be lifted and that new political parties would be allowed to 
form. Judging from the tone of the President's statement and consid-
ering the person to whom the announcement was made (causing it to 
be reported with some fanfare in the Post) it was a promise to be taken 
seriously. 10 This was subsequently underscored when the President 
blocked action by the Ministry of Interior to file charges against the 
DPP for violating the prohibition against new political parties. 
In mid-October the KMT approved a proposal whereby martial 
law would be replaced by national security legislation patterned after 
the U.S. and other Western democracies. While it was assumed that 
this would take some time to be formalized by the Legislative Yuan, 
most thought that the legislation passed because the KMT held the 
majority vote in that body. In the meantime, martial law for all in-
tents and purposes was held in abeyance. Certainly DPP leaders made 
this assumption. Hence, to the DPP, the elections would not be held 
under the constraints of martial law or the ban on forming new polit-
ical parties. 
On November 8, You Ching, one of the most visible leaders of the 
DPP, told Japanese reporters that the DPP had a membership of 
2,500 and expected to grow to 100,000 in less than a year. 11 He de-
clared the DPP's objective was to "break KMT one-party monopoly 
rule and build a welfare society after the Western European model." 
He also said that the DPP stands for "self-determination" and wanted 
Taiwan to be readmitted into the United Nations (though he did not 
say how this might be accomplished or if he meant that the country's 
name should be changed). 
On November 10 the DPP announced its "party" organization 
and leadership. Oddly, the DPP was structured after Leninist organi-
zational principles. Opposition politicians had long pointed out KMT 
"hypocrisy" because of structuring the ruling party after these "com-
munist" tenets of party organization. Apparently they were not im-
10. See Daniel Southerland, "Taiwan President to Propose End to Island's Martial 
Law," Washington Post, October 8, 1986, p. 3. 
II. See Carl Goldstein, "The Opposition Party," Far Eastern Economic Review, No· 
vember 20, 1986, p.36. 
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pressed with the organizational structures of the Western political 
parties. They had studied various party structures (including those in 
the U.S.) but ostensibly considered unity and party discipline too im-
portant to adopt the organizational structure of any of them. 
Chiang P'eng-chien, a relatively little-known member of the Leg-
islative Yuan, was elected chairman of the DPP in what appeared to 
be a close and divisive vote. You Ching and several others were in 
contention. Inside observers said the decision was a compromise and 
that the DPP's most well-known and most charismatic leader (mean-
ing You Ching) was not picked to head the DPP because of factional 
infighting. Many called Chiang's appointment a mistake. Subse-
quently P'an Li-fu, a DPP Standing Committee member representing 
activists from the south of Taiwan, threatened to resign and take rep-
resentatives of Pingtung county with him. A serious party split 
seemed in the offing. 12 
Because those involved realized that party unity was a sine qua 
non to compete successfully in the December election, a formal split 
was avoided, and party unity, at least on the surface, was restored. 
Obviously something had been learned from the tangwai's perform-
ances in past elections. Moreover, the DPP had to maintain party 
unity if there was to be a two-party election-which the polls showed 
the public wanted. Individually, DPP leaders had to consider public 
opinion not only for the sake of the party but also, in most cases, for 
the sake of furthering their own candidacies-since most of them were 
running for office in December. 
President Chiang meanwhile announced that, to become a legal 
party, three conditions must be met: agree to abide by the Constitu-
tion (meaning among other things foreswearing violence), renounce 
communism, and deny supporting independence. These conditions 
did not seem onerous. The opposition had long supported the Consti-
tution; it had even criticized the KMT for not upholding it, especially 
in its original form. Few tangwai politicians had even hinted at sup-
porting communism; there was certainly no support among the electo-
rate. The DPP had been critical of Taiwanese Independence 
Movement activities in the U.S. and Japan and eschewed direct con-
tacts with the Movement in either place. 13 
The DPP, however, refused to accept the President's three condi-
12. See Ramon H. Meyers, "Political Change and Democratization in the Republic of 
China 1986," Free China Journal, December 1, 1986, p. 2. 
13. DPP leaders made such statements at the time the party was formed. For further 
details, see John F. Copper, "Political Developments in Taiwan 1986," China News Analy-
sis, January 15, 1987, pp. 1-9. 
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tions, ostensibly because the new party did not want to give the im-
pression it was colluding, or even cooperating, with the KMT. DPP 
leaders, in fact, sought to accentuate differences between their party 
and the KMT. The DPP openly challenged the KMT's policy of 
reconquering the Mainland and instead called for separation from the 
People's Republic of China. The DPP charter even contained a 
"plank" which stated that the future of Taiwan should be "decided by 
the residents of Taiwan ... " Many interpreted this to mean advocat-
ing self-determination and/or ties with the Taiwanese Independence 
Movement. DPP officials pointed out that the two were not the same. 
Meanwhile a nationwide opinion poll was conducted (and pub-
lished in one of Taiwan's largest newspapers) which reflected public 
support for the President's decision to lift martial law and to allow 
new parties to form. However, more detailed public opinion queries 
reflected that the public had not changed its view about martial law 
but rather remained supportive of it. The poll also indicated public 
disapproval of the formation of the DPP. 14 In light of this poll, the 
President's actions apparently represented a commitment to a wholly 
democratic system-therefore the public supported him. Martial law, 
even if supported by the public, had to go in order to realize the bigger 
objective: democracy. The DPP's suddenness in forming and viola-
tion of the law apparently alienated a sizable portion of the public. 
Alternatively, the DPP's stated tenets on a number of issues had this 
effect. 
In any event, the lines were being drawn between the KMT and 
the DPP on several important issues. Polarization was not so serious, 
however, as to make the election process unworkable. Most wanted 
the system to work. Moreover, it was clear the DPP was going to 
participate in the election as a party, even though legal status was yet 
to be granted. Blocking its participation would have hurt Taiwan's 
political development and sent the wrong signals domestically and 
internationally. 
The Election Campaign 
On November 14, a week before the campaign began, seven U.S.-
based dissidents returned to Taiwan to support the DPP and "democ-
ratize the elections." The leader of the group, Lin Shui-chuan (who 
had been in the U.S. since 1982 after finishing a prison term in Tai-
wan) was refused entry because he presented no travel documents. 
Some of the other members of the group also failed to show passports; 
14. See "Gearing up for Elections,'· Asia Bulletin, November 1986, p.35. 
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the rest declined entry when Lin was detained. The group started a 
scuffie with police before they left-causing a scene that soon became 
a campaign issue for the DPP. 15 DPP candidates, looking for an elec-
tion issue to rally their supporters, charged the government and the 
ruling KMT with supporting police brutality, oppression, and with 
subverting democracy. 
With this introduction, the campaign began on November 21 
with individually (candidate)-sponsored forums and speeches. This 
lasted for eight days. Prior to the onset of the campaign period, a 
number of candidates held "teas" and other "parties" as a way of 
starting their campaigning early-in violation of the Election and Re-
call Law. 16 KMT candidates generally observed the election rules in 
this regard. During the period of candidate-sponsored forums, over 
500 individually-sponsored meetings were held. Moderate DPP candi-
date Kang Ning-hsiang held the most-43. Opposition DPP candi-
dates Hsiao Yu-chen and Chou Ching-yu held 37 and 36 
respectivelyY Candidates generally attracted good crowds, but ac-
cording to several observers (in agreement with this writer's percep-
tion) these crowds were not as large as in the past two elections. There 
also seemed to be a larger discrepancy in the size of the audiences 
attracted to different candidates. 
Following the period of private campaigning, public forums spon-
sored and arranged by the Election Commission were held for seven 
days. There were 721 such meetings throughout the country. By as-
signing the place, order of speakers, and time of presentation, the pub-
lic forums in some ways resembled debates between political 
candidates in the U.S. and in other Western democracies. This was 
certainly the case inasmuch as the electorate was able to compare can-
didates' views and presentations. 
According to opinion polls conducted both before and during the 
campaign, the issues the electorate perceived as important differed 
markedly from those the candidates thought were the central issues. 
Voters surveyed in Taipei indicated traffic, air pollution, and public 
safety as their biggest concerns. They ranked the formation of new 
political parties below a dozen other issues in importance. In Kaohsi-
ung, voters rated public safety as their first concern, followed by traffic 
15. See footnote 13. 
16. This had been a problem in previous elections. Candidates could circumvent the 
Election and Recall Law by holding private birthday parties and teas, that were in reality 
political meetings. No solutions to this problem had been found. 
17. "By-Election Campaigning to Enter 2nd Stage Today," China Post, November 29, 
1986, p. 3. 
54 CONTEMPORARY AsiAN STUDIES SERIES 
and air pollution. The formation of new parties was not even among 
their top twenty priority concerns. In contrast, candidates in Taipei 
replied that social welfare, foreign relations, and national security and 
human rights were their foremost concerns. They put the top three 
issues as ranked by the voters below fourteen other issues. Candidates 
in Kaohsiung stated that social welfare, economic freedom, foreign re-
lations, and national security were the most important campaign 
issues. 18 
The discrepancies (which also existed in previous elections) may 
be explained by the fact that none of the issues the voters regarded as 
the most important, with the possible exception of the crime issue 
(part of the public safety problem), were issues that could be sensa-
tionalized or used to attract attention. Certainly they were not issues 
that could be used to excite listeners at rallies. Candidates thought 
that they had to attract a devoted and committed group of supporters 
(to enlist as campaign workers and activists) first. They also perceived 
that they needed to attract public attention to get their campaign 
started well; without this they would be viewed as boring and could 
not build momentum. 
Many candidates seemed to believe they could ignore the issues 
the voters considered important early in the campaign and address 
these issues only when asked or when other candidates did so. Some 
said they could bring up these issues during the "less interesting" gov-
ernment-sponsored forums. Many candidates, furthermore, pointed 
out that nearly all candidates took an identical position on these is-
sues, i.e. favoring more orderly traffic, getting rid of air pollution, and 
reducing crime. Even specific means of handling these problems or 
solutions did not differ among candidates very much, at least suffi-
ciently enough to build candidate identification or image based on po-
sitions on these issues. 
During the campaign, KMT candidates in general espoused more 
conservative positions while DPP candidates took more liberal views. 
However, few candidates presented themselves as ideologues, inas-
much as this was not a mark of success in previous elections. Hence, 
liberal and conservative views on many issues were not very clear 
much of the time. Finally, there was considerable disparity of views 
within each party, blurring differences between the parties. 
Still, the two parties were different enough that party identifica-
tion was not difficult. DPP candidates fairly consistently favored 
18. "Poll: Citizens, Candidates Differ on Election Issues," China Post, November 12, 
1986, p. 3. 
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more press freedom and freedom of speech and advocated increased 
civil and political freedoms. DPP candidates were in general agree-
ment that campaign regulations were too restrictive, that the cam-
paign period needed to be lengthened, and that limits on campaign 
spending needed to be broadened or lifted (notwithstanding public 
concern about "money politics" and a serious problem of vote buying 
in previous elections). KMT candidates were usually stronger advo-
cates of law and order and reducing crime. As a rule, they favored 
keeping the present election rules or changing them only slightly (even 
though the election laws were not working very well). KMT candi-
dates as a group expressed satisfaction with the nation's progress in 
broadening civil and political liberties. 
DPP candidates supported increased social welfare and made this 
a major issue in the campaign, just as the tangwai had in previous 
campaigns. KMT candidates took credit for the nation's economic 
prosperity, and they boasted of successful social welfare legislation and 
work done by the KMT in this area. KMT candidates also claimed 
credit for low unemployment and the nation's low disparity of income 
that made social security less necessary than in other countries. 
DPP candidates advocated a more aggressive foreign policy, in 
particular arguing for policies that would get the country back into the 
United Nations and other international organizations. They did not, 
however, cite any specific means for doing this and appeared to lack 
any feasible plan. They did, on the other hand, have concrete propos-
als regarding the Asian Development Bank: Remain in! KMT candi-
dates, when they talked about foreign policy issues, stressed the 
government's successful economic and cultural diplomacy and defined 
past "diplomatic failures" as inevitable, not as mistakes. 
DPP candidates criticized the government's "three no's" policy 
and suggested "contacts while maintaining separation" with the Peo-
ple's Republic of China. As with most foreign policy issues, they did 
not elaborate on this issue. They criticized the nation's large defense 
budget and suggested that more money should be spent on social pro-
grams, unemployment insurance, etc. KMT candidates generally es-
poused the line of not trusting, and therefore not negotiating with, the 
communists. They were critical of "unrealistic" DPP foreign policy 
proposals, though they generally avoided talking about the issue of 
retaking the mainland, which the DPP labeled as unrealistic. For the 
most part, KMT candidates supported current defense spending. 
Foreign trade issues were rarely discussed. Likewise, Taiwan's 
large trade surplus with the U.S. and currency revaluation were not 
important election issues. This was so in spite of growing tensions 
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with the U.S. over trade and rapidly growing foreign currency reserves 
that threatened to touch off inflation. 
The DPP talked about democracy and the need for greater free-
doms for candidates to say and do as they desired in order for the 
political system to become truly democratic. They charged that the 
KMT monopoly of the media and the country's one-party system pre-
cluded real democracy. They continued to indict the KMT for not 
allowing genuinely free elections and for lack of fairness in the election 
system, especially the system's favoring the ruling party. KMT candi-
dates spoke of the need for political and social stability as a precondi-
tion for democracy and accused DPP candidates of naivete in this 
regard. They also accused the opposition of "reckless" and unrealistic 
talk about democracy, which KMT officials labeled foolish and dan-
gerous since it would "play into the hands of the communists." 
The most emotionally-laden or sensitive issues were self-determi-
nation and DPP street politics, labeled by the KMT as lawless and 
leading to anarchy. Views on both issues polarized during the cam-
paign. Some KMT candidates charged that DPP candidates advo-
cated independence, which was treason. Others said the DPP played 
into the hands of the Taiwanese Independence Movement and the 
Communists. Many argued that the DPP's advocacy of self-determi-
nation was either already realized, since Taiwan had a legally consti-
tuted government, or was an unnecessary provocation. The People's 
Republic of China underscored the latter point when a press spokes-
man for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs publicly assailed the DPP's 
advocacy of self-determination during the middle of the 
campaigning. 19 
KMT and DPP differences on the touchy issues were amplified 
when dissident Hsu Hsin-liang tried to return to Taiwan from the 
United States. Hsu had left Taiwan under indictment for treason 
before the "Kaohsiung Incident" in 1979. He subsequently applied 
for and was granted political asylum in the U.S. Not having been an 
important official or opposition spokesman at the time (a county mag-
istrate), he was not able to win much of a following in the U.S. or 
much support back home--though his name was remembered through 
his brother, who was running for office from his home district. How-
ever, Hsu became better known immediately before the campaign as 
he became intensely critical of the government and after he claimed to 
represent the DPP in the U.S. and vowed to return to Taiwan as an 
19. For further details on Peking's attitude, remarks, and threats, see "The Peking 
Factor," Asiaweek, December 21-28, 1986, p.29. 
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"Aquino. " 20 
DPP leaders repudiated Hsu's claim to represent the party in the 
U.S. They underscored this when his advocacy of terrorism and ter-
rorist tactics were documented in Taiwan's newspapers at the time, 
some in rather lurid detail.21 This embarrassed the DPP and caused 
many in the opposition to distance themselves from Hsu and the 
Taiwanese Independence Movement. Still, DPP leaders perceived 
Hsu's return as an opportunity to rally their forces and win public 
sympathy and support for their cause. Demonstrations and rallies 
during the spring and summer had had that effect; why not now? 
Thus the DPP prepared for Hsu's rumored arrival on November 20th. 
DPP leaders were also plainly aware of the fact that the govern-
ment had ordered the police and other authorities to behave with the 
utmost restraint and leniency in order to prevent anything from hap-
pening during the campaign which would be construed by the foreign 
press as sullying an otherwise fair election or oppressing democracy. 
Thus, the DPP assumed they could organize demonstrations at the 
airport without fear of retaliation. So they joined in mass to meet Hsu. 
Many KMT candidates meanwhile opposed the government's 
"excessively lenient policy" toward protest demonstrations. They saw 
it as creating a situation in which the DPP was given carte blanche to 
advocate radical policies, undermine government authority, and create 
a situation verging on a breakdown of law and order. Others, how-
ever, opined that the fear of anarchy would work to the KMT's advan-
tages. They saw a repeat of the Kaohsiung Incident of 1979, when the 
opposition alienated the population by creating political instability 
which threatened to escalate into chaos. 
In any event, 20,000 demonstrators gathered at the airport when 
Hsu was rumored to arrive. They turned over and burned police cars, 
threw rocks, and hit, kicked, and insulted police officers-including 
women officers. One reporter videotaped a scene of a demonstrator in 
a shoving fracas with police, after which he doused his head with 
animal blood or paint from a sack in his pocket, then claimed that he 
had been beaten by police. This was reported by several large newspa-
pers and the T.V. networks. It clearly damaged the image and reputa-
tion of the DPP. So did the fact that the opposition was seen to have 
20. Carl Goldstein, "Barricaded Tarmac," Far Eastern Economic Review, December 
ll,l986,p.l6f. 
21. See "Dissident Enters Illegally Flying Under False Colors," Free China Journal 
December 8, 1986, p. 2. Several of Taiwan's major newspapers carried stories citing Hsu'~ 
advocacy of violence and reprinted some of his writings on the use of terrorism during the 
campaign. 
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started the violence and the widespread belief that police acted with 
restraint. One public opinion poll recorded an immediate 3 percent 
drop in voter support for the DPP.22 
The DPP cried foul play and officially repudiated the violence, 
perceiving that it was creating a serious backlash. In order to effect 
damage control, the DPP showed their own tapes at their campaign 
offices and elsewhere in public. These tapes showed only the police 
throwing rocks and using water cannons and tear gas. One tape they 
played repeatedly showed the demonstrators being pushed away by 
police; they dubbed this "movie" "the ugly cop." DPP leaders also 
decried media reports on the incident that allegedly unfairly favored 
the KMT. On one occasion, DPP supporters held a rally to burn cop-
ies of the United Daily News-one of Taiwan's largest papers-which 
had reported that the violence was started by DPP supporters and was 
organized by the party. 23 
Hsu later managed to get to Taipei from the Philippines. But he 
was discovered before disembarking at Taipei International Airport, 
and the plane carrying him was forced to leave before it was widely 
known that he had arrived. Subsequent repeated efforts by Hsu to get 
to Taiwan failed. His campaign to play the spoiler role or become 
"Taiwan's Aquino" ultimately proved anti-climatical. 
Besides the "Hsu incident," the campaign was full of antics and 
tricks. Even before the campaigning started a number of candidates 
publicly accused their opponents of sexual and financial misconduct. 
Several filed suits against opposing candidates prior to and during the 
campaign. Organized rumormongering was common. Candidates fre-
quently hired audiences to support their speeches and forums and to 
disrupt their opponents, using firecrackers car horns and other noise 
makers. A number of DPP candidates had their workers cut the elec-
tricity during their speeches; they could then blame the disruption on 
KMT "operatives." 
Some campaign workers printed counterfeit ballots and placed 
them in their opponents' offices, after which they telephoned election 
officials. Campaign workers also called voters during the night, using 
opposing candidates' names. Phony handbills were printed to misrep-
resent opposing candidates. Campaign dirty tricks were widespread; 
some were reportedly learned from studying election campaigns in 
Western democracies. 
Candidates and their workers and supporters regularly violated 
22. "The People Spoke Their Minds," Asiaweek, December 21-28, 1986, p.25. 
23. Ibid. 
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election laws by using too many handbills, larger posters than pre-
scribed by law, and by campaigning in places that were restricted. "Il-
legal" marches were commonplace. Political advertisements were put 
in the newspapers in violation of the Election and Recall Law. Some 
did television commercials to get more exposure, in violation of the 
spirit of the election law. In short, election rules were blatantly and 
frequently flaunted. 24 
Yet there was little violence. Nor was there frequent breaking of 
important election rules or laws. DPP politicians burned KMT flags, 
but did not bum any national flags. DPP candidates used unflattering 
terms (such as "pig" on some occasions) to describe the President, but 
when this seemed likely to create a backlash they refrained from any 
mention of the President or other high officials. KMT candidates ac-
cused the DPP of disregard for social stability and of lawlessness; they 
did not accuse them (or at least very rarely) of treason or sedition. 
Some DPP candidates talked about "revolution." Several 
claimed to be "Corazons"-making reference to President Aquino of 
the Philippines. Yet few opposition candidates' statements could be 
construed as preaching or advocating revolution. Many DPP candi-
dates referred obliquely to self-determination; few mentioned the 
Taiwanese Independence Movement. Fewer still made any mention of 
Beijing or communism. The People's Republic of China assailed the 
advocacy of self-determination by DPP candidates, but the latter did 
not reply. 
In short, the election was full of technically illegal actions on the 
part of numerous candidates. But most knew that the law would not 
be rigidly enforced. This made many of the campaign regulations al-
most meaningless. Some even opined that the Election and Recall 
Law was not, in fact, working and that it should be regarded as de-
funct. Still, the system worked. In fact, some said the system was 
strengthened because it was able to work "under stress." 
The Election Results 
306 candidates had registered to compete for 73 seats in the Leg-
islative Yuan and 84 seats in the National Assembly-a total of 157 
seats. There were 169 candidates for National Assembly seats and 137 
for Legislative Yuan seats. Of the 306 candidates, 179 represented the 
Nationalist Party or Kuomintang; 44 represented the newly formed 
24. See, for example, "Videotaping Questioned," "Nonpartisans Insulting Head of 
State, Newspapers Say," "Nonpartisans Get Warnings for Street Demonstrations," China 
Post, November 27, 1986, p. 12. 
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Democratic Progressive Party. The rest were independents or repre-
sentatives of the two minor parties. 
The KMT won 59 seats in the Legislative Yuan and 68 in the 
National Assembly. Translated into a margin of victory, the ruling 
party captured 80.8 percent and 80.95 percent respectively of the seats 
contested in these two elected bodies of government. In popular vote 
the KMT won 66.3 percent and 60.2 percent respectively in the two 
contests. On the basis of these figures the ruling party could claim a 
victory. And its leaders did.25 
The KMT also performed well on the basis of electing a high 
proportion of the candidates it nominated. In fact, no KMT candidate 
that did not have the Party's official endorsement won in the election. 
Party discipline, in short, was maintained, which had not been the case 
in previous elections. Finally, many KMT candidates claimed to be at 
a disadvantage because DPP candidates were freer to engage in tricks 
and antics, while the KMT restrained its candidates and acted to pre-
vent or minimize violations of the Election and Recall Law. Thus, 
their performance must be judged in view of a serious handicap during 
the campaign. 
The KMT may be proclaimed the victor in another sense. It was 
due for a defeat in the sense that electorates tend to be fickle and 
change their minds about political participants whether they are per-
forming well or not. The KMT had won the two previous national 
elections (in 1980 and 1983) and won (according to most observers) 
the nationwide local election in 1985. In popular vote as well as in 
seats, the KMT did better in these elections than in major elections 
during the 1970s. Additionally, the fact that the public wanted two-
party competition seemed to indicate that the KMT was destined to 
lose. 
Another factor was the KMT's election strategy. The KMT's 
strategy in this election (unlike previous elections) was not clearly su-
perior to that of the opposition. In other words, the ruling party lost 
this advantage. Some observers even contended that the KMT had 
become complacent. In at least one case the KMT did not calculate 
the electorate correctly. The Party's military candidate, retired Air 
Force Chief of Staff Chen Hung-chuan, lost because of a diluting or 
splitting of the vote in his district. This reflected bad planning. The 
KMT also showed signs of some disagreement among its candidates 
25. See, "Voting Heavy, Smooth-Running in Apparent Landslide for KMT," China 
Post, December 7, 1986, p. 3. 
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concerning how to cope with the DPP-whether to take a hard line or 
not. 
Finally, the KMT did well in spite of the fact the DPP had the 
momentum. Rallies and demonstrations in the months preceding the 
election gave the opposition both unity and a spirit of cooperation, not 
to mention a feeling that they were making democracy work. Many, if 
not most, opposition politicians perceived their cause to have histori-
cal significance. Events during the campaign focused attention on the 
new party and its candidates. Just before the election DPP leaders 
boasted they would win thirty percent of the popular vote. They did 
not win that much. 
The DPP also claimed victory. In several respects its claims were 
more credible than the KMT's. The DPP won 12 and 11 seats respec-
tively-double the figure they (meaning the tangwai ) won in the previ-
ous election for the Legislative Yuan and an increase of four over the 
previous National Assembly contest. They won 16.4 and 13.1 percent 
of the seats contested in the elective bodies, which was impressive 
when compared to the opposition's past record. Over half of the DPP 
candidates were elected-23 of 44. The DPP's popular vote was also 
several percentage points above that attained by the tangwai in previ-
ous elections: 22.2% in the Legislative Yuan election and 18.9% in 
the National Assembly contest. 
The DPP, moreover, did not suffer from factionalism. The 
tangwai had. No DPP candidate won who was not officially endorsed 
by the DPP leadership. There were no "unofficial" DPP candidates. 
None left the party or refused to follow the party platform at least 
nominally. In fact, DPP party unity reduced the number of independ-
ent candidates drastically. Seven joined the DPP before the election. 
Only two seats in the Legislative Yuan and four in the National As-
sembly were taken by candidates not officially nominated by the KMT 
or the DPP. One Democratic Socialist Party candidate won (in the 
National Assembly race). The China Youth Party, with two and three 
candidates in Legislative Yuan and the National Assembly races re-
spectively, failed to elect a candidate. In short, the election seemed to 
be much more a contest between the KMT and the opposition, which 
in this case coalesced to become the DPP, than in previous elections. 
The DPP also had the big vote getters: the top four DPP candi-
dates for the Legislative Yuan contest-Hsu Chung-shu, Hong Chi-
chang, You Ching, and Hsu Kuo-ta-won the largest number of pop-
ular votes. DPP candidates were the top vote getters in five of the 
eight electoral districts in this part of the election. The DPP also had 
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big winners in the National Assembly contest: the biggest vote getters 
in four districts. 
The DPP fared especially well in the capital city and in Taiwan's 
second largest city, Kaohsiung, capturing over 30 percent of the pop-
ular vote in both. Since some consider the big cities, especially Taipei, 
bellwethers, the DPP could look ahead to an even better performance 
in future elections. 26 It also had another plus from a strong showing 
in the capital city: some psychological advantage in terms of its im-
pact on the legislation process. 
The DPP also performed well in spite of the fact that economic 
growth projections published just before the election made the govern-
ment and the KMT look good. The electorate was looking at an eco-
nomic growth of 10.7% for the year. Clearly the public was pleased 
with the KMT's performance in economic growth terms. The an-
nouncements that martial law and the ban on new political parties 
would be rescinded likewise should have helped the KMT. That the 
KMT had nominated a slate of candidates that was generally young, 
reform-oriented, and Western-educated also made the KMT attractive 
to the voter.27 
The bottom line: Most observers felt the election results sug-
gested more a victory for the DPP than for the KMT. Clearly the 
DPP's performance as measured against its past record was astound-
ingly better. The KMT's was not; it gained seats in the National As-
sembly but lost in the Legislative Yuan. The DPP had the biggest 
winners. In terms of the popular vote, perhaps the best indicator of 
success, the DPP did better; and the KMT did worse. 
An assessment of the results of the election suggest still other 
conclusions. Most important, the political development process 
won--democracy won. It is no doubt accurate to say that the nation 
and political modernization were bigger winners than either party or 
any candidate. Clearly the voters wanted a more competitive party 
system to advance democracy, and they got it. 
Reflecting the electorate's feeling toward the electoral process in 
this election, the voter turnout in this election was higher; 65.4 per-
cent-compared to 63.17 percent in the previous comparable election. 
There had been a gradual decline in voter turnout in elections in Tai-
wan until the 1985 nationwide local election. However, because it was 
a local election, some considered the better turnout a fluke, not a sig-
nal of a reversal of the downward trend. The higher turnout in this 
26. "The People Spoke Their Minds,'' Asiaweek, December 21-28, 1986, p.2S. 
27. Ibid. 
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election could thus be seen as a positive sign and perhaps as sufficient 
proof that voter alienation or cynicism about the political process had 
not grown. 
Female candidates did well in the election-winning six seats in 
the Legislative Yuan and nine in the National Assembly. In other 
words, women captured just under ten percent of the seats in the Leg-
islative Yuan and over ten percent in the National Assembly race. 
The largest vote getter in the Legislative Yuan race was a woman. 
The performance of female candidates in this election, though it was 
not markedly different than several past elections, compares very fa-
vorably to most Western democracies, better than most. 28 
The education level of winning candidates was also high. Only 
four winners in Legislative Yuan contests and twelve for seats in the 
National Assembly did not have an education level beyond high 
school. 23 and 15 candidates respectively in the two races had gradu-
ate education. Over 31 percent of winning candidates for Legislative 
Yuan seats had graduate education-a very good mark compared to 
the Western democracies. Nearly 95 percent were college educated or 
had an equivalent degree. 23 candidates with PhD degrees ran; 
twenty (or 86.95%) won.29 
The age of victorious candidates is also instructive: 46.5 average. 
The average age of winning candidates in the Legislative Yuan was 
45.9; in the National Assembly contest it was 47.2. The majority of 
winning candidates in both elections were in their forties. In neither 
race did a candidate over 69 win. 30 This suggests that the voters 
wanted representatives with both experience and sufficient energy to 
serve in the jobs for which they were chosen. 
A number of less quantifiable indicators also reflect positive sig-
nals. As in past elections, candidates emphasizing ideology did not 
fare well. Radical candidates also did poorly, particularly compared 
to previous elections, and this was especially true among non-KMT 
candidates. Several that talked about revolution during the campaign 
did not win. Kang Ning-hsiang, a well known opposition candidate 
who lost in the previous Legislative Yuan election (many say because 
of his moderate position) won big in this election. The KMT's biggest 
winners were moderates or progressives: Chao Shao-kang in Taipei 
and Hung Chao-nan in Taichung. Chao said throughout the cam-
28. This compares to 4.6 percent in the U. S. Congress--2 percent in the Senate and 
5.28 in the House of Representatives. 
29. See, North American Daily (in Chinese), December 9, 1986, p. 2. 
30. Ibid . See also "People's Voice Loud, Clear," Free China Journal, December 15, 
1986, p. 2. 
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paign that "a vote for me is a vote for reform."31 
Money also seemed to be less a factor in this election than in 
previous elections. Most observers (including this writer) perceived 
that vote buying (both with money and gifts) and expensive campaign-
ing were less prevalent. Clearly, most victorious candidates were not 
known as much for their large or lavish campaign spending as had 
been the case in previous elections. Certainly "money politics" did not 
seem as great a problem-notwithstanding the country's continuing 
economic growth and prosperity. It may be that accusations and pub-
licity about vote buying and excessive campaign spending in recent 
elections and during the campaign for this election had some impact. 
A poll taken after the election showed that the populace per-
ceived that the election reflected progress-by nearly seven-fold over 
those who perceived that it did not. Over 60 percent replied that the 
election was fair-nearly five times as many as those that thought it 
was unfair. Vote buying was also judged to be a less serious problem 
(confirming what observers, including this one, perceived), with nearly 
70 percent saying that they did not think it was a serious problem in 
their district or did not personally know about any such incidents. 
The problem seemed to be perceived by those polled as more serious in 
other areas. 32 
Most considered the election to have gone smoothly in view of the 
existence of a new party and the fact that it was the first true party 
competition in a national election in Taiwan. Because it was generally 
understood that the government was not going to enforce most of the 
campaign rules, many felt the election, especially the campaigning, 
would not be orderly. On the other hand, there were very few serious 
incidents during the campaign and none during the voting. 
Clearly there was no overwhelming issue that divided the nation. 
Issues were "bread and butter" issues. Sensitive or controversial is-
sues were used primarily as attention getters. Perhaps this was be-
cause the system was "on trial," as were the democratic process and 
political modernization. This was as it should have been, considering 
the country was in a transition phase evolving into a democratic sys-
tem-at a very high rate of speed. 
31. See "The People Spoke their Minds," Asiaweek, December 21-28, 1986, pp. 24-29. 
32. See China Times (in Chinese), December 7, 1986, p. l. 
CHAPTER4 
TAIWAN'S 1989 NATIONAL AND LOCAL ELECI'IONS 
Introduction 
On December 2, 1989, the electorate in Taiwan went to the polls 
to pick 101 members of the Legislative Yuan, 77 members (or a ple-
num) of the Provincial Assembly, 94 members of the Taipei and 
Kaohsiung city councils, and 21 county magistrates and city mayors. 
This was one of four major elections in Taiwan's recent history to play 
a vital role in pushing the democratization process ahead. 1 
Observers noted that this election was in many ways the culmina-
tion of rapid, progressive change in the electoral processes in Taiwan. 
This was also another watershed election in several respects because 
the opposition Democratic Progressive Party attained what most con-
sider a resounding victory, giving it the status of a serious opposition 
party and perhaps auguring in the beginning of a two-party system. 
There was widespread discussion of Taiwan independence causing re-
lations with the People's Republic of China to become a campaign 
issue as it had never been before. 
The election was preceded by several important "legal changes" 
in the system (since the last national election in 1986) that affected the 
election process. First was the enacting of the Civic Organization 
Law, which made it legal to form new political parties.2 Thus, for the 
first time the Nationalist Party (KMT) faced a genuine, legal opposi-
tion. It was unclear in the months prior to the election whether the 
opposition would take the form of one main or core opposition party 
or many. Nearly forty parties formed; eighteen entered candidates in 
the race. 
Second, the government had just revised the Public Officials Elec-
I. The other three were in 1980, 1983 and 1986. For details on past elections, see 
John F. Copper with George P. Chen, Taiwan's Elections: Political Development and De-
mocratization in the Republic of China (Baltimore: University of Maryland School of Law, 
1984); John F. Copper, "Taiwan's 1985 Elections," Asian Affairs, Spring 1986, pp. 27-45; 
John F. Copper, "Taiwan's 1986 National Election: Pushing Democracy Ahead," Asian 
Thought and Society, July 1987, pp. 115-136. 
2. Excerpts of this law have been published in typewritten form by the Government 
Information Office in Taipei. A complete English version will be forthcoming. 
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tion and Recall Law.3 Control over election campaigns and other en-
forcement of election laws was transferred from the military to civilian 
organizations. The new law also expanded political participation and 
made elections more competitive in form. The Democratic Progres-
sive Party characterized the revisions as making the system more dem-
ocratic, but it complained that there were too many limits or 
restrictions on electioneering and that the law discriminated against 
the opposition in a number of ways. DPP leaders particularly com-
plained about the short campaign period and the forbidding of televi-
sion advertising, which they charged did not hurt the KMT since it 
owned or controlled all of the T.V. networks.4 KMT candidates com-
plained that the "equal access" to media coverage in the revised law 
treated the ruling party unfairly since it was much larger. Both lauded 
provisions which were aimed at discouraging "whimsical candidates" 
and which hurt smaller parties and independents; the two major par-
ties felt these provisions made the process more rational. Both chided 
the unrealistic restrictions on campaign spending. 
Third, early in the year the Legislative Yuan passed the Law on 
Voluntary Retirement of Senior Parliamentarians. 5 In enacting this 
bill, the Legislative Yuan sought to reduce the number of delegates to 
the elected bodies of government who were voted into office (and sub-
sequently frozen or replaced with appointed members) before the gov-
ernment moved to Taiwan in 1949. This was a sensitive issue because 
the opposition regarded these delegates to the National Assembly, the 
Legislative Yuan, and the Control Yuan as illegitimate. DPP candi-
dates mocked them in public and asked them to "step down or hurry 
up and die," charging they were an obstacle to democracy. The KMT 
argued that they were duly elected and should be allowed to retire 
with respect. The issue mirrored the fact that Taiwan's political sys-
tem assumes one China, which the KMT supports and the DPP labels 
ludicrous. The KMT, in its one-China policy, however, had the sup-
port of both Washington and Beijing. 
Another systemic change affecting the campaign and the election 
was the inauguration of a primary election system by the KMT, with 
3. The Public Officials Election and Recall Law of the Republic of China (Taipei: 
Shine Chin Enterprises Co., Ltd. 1989) 
4. These complaints were presented by Shih-yuan Tsai, Deputy Secretary-General of 
the Democratic Progressive Party, during a briefing to an election observer team in Taipei 
during the campaign. They are also contained in a typed booklet entitled "Taiwan Accord-
ing to the DPP" given to members of the observer teams. 
5. This statute has been printed in English and is available in typed form from the 
Government Information Office. 
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the DPP immediately following suit. This weakened the KMT leader-
ship's control over the nomination process and caused some ruling 
party officials already in elective office to fail to be nominated. Both 
created serious problems for the KMT. Primaries also resulted in the 
military and veterans having a large voice in the nominating process, 
since their turnout was high and they voted as a bloc in the primaries. 
The KMT hence nominated more Mainland Chinese. The primaries 
caused problems for the DPP as well, but in the context of already 
serious differences on central issues and leadership it was not as dis-
ruptive a process as for the KMT.6 
This was the first election in Taiwan since the termination of mar-
tiallaw in July 1987 and the January 1988 end of a ban on new news-
papers. It was the first since the death of Chiang Ching-kuo in 
January 1988 and the succession of a Taiwan-born president. It also 
followed the opening of significant contacts with the People's Republic 
of China. Finally, it came in the wake of the Tiananmen Massacre-
which some linked to an urgent need to keep Taiwan separate from 
China and which led some to talk about and even advocate 
independence. 
The election results were generally unexpected. Only the KMT 
and the DPP emerged with meaningful representation in the elective 
bodies of government. Other parties and independents did poorly. 
More important, the DPP victory exceeded the predictions of most 
experts. This gave rise again to speculation about the evolution of a 
two-party system, the impact of opposition politicians on the decision 
making process in the future, and much more. The KMT, though still 
in control and sometimes claiming the ruling party had won in a fair 
and even contest, perceived the election as a setback. 
The Campaign 
The campaign began officially on November 17 for the Legislative 
Yuan race and on November 22 for the other contests. The period 
was divided into two parts: the individually or privately-conducted 
part followed by officially-sponsored or public sessions. In fact, how-
ever, the campaign began much earlier, technically in violation of the 
election law; but this was not unlike previous election campaigns. 
Candidates, in order to circumvent the restrictions on the length of 
campaigns, held teas and birthday parties and gave "educational 
speeches." Observers viewed these events as "early campaign" efforts. 
6. See Wu Wen-cheng and Chen 1-hsin, Elections and Political Development in Tai-
wan (Taipei: Government Information Office, 1989), pp. 16-18. 
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The DPP's "early campaign" was highlighted by the return of a 
number of dissidents, mostly anti-KMT figures, from abroad, mainly 
from the United States. Many came carrying U.S. passports with dif-
ferent spellings of their names and in this way escaped detection. Hsu 
Hsin-liang was the most famous. Hsu, who was under indictment for 
treason, had tried to return for the 1986 election, only to be detained 
at the airport and sent back. This time he returned on a fishing boat 
and was arrested, making it difficult for the government to ignore him. 
In fact, he said that he had come back to stand trial, which he had 
been denied before. Former U.S. Attorney General Ramsey Clark 
attempted to travel to Taiwan to represent him but was not granted an 
entry visa. In jail, Hsu was allowed to talk to news reporters, thus 
drawing attention to his case while rallying his supporters. On Octo-
ber 10 supporters besieged the detention center where he was held, 
sparking a riot that resulted in injury to a number of police and 
onlookers. 7 
Another was Lin Yi-hsiang, whose mother and daughter were 
mysteriously murdered subsequent to the Kaohsiung Incident in 1979. 
Lin, shortly after he got back to Taiwan, published what he called the 
"basic law" for the "Republic of Taiwan." The text was printed in 
two of Taiwan's large newspapers. The Justice Ministry initiated pro-
ceedings against him as well as the newspapers, but the Ministry did 
not act quickly. Lin's "basic law" thus became well known and was 
widely discussed throughout Taiwan during the campaign. 8 
A third famous dissident who returned was Kuo Pei-hung. Kuo, 
chairman of the U.S.-based World United Formosans for Indepen-
dence, was on the wanted list in Taiwan for sedition. He came back 
without notice before the campaign and organized his followers for a 
"grandstand play." On November 22, during an evening political 
rally, he stepped out of the crowd and up on the platform and to the 
podium. He proceeded to give a highly emotional and inflammatory 
speech in which he attacked the government and the KMT. This ex-
cited the crowd, most of whom expected the police to close in at any 
moment and arrest Kuo. The police attempted to do exactly that, but 
when they moved in someone turned out the lights. Kuo and hun-
dreds of his supporters donned black masks, and in the confusion Kuo 
escaped. The police, and the government, were thoroughly embar-
rassed by the incident. Subsequently DPP candidates exhibited or 
7. Lincoln Kaye, "On the Defensive," Far Eastern Economic Review, October 19, 
1989, p. 26. For details on Hsu's earlier attempts to return, see Copper, "Taiwan's 1986 
Election" cited in footnote 1. 
8. For details, see China Post, November 11, 1989, p. 12. 
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wore similar black masks at their rallies-black symbolizing their 
blacklisted colleagues who could not return to Taiwan or could not 
run in the election. After some deliberation, the Election Commission 
banned the use of masks by candidates. 9 
Just before the campaign period started, 32 DPP candidates be-
longing to the New Tide Faction, which advocated or supported Tai-
wan independence, announced the formation of the "New Country 
Alliance" and called for a new constitution and the election by Tai-
wan's electorate of all members of Taiwan's elected bodies of govern-
ment. This pushed the independence issue further to the forefront of 
the campaign and underscored the challenge of the issue to the gov-
ernment and the KMT-and to Beijing. 10 
The KMT responded, though not in kind. KMT legislators 
pushed a tough anti-crime bill through the Legislative Yuan, timing it 
to be announced just before the election. Government officials also 
initiated several special crime control efforts, including dragnets that 
brought in large numbers of wanted criminals. Some were associated 
with the DPP. Beijing assailed the advocates of Taiwan independence, 
referring to the "evil consequences of the policy of two Chinas," and 
promised to make a "strong response." 11 Nationalist Party leaders 
widely quoted Beijing's threats. 
The government, with KMT prompting, also announced a 
number of bills and actions that Party leaders hoped would help KMT 
candidates. Though many had been on the agenda for some time, they 
were given special emphasis or a different spin. In mid-November the 
KMT published a campaign advertisement saying that a vote for the 
KMT would be a vote for a bullish stock market-implying that vot-
ing for the DPP would cause the market to fall, thereby hurting nearly 
four million owners of shares of stock (one fifth of the population and 
perhaps half of the voters). 12 The government, apparently at the insti-
gation of KMT leaders, also backed down from investigating invest-
ment houses which had been criticized for creating an atmosphere of 
wild financial speculating in Taiwan. Officials also suddenly decided 
9. See "No more marks allowed, Election Commission says," China News, November 
30, 1989, p. 12. See "Kuo Pei-hung's parents ask police to stop hunt," China Post, Novem-
ber 27, 1989, p. 12 for details on the impact of the case during the campaign. 
10. See James McGregor, "Taiwan Poll Renews Independence Issue," Asian Wall 
Street Journal, November 30, 1989, p.l. 
11. See "Guarding Against the Ideological Trends of Taiwan Independence,'' Liao 
wang, November 27, 1989, pp. 21-22, translated in FBIS (China), November 29, 1989, p. 
52. 
12. See "KMT ad misled investors into purchasing shares,'' China Post, November 26, 
1989, p. 8. 
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against imposing a higher stock transaction tax to dampen stock 
speculation. 
When the campaign period started, the government ordered 
10,000 extra police on duty to keep order. Riot police in full gear 
patrolled areas where they thought violence might occur. Govern-
ment spokesmen said this was justified by the rise in crime in Taiwan 
in recent years. Moreover, crime escalated at election time due to 
criminals taking advantage of the increased presence of cash in the 
hands of campaigners and their assistants. There were other reasons 
for concern about violence during the campaign: Chen Yung-yuan, an 
independent candidate for a Legislative Yuan seat, had been shot on 
the street in Changhua, apparently by gangsters who had tried to ex-
tort money from him. The death of Yu Deng-fa, the founder of the 
opposition movement in southern Taiwan and father of Yu Chen 
Yueh-ying, who was running for Kaohsiung county magistrate, also 
drew attention. Yu probably died of natural causes (as the coroner 
had reported), though DPP leaders claimed he had been murdered. 
DPP candidate Hsu Jung-shu's office was torched and TV host Hu 
Kua, a KMT supporter, reported numerous death threats. 13 
The DPP complained about the police, but many of their candi-
dates requested the same police protection that was offered to all can-
didates. Many also hired their own bodyguards. A police dragnet 
launched during the campaign resulted in five thousand arrests and 
the seizure of hundreds of handguns smuggled in from China. 
DPP candidates and their aides accused the KMT of vote buying 
at nearly every rally. In private, however, DPP leaders admitted that 
DPP candidates were also engaging in the practice. The prosecutor's 
office of the Supreme Court offered a NT $200,000 reward for evi-
dence of vote buying, but this brought few results. Certainly it did not 
hinder the practice much. On the other hand, one expert opined that 
vote buying was only a 20 percent guarantee of a vote for a specific 
candidate. 14 
Spending in excess of legal limits was also commonplace. DPP 
candidates accused the KMT of using funds from party-owned compa-
nies in illegal ways. Wu Li-yi, a KMT candidate, shocked an Ameri-
can election observer team when he stated publicly that he would 
spend N.T.$30 million (over one million U.S. dollars) on the election 
and his DPP opponent would spend double that. Like their KMT 
counterparts, DPP candidates clearly had money to spend, as reflected 
13. See "Shadow of Violence," Asiaweek, December 1, 1989, p. 35. 
14. See China Post, November 28, 1989, p. 12. 
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by their well-heeled campaigns, gifts, and lavish parties. Observers 
noted that vote buying and illegal campaign spending were the result 
of Taiwan's economic boom combined with the now greater impor-
tance of elected officials in influencing economic decisions. Most re-
garded the growth of "money politics" as unfortunate but also 
inevitable. 
The DPP almost daily charged that the KMT possessed a monop-
oly over television coverage and political advertising since all three of 
Taiwan's stations are either owned by the KMT or by the government. 
Late in the campaign, the DPP decided to do something about this. 
Announcing it in advance, the DPP began broadcasting from a "guer-
rilla station." DPP leaders subsequently claimed to be establishing a 
permanent station in the Philippines to broadcast opposition views to 
Taiwan. DPP candidates meanwhile sold videotapes of their speeches, 
anti-KMT demonstrations, and the rally where Kuo Pei-hung ap-
peared and then disappeared. 15 
Both parties took a number of opinion surveys during the cam-
paign. Many distorted the results; some were completely fake. One 
opposition candidate even sued a polling organization over an inaccu-
rate survey. The KMT published several surveys indicating that most 
of the population did not support Taiwan independence. The DPP 
responded with polls indicating that virtually no one wanted to unify 
with China and be ruled by the Chinese Communist Party, thus sug-
gesting that the majority favored separation and thus independence. 
Completely different results were obtained by asking the question dif-
ferently. Both sides also published inaccurate poll data predicting the 
election outcome. 16 
So-called "snails without shells" (people with sufficient incomes, 
but unable to afford decent housing) staged mass "sleep-ins" in expen-
sive residential areas and in conspicuous places in several of Taiwan's 
large cities during the campaign. 17 Some observers said the DPP was 
behind these demonstrations. "Water buffaloes without skin" (people 
who could not cheat on their income tax because of withholding) also 
complained in organized public appearances. 
A large number of candidates slandered opponents. Many filed 
15. See Lincoln Kaye, "Television Tangle," Far Eastern Economic Review, November 
30, 1989, pp. 23-24. 
16. "Opposition Candidate Sues Group Over Inaccurate Survey," China Post, Novem-
ber 30, 1989, p. 11. Also see, "KMT Projects Winning 70 Percent of Votes," and "DPP 
Comes Out on Top in NTU Simulated Poll" in China Post, November 30, 1989, p.ll. 
17. "'Snails without Shells' Endorse 18 Candidates," China Post, November 30, 1989, 
p. 12. 
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lawsuits against opposing candidates. A retired military man slapped 
Kaohsiung county commissioner Yu Chen Yueh-ying while she was 
campaigning. Organizing groups to heckle other candidates or honk-
ing car horns to disrupt their speeches was widespread. Candidates 
beheaded chickens and swore to be honest politicians or took vows in 
temples. There was a multitude of other campaign antics. 18 
Some opposition candidates compared the Presidential Square in 
Taipei with Tiananmen. Others said that if the KMT stole the elec-
tion its leaders would have to leave as the Marcos' did and would 
probably take all their treasures and money with them. Some accused 
the old guard KMT of "refusing to die." Many spoke in Taiwanese 
only, saying that it was the "language of the people", in contrast to 
Mandarin Chinese, which was the ruling class language. Many ac-
cused top leaders of having multiple wives or of other moral 
indiscretions. 
Ju Gau-jeng, the "KMT's Rambo," accused opposition candi-
dates of stupidity with regard to the independence issue, and he said 
they were ignorant and generally uneducated. He even declared that 
some of his critics "should be exterminated." He bragged of his large 
following and claimed credit for changing the KMT's foreign and do-
mestic policies singlehandedly. 19 
Attracting more attention than other candidates, New Country 
Alliance members responded to authorities in Beijing criticizing their 
advocacy of independence by staging public burnings of People's Re-
public of China flags while challenging Deng Xiaoping and other com-
munist leaders to use military force against Taiwan. Many cursed 
Deng and other Chinese leaders. One DPP candidate sent an invita-
tion to Premier Li Peng to come observe the election. 
The single candidate drawing the biggest crowds, however, was 
Hsu Hsiao-tan of the Labor Party. Hsu, who had been a stripper, ran 
on a platform of supporting the arts and openness in government. De-
picting both, she distributed a campaign poster with a picture of her-
self, nude, breaking through a KMT emblem. At one point she 
challenged her opponent, also female, to a debate in English and a 
comparison of nipples. 
Toward the end of the campaign uncertainty prevailed in the 
stock market, and the Tai Index saw the biggest drop ever in a single 
18. See HoYing, "Tactics and Strategies Within the Combat Zone," China News, No-
vember 30, 1989, p. 12. 
19. Ibid., p. 23. 
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day. The next day it rose a record amount. 20 The government, on 
behalf of the KMT according to opposition critics, issued a statement 
on the stock transaction tax a couple of days later hoping that this 
statement would cause the market to rise. The stock market stabi-
lized, but slid downward during the last few days before the election. 
The day before the election, when KMT General Secretary James 
Soong announced that 34 of the elder parliamentarians would be re-
tired, DPP leaders cried foul. They had a similar reaction when a 
statement by Deng Xiaoping, to the effect that he would solve the 
"Taiwan problem" in five years probably from "inside of Taiwan," 
was published the day of the election. DPP leaders said this was cal-
culated to frighten the electorate from voting for opposition 
candidates. 21 
The newly organized Campaign for Clean Elections sought to 
oversee the election. It published several tracts on human rights 
problems in Taiwan and a list of those candidates engaging in vote 
buying. Because it was an arm of the DPP (according to the KMT), 
most of the accused were naturally ruling party candidates. Two to 
three hundred foreign reporters covered the election along with several 
U.S. election observer teams, including one composed of five members 
of Congress. 22 
The kind of campaign just described naturally overshadowed the 
two parties' platforms and strategies. Thus both need to be assessed 
in-depth. 
The KMT's platform remained much the same as in previous 
elections. It claimed credit for the Taiwan economic "miracle" and 
the high standards of living and prosperity it produced. It also 
claimed to have engineered political development. The KMT simi-
larly portrayed itself as the party of experience, which could keep the 
nation "on track"-prosperous and stable. More specifically, its 
agenda consisted of capitalism mixed with the right amount of social 
security and welfare, a trade-led growth economy, and shifting to a 
capital and knowledge-intensive economy. The party claimed also to 
be a party of progress and a "party on the go" that would lead the 
nation ahead. 23 
The KMT took a tough stand against crime and advocated social 
20. See James McGregor, "Taipei Stocks Bounce Back By Record 6.5%," Asian Wall 
Street Journal, November 30, 1989, p. l. 
21. "Candidates Engage in Last-minute Campaigning on Eve of Election," China Post, 
December 2, 1989, p. 12. 
22. "300 Newsmen, Observers Here for Election," China Post, December 2, 1989, p.12. 
23. For a summary of KMT platform and strategy, see "Campaign Strategist," (Inter-
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and political stability. It promised actions to deal with bread and but-
ter issues such as air pollution, traffic, and water problems. 
The only ideological issue of importance in the K.MT's platform 
was anti-independence. KMT leaders promised to keep Chinese terri-
tory and culture in tact: a one China policy. Party leaders who 
sought to give this a different or more positive spin cited the "Taiwan 
model" for reform on the mainland. Some KMT candidates, however, 
ignored or played down the one-China idea, choosing to concentrate 
on domestic issues. 
The KMT appealed to farmers and the business community more 
than to other groups, but it claimed to represent the whole nation 
rather than specific groups or interests. Its program was basically con-
servative, which it said fit with the traditionalism and conservatism of 
Chinese culture. It lauded education, hard work, honesty, and merit. 
It also spoke of morality in government. 
KMT strategists sought to portray the DPP and most of the other 
new opposition parties as radicals and hotheads who associated with 
criminal and lower-class elements. The KMT pictured the opposition 
as having little experience, unrealistic programs, and an agenda that 
might bring the country to ruin economically and to war with the 
mainland. 
The DPP's campaign platform listed "political order based on de-
mocracy and freedom" as its first item. Party briefings and campaign 
literature focused on "real democracy" and more political and civil 
liberties. DPP leaders pointed out that to have democracy the KMT 
must cut its ties with the government and end its control of the media 
and its "illegitimate" relationship with numerous industries and busi-
nesses. They stressed that constitutional guidelines such as checks and 
balances must be respected and charged the KMT with being in power 
too long.24 
The DPP's main tactic was to make the electorate believe that, in 
order for Taiwan to become democratic, the public must support the 
DPP. In short, a DPP victory--or even a better performance in the 
election-would mean truly competitive elections, and therefore, polit-
ical modernization in the direction of democracy. In this connection 
party leaders insisted that Taiwan must become democratic in order to 
parry efforts by Beijing to incorporate Taiwan. 
view of Wang Shu-ching, Chief Commissioner of the KMT City Committee, by Chen Yi-
ming),Free China Review, December 1989, pp. 32-37. 
24. See "Taiwan According to the DPP," (mimeographed brochure given to foreign 
observers by the DPP during the election). 
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The DPP platform called for balanced economic and financial ad-
ministration, which in more specific terms meant full employment, a 
fairer tax system, better transportation, and environmental protection. 
It proposed an improved welfare system and social security system. 
The DPP advocated a "peaceful" foreign policy and mentioned specif-
ically cutting the size of the military, ending hostilities with the main-
land, and participating in international organizations. 
Most frequently mentioned in DPP candidates' speeches were the 
unfair advantages possessed by the KMT, the KMT's hold on the gov-
ernment, the senior parliamentarians, and KMT vote buying. They 
charged that under the KMT political change had not kept pace with 
economic development. Although the party itself did not take a spe-
cific position on the issue of Taiwan's independence, it did cite self-
determination in its platform. Moreover nearly all of its candidates 
argued that unification with China was a stupid idea, which had no 
public support, and that something must be done (meaning keeping 
Taiwan separate) in response to Beijing's terrible human rights record 
and its threats toward Taiwan. DPP leaders chided the KMT's wait-
and-see policy and the idea that time was on Taiwan's side. 
The DPP made a clear and strong appeal to only one interest 
group: labor. Party leaders made reference to farmers' problems, but 
not strongly; they did not expect to win many of those votes. While 
not trying to appeal to socio-economic or occupational groups or to 
regions in Taiwan, DPP leaders aimed to attract anti-government, 
anti-KMT, and protest vote. The DPP also appealed to the demo-
cratic-minded and to those with a socialist inclination. Its program 
was clearly more liberal than conservative, if compared to the KMT or 
to definitions used in platforms of political parties in Western 
countries. 
The DPP stated that its strategy for election victory was to seek 
power at the local level and "surround the center." This, especially 
the terminology, sounded like Mao's 1940 strategy to defeat the Na-
tionalists: by winning popular support, a guerrilla war strategy aimed 
to defeat the Nationalists by prevailing in the countryside and later 
surrounding and strangling the cities. Many, in fact, understood the 
allusion. On the other hand, DPP leaders also vowed that in this way 
they could get the KMT accustomed to sharing power and not evoke a 
KMT backlash to their gains. In any event, the DPP had good cause 
to adopt such a game plan because it was more capable of winning 
local elections, and local elected positions are powerful and are spring-
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boards for national elective office in Taiwan. 25 
As in previous elections, the platforms of both parties failed to 
reflect very well what the voters thought were the most important is-
sues. The biggest election issue as reflected in most polls was crime. 
Following were pollution and traffic. Taxes, water control, and other 
tangible issues were also important. Economic growth was an issue, 
but only in the sense that the electorate wanted sustained growth; few 
wanted higher growth rates. Trade was an issue, but this was a matter 
of keeping trade on track. Social security, health insurance, and wel-
fare were important, but what the public wanted in these areas was 
unclear. 26 
With regard to these "bread and butter" matters, not only did the 
two parties not focus on the issues, but their positions did not differ 
very much. Both parties called for a crackdown on crime. The KMT 
claimed to be the party of law and order, and most citizens perceived 
it as such. However, because big increases in crime in Taiwan had 
occurred on the "KMT's shift," its position on law and order was 
somewhat less than credible. Some even said that the KMT had be-
come too soft and was making too many concessions to democracy. 
Others said the KMT did not mind the increasing crime rate since this 
was an issue that favored a KMT vote. On the issues of pollution and 
traffic and on a number of other substantial issues, the KMT was seen 
by the electorate as more competent to handle the problems, but also 
as the party that allowed the problems to become as serious as they 
were. Most voters expected higher taxes to pay for more social welfare 
if the DPP were to rule the country, but they did not think seriously in 
terms of that happening and thus did not show much worry over 
higher taxes. 
The choice between parties, in the last analysis, was more a mat-
ter of supporting either the status quo or more democracy. The KMT 
had a better agenda; the DPP had in its favor the democratization 
issue. To some extent ethnicity was important: Mainlanders favored 
the KMT; Taiwanese identified with both parties, though the DPP 
was seen as a Taiwanese party. On the issue of Taiwan independence 
the choice between the two parties was clear, though the meaning of 
that term was not. Meanwhile, nearly every candidate's campaign was 
25. For further details, see James McGregor, "Taiwan's DPP Pins Hopes on Local 
Posts," Asian Wall Street Journal, December 1-2, 1989, p. l. 
26. The issues the voters were most concerned about were little different from other 
recent elections. There were differences in voters' interests comparing urban and rural 
areas. In some cases the polls reftected contradictory interests; for example, voters favored 
increased social security and health insurance, but not higher taxes. 
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to a great extent personal: differences between himself or herself and 
the opponent. 
The Election Results 
The Election Commission was not able to announce all of the 
results of the election by midnight on polling day as it had promised. 
Despite the more refined and sophisticated vote tallying system, accu-
sations of vote fraud and demands for recounts slowed down the pro-
cess. The DPP had organized protest demonstrations in advance, 
thinking that its candidates would be cheated or assuming they would 
lose. In most cases, however, the DPP candidate either was victorious 
or the KMT candidate won so clearly that alleged irregularities were 
not taken seriously. Yet a couple of exceptions caused protest demon-
strations to go on for two or three days. 
In the Legislative Yuan contest the KMT won 72 seats, the DPP 
21, and others (meaning independents) 8; this was 71.3%, 20.8% and 
7.9% of the seats respectively. In the Provincial Assembly race the 
KMT won 54 seats, the D PP won 16, and others 7; this was 70.1%, 
20.8%, and 9.1% of the seats. In the country magistrate and city 
mayor races the KMT won 14, the DPP 6, and others 1, or 66.7%, 
28.6% and 4.8% in the order listed. For the Taipei City Council and 
the Kaohsiung City Council races the tallies were: KMT 36, the DPP 
14, and others 1, and the KMT 29, DPP 8, and others 5.27 
In comparison to the number of seats each held before the elec-
tion (as a result of the 1986 election in the case of the Legislative Yuan 
and the 1985 election for the other races) the KMT lost ground in 
every category: 6 seats in the Legislative Yuan, 5 in the Provincial 
Assembly, 3 county magistrate and city mayor offices, 2 Taipei City 
Council seats, and 3 Kaohsiung City council seats. Since the DPP had 
come into existence in 1986, after the previous local election, DPP 
gains other than in the Legislative Yuan election were all new. How-
ever, if one assumes the DPP is the successor to the tangwai, the DPP 
made significant gains in those races. In the legislative race the DPP 
gained 9 seats. 
Besides reflecting a broad and significant DPP victory, which will 
be discussed further below, the election results indicate that third par-
ties were unprepared. The new opposition parties, in short, failed to 
prove they had, or could build, a base of support. Only the Labor 
Party won a seat-a single place on the Kaohsiung City Council. The 
27. Final election results were published in China Post and China News, December 4, 
1989. 
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two older parties which were aligned with the KMT also failed to 
demonstrate viability: the Young China Party lost the two seats it 
held in the Legislative Yuan and its one seat in the Provincial Assem-
bly, while the China Democratic Socialist Party lost its only seat in the 
Provincial Assembly. Similarly, independents did less well than in 
previous elections, losing ground in all of the races except the Legisla-
tive Yuan race. While it may be too early to make such a conclusion, 
this is strong evidence that a two-party system, not a multi-party sys-
tem, is evolving. In any event December 1989 witnessed a two-party 
election victory. 
Because there was a larger number of candidates than in previous 
elections, a significantly smaller percentage of contestants won: 
33.2% for Legislative Yuan seats as compared to 73% in the 1986 
election. In this sense the election was more competitive than other 
recent elections. Besides this, few incumbents won office. This was in 
part because few ran: only 48 of the 304 candidates for Legislative 
Yuan seats were incumbents. Of those, seven lost. This translates into 
70% newcomer winners. 28 In many cases incumbent legislators de-
cided to run in other elections, many of them viewing some of the 
other offices, especially county magistrates, as more important. KMT-
DPP competition was also more intense for magistrate offices, thereby 
causing both parties to try to put their best candidates up for these 
races, in a number of cases pulling them from other races. 
Family members or relatives of known political figures generally 
did well. Relatives of the presidents of the Legislative Yuan, the Judi-
cial Yuan, and the Control Yuan all won seats. Two sons of the for-
mer mayor of Kaohsiung won posts running on the KMT ticket. Yu 
Chen Yueh-ying, who was reelected Kaohsiung County magistrate, 
saw her son elected to the Legislative Yuan and her daughter elected 
to the Taiwan Provincial Assembly. Chang Po-ya was elected to the 
Legislative Yuan and her sister Chaiyi was elected mayor; their 
mother was a noted local politician. Meanwhile several candidates ran 
in place of their husbands or wives. However, some kin of known 
political figures lost, such as You Ching's brother, who ran for the 
Legislative Yuan.29 
A number of candidates won on sympathy vote. Chen Shui-bian, 
who had been injured in an accident, campaigned in a wheel chair; he 
won. Yeh Chu-lau, whose husband burned himself to death in April 
28. "7 Legislators Not Reelected; 70% of Parliament Newcomers," China Post, De-
cember 4, 1989, p. 12. 
29. "Political Dynasties Flourish as Family Members are Elected," China Post, De-
cember 4, 1989, p. 12. 
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after his opposition magazine was closed and while under investigatio~ 
for sedition, won a seat in the Legislative Yuan. A number of candi-
dates who had served jail terms were elected. Several won who cam-
paigned on the independence issue and some won after declaring they 
could avoid jail if elected. 
Mainlander and female candidates did well, especially in the Leg-
islative Yuan. Mainlanders won 19.2 percent of the seats; female can-
didates won 14.1 percent. Over 25 percent of KMT victors of 
Legislative Yuan seats were Mainlanders- the result of the military 
vote in the primary. Almost 20 percent of KMT winners were fe-
male-a product of the KMT entering more female candidates than 
ever. Less than 6 percent of DPP victors were Mainlanders or 
women.30 
The increase in the number of Mainlanders (all second genera-
tion) was five fold. (Only three had won seats in the 1986 election.) 
Some observers said this marked an end to the KMT's "affirmative 
action" policy designed to run more Taiwanese candidates. It needed 
to be reversed, many said, since the percentage of KMT Taiwanese 
candidates in recent elections had exceeded the percentage of the 
Taiwanese population. Moreover, many applauded the young Main-
lander candidates as a force for reason and democracy, since most ad-
vocated phasing out senior parliamentarians and reforming the KMT, 
yet were more moderate on other issues. Some said the ethnic back-
grounds of candidates had faded in importance. In any event Jau 
Shau-kong, a second generation Mainlander, won the third largest 
number of votes nationwide. Another Mainlander, Yu Mu-ming, was 
the top vote getter from the southern Taipei area. 31 
The educational level of winning candidates was high but did not 
show an increase from the last election. In fact, it dropped. This was 
due in part to the larger number of DPP winners-the DPP not giving 
the same emphasis to educational qualifications as the KMT. The 
level of experience of winners was also less for the same reason. Put-
ting a positive twist on these facts, many observers said educational 
qualification had been overemphasized in past campaigns, while lack 
of experience may be interpreted to mean broader experience. 32 The 
average age of winning candidates was somewhat higher, though for 
30. These calculations are my own based on a number of local newspaper reports on 
winning candidates. 
31. "2nd Generation Mainlanders Do Well in Poll," China Post, December 4, 1989, p. 
12. 
32. "Newly Elected Officials by Age and Educational Background", China News, De-
cember 4, 1989, p. 12. 
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victorious candidates for Legislative Yuan seats it was almost the 
same. 
Voter turnout was 75.4% of an estimated 12 million eligible vot-
ers. This was up markedly from the last two elections. In fact, the 
voter turnout in this election was the highest in ten years. Inasmuch 
as campaign rallies were not attended as well as in the last three elec-
tions, voter interest seems to have been hidden. Alternatively, voters 
were interested but based their decisions on information from other 
sources. 33 
In light of the election results, the KMT could, and in some cases 
did, claim victory. The ruling party won 60 percent of the popular 
vote and more than two-thirds of the seats in every category of candi-
dates: Legislative Yuan, 71.3% (69.6% not counting the 13 of 18 vo-
cational seats); Provincial Assembly, 70%; Taipei City Council, 67%, 
Kaohsiung City Council, 67%; county magistrates and city mayors 
(taken as one category), 67%. The KMT accomplished this while 
making the playing field level or almost level and in spite of many 
voters favoring the opposition not because of its platform or its candi-
dates but in order to make the system democratic. Finally, by com-
parison with elections in Western democracies the vote was a 
resounding victory for the KMT. 
Still, few observers viewed the election as a KMT victory; most 
saw it as a major setback. All of Taiwan's major newspapers carried 
headlines that proclaimed a KMT defeat. The KMT held an emer-
gency meeting Sunday morning after the election to discuss the results, 
and most at the meeting considered it an effort to discover what went 
wrong. Party Secretary-General James Soong stated solemnly: "We 
calmly accept the upset."34 
DPP leaders unequivocally viewed the election as a defeat for the 
KMT and a victory for their party. The DPP won 31 percent of the 
popular vote. An additional 9 percent of the popular vote went to 
independents, most of whom favored the DPP. DPP leaders declared 
after the election that they had accomplished this in spite of the tre-
mendous disadvantages (not a level playing field), the small member-
ship of the party (20,000 compared to 2.5 million KMT members), 
and the fact that their party was only three years old. DPP leaders 
also noted that the purported split over the issue of independence had 
not proven real. In addition, they pointed out that all other competing 
33. For details, see "Voter Turnout," China News, December 4, 1989, p.12. 
34. See "Worst Poll Setbacks for KMT in 40 Years," China Post, December 4, 1989, p. 
1. 
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parties had failed. 35 
In terms of popular vote the DPP registered an increase of nearly 
10 percent from the previous election in 1986. In total number of 
seats, the gain was even more impressive---25 percent. The DPP made 
advances in every category of elections. In the Legislative Yuan elec-
tion the DPP won nine more seats for a total of 21. Since 20 is re-
quired to introduce legislation, this was a breakthrough. In the city 
council elections, the DPP doubled its representation in Kaohsiung 
and gained 40 percent in Taipei over what the tangwai had won in 
1985. In the Taiwan Provincial Assembly the DPP made a smaller, 
but still impressive, gain. 
The biggest DPP victory came in the county magistrate races. 
Many consider the county magistrate the most powerful popularly 
elected official in Taiwan, and the DPP campaigned hard for these 
slots. In these races the DPP won 38 percent of the popular vote, 
compared to the KMT's 53 percent. It won 6 magistrates (Taipei, 
Ilan, Hsinchu, Changhua, Pingtung, Kaohsiung). As a result, the 
DPP gained control of the executive of the county governments 
wherein 40 percent of the population lives, including the capital city. 
The KMT had never before lost more than 4 magistrate races. 
Anti-KMT county magistrates have in recent years destroyed po-
lice and intelligence agency records on county employees and have 
tried to withhold tax revenues from the national government. In so 
acting they caused major problems for the national government and 
the KMT. Now DPP magistrates can do this, and much more, if they 
choose. They may try to disestablish KMT organizations, especially 
KMT branches, within or close to county or city governments. They 
may seek to restructure local police systems. They may institute local 
health insurance programs and unemployment and welfare benefits. 
The DPP will certainly exercise considerable political influence in the 
counties for the next four years and probably beyond. 
The DPP can also claim victory inasmuch as most of the candi-
dates that the KMT tried hardest to defeat won. You Ching, winner 
of the county magistrate seat in Taipei county, site of the capital city 
and the home of President Lee Teng-hui and other top government 
leaders, is the best example. There are several others. In addition, 
many of the most radical and controversial DPP candidates won. The 
majority of DPP winners were of the New Tide faction, the most vo-
ciferous supporters or advocates of Taiwan independence. 
35. For DPP victory statements, see various articles in Independence Evening News (in 
Chinese) December 3 and 4, 1989. 
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Implications for Taiwan's Polity 
Most observers would say of the December 1989 election that the 
DPP did better than most expected and that it should be credited with 
a victory, perhaps a big victory. Furthermore, the DPP will be a force 
to be reckoned with politically in Taiwan for the foreseeable future. 
The success of the DPP also means that Taiwan has a meaningful or-
ganized opposition and that competitive elections and competitive 
politics are now well established. This translates into the following: 
Taiwan has made another big stride toward a democratic system. 
Some observers, in fact, say that Taiwan is no longer just becom-
ing a democracy; it already is one. Some opposition candidates stated 
during the campaign that Taiwan has democratized faster than any 
nation in the world over the last few years. Others admitted they con-
sider Taiwan the most democratic country in East Asia, save Japan. 
These statements may be premature; yet clearly Taiwan has in a 
number of significant ways made the transition from an authoritarian 
to a democratic system. 
This does not, however, mean that all of the important hurdles in 
the political modernization process have been crossed. Nor does it 
mean, necessarily, political stability and tranquility. Democracy is not 
without costs. The DPP victory will probably mean greater, not less, 
tension between the KMT and the opposition. There will no doubt be 
difficult relations between the national government and the county and 
city governments for some time. Decision making may, in fact, be 
paralyzed on some issues as a result. Discord between the two parties 
could spread into other realms. 
The nation may well polarize further on the issue of separation or 
Taiwan independence as a result of this election. The most vociferous 
pro-independence candidates won, but so did their loudest opponents 
and the advocates of the future unification of Taiwan with China. 
This injects an ideological issue into Taiwan politics which may not be 
auspicious. Ethnic politics may also gain, because ethnic issues were 
amplified by candidates who made issue of differences in political 
viewpoint and advocacy based on provincial or group identification. 
Similarly, special interest groups played a greater role in this election 
than in previous electoral contests. In fact, there were many com-
plaints that candidates were toadying to interest groups while ignoring 
the silent majority. There is also evidence that special interests and 
money politics reinforced and strengthened each other. Efforts to 
check money politics in Taiwan clearly have not succeeded, though 
vote buying or its equivalent seems to be the result more of economic 
prosperity than increasing corruption. 
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Party politics, for better and worse, are apparently a fact of polit-
ical life in Taiwan. Party competition normally facilitates the demo-
cratic process, but it also creates partisanship and other undesirable 
effects. Partisanship indeed seems to have taken root in Taiwan. 
The election results indicate some events and campaign tactics 
had a different impact on the voters than orginally thought. There 
was clearly some misinterpretation of issues and stances that would 
influence the electorate. Morever, the KMT made some fairly serious 
errors during the campaign. 
Many observers felt that the events in China in June- the 
Tiananmen Massacre-would help the KMT at the polls. Initially, it 
did have a salutary affect on the KMT campaign efforts. It made the 
government and the ruling party look good by comparison; students 
were not being killed with tanks and machine guns in Taipei. It also 
solved the KMT's problem of formulating a "mainland policy"-
which was troublesome and which in 1988 and early 1989 was a major 
knotty issue. After Tiananmen, the KMT did not need to worry about 
this very much. But these issues came back. DPP candidates to some 
extent successfully portrayed themselves as similar to the Beijing stu-
dents and in this way won some sympathy from the electorate. More 
important, the DPP found a poignant argument for self-determina-
tion, Taiwan independence, or whatever version of separation it advo-
cated: Tiananmen and the repression that followed justified Taiwan 
moving away from China. As one DPP candidate put it: "Beijing's 
brutality justifies calls for separation." Certainly separation at the 
time of this election-less than 6 months away from Tiananmen-did 
not look like a radical notion; rather, it seemed the only sensible 
policy. 
Events in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union also helped the 
DPP. Democracy seemed to be "breaking out around the world." 
This being the case, pushing for even more democracy in Taiwan did 
not seem to be out of place. The KMT had taken the position that it 
had introduced democracy to Taiwan at a very rapid pace; the DPP 
said it was not fast enough. The DPP in this context seemed to be 
right. 
The DPP's disadvantage in not having access to television was no 
doubt exaggerated; otherwise the DPP could not have done so well. 
In fact, survey polls indicate the electorate did not base its decisions 
much on TV, clearly not as much as in many Western countries. 
Moreover, the DPP was able to both make this an issue of fairness 
(and thus democracy) and offset the handicap with effective advertis-
ing in newspapers, magazines, and other places. 
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The KMT, and many outside observers, overestimated the impact 
of the DPP split. KMT leaders did this intentionally to some extent to 
support their position that the DPP was a group of ruffians; the ration-
ale being if they were ruffians, naturally they would not be able to get 
along with each other. Differences over whether to agree with, sup-
port, or advocate independence have been around for some time; these 
differences did not cause a very serious split in the DPP ranks. In any 
event, the DPP was not very dependent on party discipline, instead it 
relied on activist candidates and personalities to win. 
Counterpointwise, the KMT was not seen as factionalized; yet it 
was-over how quickly to democratize, whether to let the DPP have 
certain breaks and thereby level the field, and over some specific is-
sues. The issues of patriotism and separation confused KMT candi-
dates. Some KMT candidates also seemed to desire fair competition 
with the DPP and thus did not try as hard in the campaign. A major 
split in the KMT was never imminent, but differences in viewpoint did 
affect the ruling party's performance. 
The KMT also made some errors in strategy. KMT notables in 
the government appeared to try to control the stock market in order to 
influence the election outcome. They also tried to use statements 
made by Deng Xiaoping and other pronouncements made by Beijing 
to counteract the DPP's call for independence. To a sizeable portion 
of the electorate this appeared to be cynical manipulation. KMT lead-
ers also seemed to give too much emphasis to educational standards 
so as to portray the DPP as hoodlums. Thus, in picking candidates 
they weighed too much on education and not enough on charisma. 
This made the KMT look elitist and helped give the DPP an image of 
a commonman party. 
The KMT underestimated the sympathy vote and tried to use 
logical arguments against it. It also put too much reliance on opinion 
surveys, while trying to use them to influence voting. Both had bad 
results. 
The KMT may also have been overconfident. At times it seemed 
to be. It also appeared less professional and less on the ball than in the 
past. A number of the members of foreign election observer teams 
noted this. Changes in personnel may have been the cause. A decline 
in morale as a result of Chiang Ching-Kuo's death may explain it. 
Similarly a number of KMT leaders seemed to be locked in a power 
struggle with others in the party. President Lee Teng-hui was still new 
in office, and, though his public image was very good, he has yet to 
resolve some internal party disputes and convince many Party 
stalwarts of his leadership abilities. 
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DPP candidates made much of the fact that they were underdogs. 
And this worked. They won the protest vote and the sympathy vote. 
DPP candidates also benefitted from the widely-held view that a vote 
for them was a vote for democracy. To some, a vote for the DPP 
would encourage the KMT to do better. Thus there was a large bloc 
of votes which did not directly support the DPP but which helped it in 
the election. Most voters did not consider the possibility that the DPP 
might win sufficiently to rule the country and did not worry about 
their shortcomings. Finally, to some, DPP candidates (assuming the 
KMT could not lose at the national level) winning local office would 
make the system more competitive and perhaps more efficient. 
In sum, the DPP's strategy and performance in the campaign 
were considerably better than most observers anticipated. The KMT's 
were worse. This, plus the DPP's attraction of the protest vote and 
the vote for competitive elections and democracy, help explain the 
DPP's gains. But so do world events: Tiananmen, the democracy 
movements in Europe, and the pending collapse of communism. 
Deng's threatening statements in this context amplified the help these 
events gave the DPP. Events in Japan, too, had an effect: the ruling 
conservative Liberal Democratic Party, which had been in power for 
nearly 35 years, seemed to be suffering from age and corruption. 
Many in Taiwan modelled their politics after Japan; this being the 
case, the KMT could look forward to a long period of rule in an essen-
tially one-party dominant system. However, the Japanese electorate's 
rejection of the Liberal Democratic Party in the summer and the 
LOP's subsequent difficulties sent another signal to Taiwan's voters. 
All of these factors could be reversed, or at least different, in the 
next election. Thus 1989 seems to suggest a rise of the opposition and 
competitive democracy in Taiwan; it does, however, not mean a de-
mise of the KMT. 
How DPP politicians perform in office will surely influence the 
next election. By 1992 the DPP will no doubt be seen to some degree 
as a ruling or government party- certainly at the local level. The 
DPP will have to campaign on its record next time. That may be an 
advantage; in Chinese politics, it helps to be an incumbent. Yet being 
an outsider, at odds with the KMT, proved a boon in this election. In 
the next three years the DPP will have to come to terms with the 
KMT, compromise or paralyze the system- either of which may hurt 
their image with the protest voter. 
The DPP will also have to reconcile many of its election promises 
and statements with reality. DPP candidates spoke of a "peaceful for-
eign policy" and of reentering international organizations, including 
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the United Nations. Fulfilling these promises will be very difficult. 
The DPP will have to defend many of its "socialist" policies in the 
context of the failure of both communism and socialism around the 
world. They will have to cope with the female vote, which is growing 
in influence in Taiwan. The KMT has a better record with both wo-
men candidates and women's issues. The DPP will have to deal with 
an image of a party dominated by narrow objectives that appeals to 
special interest groups rather than the national interest. It will have to 
deal with the crime issue, which certainly will not be easy. 
Meanwhile the KMT will no doubt learn something from this 
election setback. How the KMT responds to this "defeat" is difficult 
to predict. It has been a party that has dealt with all kinds of adversity 
in the past. It may be able to improve its image based on Taiwan's 
democratization, its enhanced role in global economic affairs, and 
what some call Taiwan's new identity. It may be able to adjust to 
breaking its ties with the government and its control of television and 
a large number of corporations and enterprises. It can probably also 
change from an election strategy that emphasizes morality in govern-
ment to a strategy built on tough political campaigning in a pluralist 
country. 
In any event, it is clear that the election process and democracy 
have been advanced by the 1989 national election. Probably future 
analysts will say it was furthered by a big notch. 
CHAPTER 5 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
The analysis of the factors that have promoted or facilitated dem-
ocratic electoral politics in Taiwan and the separate assessment of 
three elections in Taiwan above, reflect that democracy has quickly, 
and no doubt permanently, become a part of this nation's political sys-
tem. In fact, that this has occurred is no longer in doubt. Why and 
how it happened are still questions of some interest. 
Local politicians in Taiwan often argue that national democratic 
elections were made possible, even engendered, by democratic elec-
tions for local office in Taiwan for more than three decades-begin-
ning in the 1950s. They reason that there was a "seeping up" process: 
democracy worked at the local level, so why not apply it at the na-
tional level? Additionally, there was pressure from local governments 
and from the population to "push democracy up." 
Indeed, democratic means of selecting local officials have been 
used in Taiwan for some time. Popularly elected officials made local 
politics work democratically. They sought to push their system to the 
top, or democratize the nation by a "seeping up" process. Over time 
these "democratic politicians" also rose in eminence and assumed po-
sitions of greater importance, many of them in national affairs and in 
the central government. 
The political system they encountered at the top was, in principle, 
a democratic system of government. It had a democratic constitution. 
Its political ideology-Sun Yat-sen's Three Principles of the People-
was democratic. A political culture or climate had begun to evolve in 
the direction of democracy. Free market capitalism made this possible, 
or necessary. Economic development created a middle class that 
made demands for political change. 
Central government officials nevertheless argue that, rather than 
democracy seeping up, they gave Taiwan democracy at the local level. 
They could have encouraged a different political system. They served 
to oversee and force it to work. Local politics in Taiwan was full of 
factional struggles. Had there not been oversight or what the Nation-
alist officials call tutelage, chaos probably would have resulted. Some 
top Nationalist officials have also averred that they wanted to create 
democracy at the local level because they knew it could not have been 
(87) 
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implemented quickly at the national level. They were committed to 
democracy, but could not install it in the central government because 
of both internal resistance and external threats. 
The sudden or unexpected competitive election in 1980 and the 
subsequent quick evolution of democratic electoral politics-in less 
than a decade-suggests that it was not just a "seeping up" process. 
Democratic political thought helped make it possible. Central govern-
ment officials had to have been ready and favorably disposed. Presi-
dent Chiang Ching-kuo---Taiwan's "democratizer"-also played a 
vital role. He was an impetus from above for Taiwan's democratiza-
tion. He conveniently used electoral change and election politics to 
direct Taiwan's political modernization towards democracy. 
The U.S. was also a factor. America had high expectations for 
Taiwan: because Chiang Kai-shek (and every other president follow-
ing him) was a Christian; because Taiwan called itself "Free China" 
and had a political system and a constitution both patterned after the 
American models; because of the free market economy and the degree 
of penetration ofTaiwan by foreign (mostly from Western democratic 
countries) business and ideas. The U.S. also encouraged, with a heavy 
hand at times, Taiwan to democratize-early on in order to justify 
economic assistance and policies that favored the Nationalist govern-
ment over the Communist regime in Beijing. Later, after 1979 when 
the U.S. broke relations with Taipei and the U.S. Congress wrote the 
Taiwan Relations Act, to rationalize this legislation-the only law in 
U.S. history written to govern relations with a specific country and 
which cited concern that Taiwan remain secure and that it continue to 
see progress in the areas of human rights and democracy. 
Similarity, Beijing was a factor-albeit an indirect one. The Peo-
ple's Republic of China sought to isolate Taiwan. It endeavored to 
make the government of Taiwan appear autocratic and its foreign pol-
icy hostile, uncompromising, and narrow-minded. Taiwan's reaction 
was to push the democratization process even faster-in order to con-
vey the message that its future should be decided by its people, that 
Taiwan should not be ruled by a communist government against its 
will. Taiwan even appealed to the global community, saying that it 
had democratized and, therefore, did not deserve to be isolated or 
considered territory belonging to Beijing. Beijing's threats to Taiwan 
also reduced ethnic tension between Mainland Chinese and locally-
born Taiwanese-who were put in the "same boat" as far as their fu-
ture, meaning their survival and the nation's sovereignty, was con-
cerned. The intimidating statements made by Chinese leaders in 
Beijing have clearly served as a unifying factor and a diversion from 
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otherwise factional tendencies and fractious disputes in Taiwan. Unity 
and common understandings between various groups in Taiwan have 
clearly helped advance democratic processes. 
Of course, one must also give credit to the fact that Taiwan, being 
an island, is protected by its geography from outside hostile forces. 
Island countries have had a better record with democracy. So have 
nations that are secure because of natural frontiers or barriers or se-
curity arrangements. A history of cosmopolitanism was also an ingre-
dient. Taiwan, for centuries, has had contacts with other peoples and 
nations. It was a trading entity in the distant past and retained this 
tradition through the years. This has made the incorporation of new 
political and other ideas, in this case a system based on the will of the 
people, easier to accept and use. 
Taiwan was made even more secure by the U.S. security guaran-
tees: in 1950 (when the Korean War started) and the U.S. intervened 
to bloc an invasion of Taiwan and in 1954 in the form of a mutual 
defense treaty. This U.S. commitment was reiterated in 1979 in the 
Taiwan Relations Act, which came at a time when the U.S.-Republic 
of China Defense Treaty was going to be cancelled. In short, the 
United States helped provide an environment wherein democracy 
could sprout and grow. Not having to worry (at least so much) about 
an invasion or about other external threats, Taiwan's leaders and its 
people could focus on internal problems, including political develop-
ment, and could fulfill the promises of democracy in the Constitution 
and in Sun Yat-Sen's Three Principles. 
Economic growth also promoted democratic institutions in Tai-
wan. This is to be expected if growth is self-generated-or done the 
hard way, by earning it rather than by luck or circumstance. Taiwan 
accomplished its economic growth by hard work, good planning, and 
cooperation between the private and public sectors, between the popu-
lation and its leaders, and among various interest groups. In recent 
years, Taiwan has gained the status and recognition of being the 
number one nation in the world in economic growth and the foremost 
success story in economic development. The criterion is growth in the 
gross national product over two decades-the standard most often 
cited by economic development and political development theorists 
alike. Because of rapid economic growth Taiwan needed democratic 
reform. The political system had to modernize because the economy 
had become increasingly sophisticated and needed a political system 
that was open and could accomodate change and innovation lest eco-
nomic growth be impeded. In other words, Taiwan's economy was 
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built on free market capitalism which created democracy and needed 
democracy to continue to grow. 
Just as economic growth provided an infrastructure for demo-
cratic politics, so did social change. Land reform was the first step. 
Launched in the 1950s, it eradicated feudalism in n _·at Taiwan. It 
made the local democracy discussed above possible. Together with 
astute planning, land reform made the agricultural sector of the econ-
omy grow quickly and at a rapid, sustained pace. As it grew, food 
production became more efficient and many people moved into the 
cities to work in Taiwan's industrial sector, which "took otr' in the 
1960s. Urbanization, which probably occured faster in Taiwan than 
in any other nation in the world at this time, promoted city political 
machines. Commensurately, more people became interested in politics 
with the changed environment and the breaking or weakening of fam-
ily and other ties that were part of rural society. As Taiwan's middle 
class grew, so did the perception that politics was not just for the rich 
or some other elite. Mass politics evolved. This created the need, and 
the demand, for democracy. Elections soon were seen as the key to 
realizing democracy. 
This is not to say that these things occurred in a clear step-by-step 
sequence: security, economic development, social change, political de-
velopment. That the order was neat and that one had to be accom-
plished before the other could begin is, of course, an over-
simplification. They occurred simultaneously to some degree and 
were interrelated and interdependent. Still there were different thrusts 
or prominent conditions in each phase of Taiwan's political develop-
ment. In fact, this may be said to constitute the Taiwan democratiza-
tion model or paradigm. The "Taiwan experience" in 
democratization, in other words, is a kind of step-by-step approach to 
political modernization. The formula? Security comes first, or it is 
the precondition. Then build consensus through economic develop-
ment plans. Successful economic growth creates the need for democ-
racy. Social change follows economic modernization and is 
sandwiched between economic change and political change. 
If political change comes last in the sequence, has not Taiwan 
reached the last stage? This might seem to be the case; yet it is also 
true that political modernization makes possible continued economic 
development and social change. If Taiwan is to make the leap into a 
knowledge-intensive economy, then continued or further political de-
velopment is essential. There seems to be a symbiotic relationship. 
The same is true for social change of a progressive nature. 
However, political change in Taiwan has not been without set-
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backs, turmoil, and apprehension. This has been reflected particularly 
in election campaigns. This author, as well as many other observers, 
both local and foreign, agree that during campaign periods, the system 
has appeared to have changed too fast. The chapters above have dis-
cussed candidates in each election that have resorted to antics, unfair 
tactics, and dishonest or illegal means to win. Each election has wit-
nessed new and sometimes serious problems that brought the system 
into question. Taiwan's election law apparently has not worked well; 
certainly it will be changed again in the future, perhaps many times. 
Money seems to have become the bottom line in election politics. Fur-
ther democratization seems, in every election, to have created vio-
lence and chaos. Political campaigns have been seen by many as 
circuses, demeaning to the candidates and to the electorate. 
But even in light of these developments, few have said that the 
nation should turn back, that democracy was a mistake. Rather, the 
citizens know that they are on the right track in spite of problems and 
second thoughts. 
If Taiwan has democratized faster than any other nation in the 
world, as this writer has earlier suggested, then one must ask: Why has 
it succeeded? One can cite the conservative nature of Chinese 
politicial culture: rapid change does not hit so hard because of funda-
mental attitudes about politics, such as the need for moral behavior 
and universality of political ideals, etc., that Chinese espouse. The 
Chinese people also fear anarchy; this is with good reason, since their 
culture evolved with the need for government to control water, build 
infrastructure projects for the transport of food, and much more. 
When government did not function, the people suffered greviously; 
many perished. Hence, when critics or opponents of the government 
go too far, particularly in the direction of destroying the system or 
using violence, the people respond with a demand for caution. When 
some advocate overthrowing the system the people respond by siding 
with the government. The electorate wants democracy, but it does not 
want it to come through the destruction of the government (unless the 
government is worse than anarchy or is itself promoting chaos, and 
that has not been the case in Taiwan). Some say government officials 
in Taiwan know that if the opposition becomes too extreme or threat-
ens violence the people will turn against them. Thus, they are more 
tolerant of opposition antics and demands than governments in most 
countries. 
That Taiwan had a democratic constitution before its period of 
rapid political development began was also helpful. Opposition politi-
cians-working within the system, or at least using it- asked that the 
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constitution be fully implemented. They assailed the "Temporary 
Provisions" which nullified some of the guarantees in the constitution, 
especially those that provided for civil and political freedoms and set 
forth a design for a democratic system. They did not advocate scrap-
ping the constitution and framing another one, nor did they advocate 
not having a constitution--or at least not until recently, (and their 
recent demands have not been taken very seriously). Opposition poli-
ticians likewise have not been very critical of the political system's 
structure. Candidates for election, for example, have rarely attacked 
the fundamental organization of the political system. They want to 
change it, make it more democratic, but not destroy and rebuild it. 
This has made the opposition in a sense a loyal opposition-even 
though one would not guess this from observing an election campaign. 
Similarly, there has been a broad consensus on the desirability of eco-
nomic growth. Differences have been primarily about how to do it, 
who should benefit and, in more recent years, how to protect the envi-
ronment while continuing to grow. Finally, although self-determina-
tion or Taiwan independence has been a heated, if not explosive, issue, 
there is behind all of the argument and rhetoric the fundamental belief 
that the Republic of China is a legal government and has sovereignty. 
The questions are rather whether the government should claim title to 
the mainland of China, whether there should be one China or two, or 
whether the central government should have representatives in elected 
office that are delegates from places other than Taiwan. The sover-
eignty of the nation has not been in contention. 
Having demonstrated in the previous three chapters that Taiwan 
has made quite impressive progress in electoral politics and thus in 
political development, leading toward, perhaps even close to or al-
ready, democracy, it seems that Taiwan's experience with electoral 
politics contains some lessons for other countries. This would appear 
particularly true in view of the fact democracy is now "breaking out" 
all over the world. Moreover, there is a special lesson for newly 
democratzing nations: Taiwan has accomplished, largely through 
election politics, democratization similar (in the words of some opposi-
tion politicians) to what it took Japan decades to do and some Western 
countries centuries. Building democracy is usually a slow process; in 
Taiwan it was a rapid one. Most of the countries poised to try democ-
racy-and there are many-are in a hurry. 
Taiwan's success with democratic electoral politics is also unique 
among Chinese people. The People's Republic of China has never 
had a meaningful democratic national election. There have been no 
two-party, competitive elections in China. Competition in the sense of 
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having more than one candidate for an electoral position is something 
very new there. Hong Kong has not gotten started either. Singapore 
has had competitive elections, but barely so. Some say elections there 
are not really competitive; the opposition is too weak and the govern-
ment too intolerant of opposition politicians. Taiwan can thus serve as 
a model for even Singapore. Only in Taiwan have there been truly 
competitive elections. Only in Taiwan have there been two-party or 
multi-party (depending upon one's point of view) elections. 
Turning directly to the factors that have influenced Taiwan's elec-
tions in a positive way and to the three recent elections themselves 
(and their significance), it is necessary to examine trends and make 
some forecasts. Some mention should also be made about unresolved 
issues. 
One thing that is certain from looking at the factors influencing 
electoral politics as well as the significance of the most recent elec-
tions, is that Taiwan no longer has a one-party system. Party competi-
tion has become a part of the electoral process and electoral politics in 
Taiwan. It is even a part of the political process in a broader sense. 
This will certainly continue to be true in the future. In fact, it is so 
widely regarded as necessary for democratization to continue and a 
democratic system to work that it is inconceivable that party competi-
tion will not last. 
This is not to say, however, what kind party system is evolving. 
There seem to be three possibilites : a one-party dominant system, a 
two- party system, and a multi-party system. There is evidence for 
and an argument to be made to justify predicting any of the three 
options. 
Given the outstanding record of the Nationalist Party in engi-
neering economic development and social modernization, and, in gen-
eral, governing the nation, it would seem reasonable to predict, and 
support as desirable, the evolution of a one-party dominant system. 
Such an argument can also be made in light of the unrealistic propos-
als made by the opposition parties, factionalism in the Democratic 
Progressive Party and its general inability and lack of preparation to 
rule the nation. One can certainly imagine a scenario where Taiwan 
follows the pattern of Japanese politics. Like the ruling Liberal Dem-
ocratic Party, the Nationalist Party may remain in power for the fore-
seeable future, with the opposition parties remaining only an 
opposition party or parties. The Nationalist Party would have to 
maintain a comfortable majority in the elected branches of govern-
ment and win all future national elections. But it is not unreasonable 
to think the Nationalist Party can and will do this. 
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While voting trends and election results, especially in the last 
election, cannot be used to argue for a one-party dominant system, 
one can certainly make the case that opposition strength is based in 
large part on the desire of the electorate for a democratic system and 
on the fact that votes for the opposition are to a large extent votes for 
democracy, not votes for a new ruling party. Independent opposition 
candidates, the tangwai, and then the Democratic Progressive Party 
have certainly been able to count on fifteen to twenty percent of the 
voters voting against the party in power or for party competition, thus 
voting for them. This being the case, assuming it goes no further, a 
one-party dominant system will result. Even if it increases to near 
fifty percent of the vote, but goes no further, the outcome will still be a 
one-party dominant system. 
An argument for a one-party dominant, Nationalist Party-led na-
tion can also be made from looking at the overwhelming advantages 
possessed by the ruling party in the realms of party registration, party 
finances, organization, experience, etc. It would also follow from the 
belief or advocacy that Taiwan needs strong leadership which only 
the KMT can provide. Similarly, some may contend that the transi-
tion from rule by the Nationalist Party to another political party 
would be too traumatic given present or near-term future conditions 
(such as Beijing's threats, the need for a strong defense, economic 
growth, and more), and that many voters perceive this--enough to 
keep the Nationalist Party in power indefinitely. 
The broad base of support possessed by the Nationalist Party that 
has not been shaken by the opposition parties is further evidence for 
the one-party dominant system. The KMT has the support of busi-
ness, farmers, labor (though this support may have weakened), and 
professional organizations. It appeals to all ethnic groups and to the 
electorate in all regions of the country. Though seen by some as a 
party of Mainland Chinese, it has in every national election won more 
than half of the Taiwanese vote. It is conservative, but so are most 
Chinese. It has the reputation for being moderate, rather than radical, 
and this suggests broad support. 
A second alternative is the development of a two-party system. 
The outcome of the 1986 election and especially the 1989 election can 
be offered as proof for the growth of a two-party system in Taiwan. 
As soon as the Democratic Progressive Party became a genuine polit-
ical party (though still not legal in 1986) it performed well in a na-
tional election. It performed even better in 1989. All other political 
parties failed in both elections, especially in the last elections. The 
DPP was able to maintain party discipline while attracting various 
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kinds of opposition politicians into its fold. It learned even before it 
gained party status to avoid ideological issues and to eschew blatant 
sensationalism and radicalism. In short, the DPP from the onset had 
a fairly broad base of appeal, and as time passed (actually not very 
long considering the history of the development of political parties in 
most countries) its political base became wider. 
The DPP has also, to a considerable extent, come to be seen as the 
opposition in Taiwan. It has been the beneficiary of nearly all of the 
protest vote. It has learned to get attention and publicity and in the 
process to upstage other opposition parties. Some would also argue 
that it has come to be seen as a party representing the Taiwanese; 
even ifthat is only somewhat true (which to date seems to be the case), 
the DPP may be able to broaden its support among the majority 
Taiwanese electorate. There is certainly a "Taiwanese nationalism" in 
Taiwan and it is likely to grow in the future. Some have also labelled 
the DPP the "liberal" party as opposed to the "conservative" Nation-
alist Party. If Taiwan's economic and political development have 
reached a mature stage, as some argue, liberal ideals may be a logical 
next step. All of these facts or pieces of evidence indicate the DPP will 
increase its strength in future years, making it a truly competitive 
party. The result has to be a two-party system. 
One can also argue for the evolution of a two-party system look-
ing at the fact that the model for democracy in Taiwan has been 
largely the United States, not to mention pressure from the U.S. to 
democratize. Because the U.S. has a two-party system, it is reasonable 
to think that Taiwan will copy or emulate this system. Moreover, 
many high-ranking officials in Taiwan as well as scholars (partly be-
cause they were trained in the U.S., but partly for academic reasons) 
believe that a two-party system is preferable to any other. In recent 
discussions about Taiwan's future party system there has been fre-
quent mention of the fact that the Western European countries with 
multiparty systems are less stable and their political systems work less 
effectively. 
Another factor is that, while the constitution of the Republic of 
China does not mention political parties, it can be argued that the 
presidential system of government implied in the constitution, and in 
effect in Taiwan for four and one-half decades, lends itself to the devel-
opment of a two-party system-just as it did in America. 
Finally, the electoral system in Taiwan favors the growth of a 
two-party system. The type of ballot, voting districts, and much more 
favor a two-party political structure. So do the election laws, includ-
ing recent changes that discriminate against "frivilous candidates" 
96 CONTEMPORARY ASIAN STUDIES SERIES 
who are not members of either the Nationalist Party or the Demo-
cratic Progressive Party. 
A third possibility is the development of a multiparty system. 
The fact that the Civic Organizations Law makes it easy to form a 
political party and there has been a proliferation of new parties is 
prima facie evidence for a multiparty system. One can thus argue 
that it is simply a matter of time before a number of these parties gain 
a following and voter support. 
There is reason to believe issue parties will develop in Taiwan. 
On some important issues the KMT and the DPP have the same plat-
form or have ignored the problems suggested by the issue. Geographi-
cally based parties have not developed. The initial success of the 
Labor Party (though it did not do well in the 1989 election) is cer-
tainly evidence that third parties can attract interest group support. 
Given the fact that Taiwan's political situation is in such flux and 
the electorate so undecided, as witnessed, for example, by the fact that 
when the DPP formed in 1986 polls showed the public did not favor 
its declaration as a party-there seems to be room for more political 
parties. This would also be evidenced by the fact that a number of 
interest groups, farmers to mention only one, do not feel adequately 
represented by any political party. They are generally conservative 
and do not favor the Democratic Progressive Party on ideological 
grounds. If they decide the KMT does not represent them well, for 
which there is some evidence, they may seek to support another party. 
Labor has already done so, or has taken the first step to do so. 
It is also easy to foresee factionalism in the DPP that could result 
in a party split or in the formation of a new party by disaffected DPP 
members. Clearly, some of the disputes among DPP members and its 
leaders look like the seeds of future party disagreements of a serious 
enough nature that they could lead to a party division. Taiwan inde-
pendence is just one of these issues. Efforts by DPP members or fac-
tions to more actively vie for the support certain groups of the 
electorate could also cause a party schism. Some DPP members have 
sought the support of interest groups to the chagrin and displeasure of 
other party members. This is likely to be a more serious problem in the 
future. Cooperation with the Nationalist Party on important issues 
also threatens to split the DPP, and this will continue to be a problem. 
Another critical factor is that the DPP has become viewed as 
something other than an opposition party because of its victory in the 
1989 election. It is the party in power in a number of counties now. 
This leaves room for other parties to claim that the DPP is no longer 
anti-government or anti-KMT, and to try to fill the void. Clearly, 
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DPP leaders in office cannot behave as members of a protest party and 
this will change the image of the DPP. It may alter its attractiveness 
to voters. It should also be noted that the DPP's strength lies in mid-
dle-echelon elective office positions, especially the county magistrates 
and city councils and mayors. The DPP has not yet shown strength at 
the town or village level. Independents, which could go in any direc-
tion in terms of future party identification (or making none), are 
strong at that level. They might form new parties in the future or 
associate with presently existing third parties. 
Though the two most recent elections give evidence for a two-
party system developing in Taiwan, two elections (in the opinion of 
this writer as well as many other observers) are too few to provide a 
convincing argument about the development of a party system. It will 
take several more elections to discern the direction of changes in the 
party system; it may take even longer. In fact, Taiwan may have 
something in between two or three different party structures for some 
time. If the DPP manages to absorb or defeat challenges by other 
oppositions parties, yet does not offer a strong challenge to the KMT, 
Taiwan's party system may resemble periods in U.S. history when one 
of the political parties was dominant over the other even though the 
system was a two-party one. Another possibility would be for the Na-
tionalist Party to lose strength while the DPP and other opposition 
parties both gain strength. This would leave the KMT in power if the 
DPP and other parties could not form a coalition or if the KMT could 
attract a coalition partner. One might draw other scenarios. 
Finally, something needs to be said about projecting trends dis-
cernible during the last three elections. Unfortunately, because of the 
newness of competitive elections and the considerable change the na-
tion is undergoing politically, projecting trends is exceedingly difficult. 
Still, it is clear that there are some significant trends. For exam-
ple, successful candidates have not been very ideological. The ineffec-
tiveness of an ideological campaign was demonstrated by several 
candidates in the 1980 election. Such campaigns have not reappeared 
to any extent. In the last three elections ideology for the most part 
played an insignificant role. Candidates could be identified as con-
servative or liberal, even the parties; yet they could not be labeled as 
highly ideological. Political philosophy was not often discussed and 
there was little evidence that it might become a future campaign issue. 
Most candidates would be defined as pragmatic or issue candidates, or 
personalistic; certainly most winning candidates can be so described. 
The pragmatic nature of the Chinese people and the failure of ideologi-
cal systems, especially communism in the People's Republic of China, 
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seems to add weight to the argument that ideology will not become an 
election issue in the future and the parties won't become ideology-
based. 
Candidates who overstated what they would do in office and can-
didates that were too showy were often rejected, consistently enough 
that one might label this a trend. However, a line must be drawn be-
tween this kind of candidate and the charismatic candidate. The latter 
did well in these elections; not only that, they fared better in the 1989 
election than in the previous elections. Likewise, commonman candi-
dates fared especially well in the 1989 election. Well educated candi-
dates were able to impress the electorate with their educational status 
in the national elections until 1989. Educational qualifications may 
have peaked as a campaign asset or such qualifications may have been 
carried too far in elections before 1989. Alternatively, because the 
DPP ran a number of candidates with outstanding educational qualifi-
cations in 1989 the difference between the two major parties may have 
evaporated at least in the voters' minds. It seems unlikely that educa-
tion will increase in importance as a qualification for political candi-
dates. In other words, elected bodies of government will not become 
institutions for the educated elite. Whether the KMT will continue to 
give it major billing is difficult to predict. 
Money politics will most certainly remain a factor in elections. 
The opposition has been disadvantaged because of fewer funds in a 
number of elections. This was particularily true in elections before 
1989. However, it was barely true, or not at all, in 1989. The playing 
field appeared to have become nearly level in this respect. In any 
event, neither party has wanted restrictions placed on campaign 
spending. With a financial advantage in the hands of the two biggest 
parties, the use of money in campaigns may become institutionalized. 
On the other hand there may be a return to demands for disclosure to 
embarrass their opponents, thereby enabling poor candidates to use a 
financial handicap to his or her advantage. If one party sees this as an 
advantage, or if independents seek office on a bigger scale, the impor-
tance of money may change. The evidence is mixed about this. This 
author favors the view that money will be an advantage to candidates 
and this favors the Nationalist Party and the Democratic Progressive 
Party. 
Party discipline was a problem in every election discussed here as 
well as in previous elections. It was less so in 1989, but this may be an 
anomoly. Both parties will certainly make strenuous efforts to in-
crease party discipline in the future. Cooperation between the KMT 
and the DPP will no doubt help both. The growth of a two-party 
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system will, of course, be a contributing factor. Party discipline may 
also contribute to the rise of a two-partv system. 
Campaign strategies will no doubt be refined and improved. The 
success or failure of both the KMT and the opposition in these elec-
tions was to a large extent determined by election strategy and tactics. 
It is particularly apparent that the DPP improved both its election 
strategy and tactics for the 1989 election. At the same time, the KMT 
suffered because of serious mistakes in both areas. Both parties will 
probably learn much from their mistakes, as well as from their suc-
cesses, and devote more time and energy to strategy and tactics, ob-
serve those of their opponents, and do a better job in this realm in the 
future. 
Regarding future campaign issues, it seems probable that the 
problems about which voters have expressed the most concern will 
remain. Crime, pollution, and traffic are almost certain to be future 
campaign issues. These problems are not being solved, or at least not 
at a sufficiently rapid pace to satisfy voters. Some of them are not 
being solved at all; they are becoming more acute. Regarding these 
issues, perception may be more important than the reality of the 
problems. It seems that, if anything, the perception is that the 
problems are increasingly important ones. New voter issues will natu-
rally arise, and as polling becomes more commonplace and more so-
phisticated, voter concern will carry greater weight. 
This does not mean that candidates will not campaign on their 
own issues, non-issues, fabricated issues, and sensational issues. Can-
didates for elective office in Taiwan have found, just as in the U.S. and 
other Western democracies, that they must identify with a controver-
sial issue or position in order to build a following before the campaign 
starts. Such issues tend to be more extreme and be issues of concern to 
minorities, interest groups, or voting blocks. Candidates then move to 
the center and take on more popular issues. This has been a visible 
pattern in recent elections and will be more so with each passing 
election. 
Candidates will also use controversial issues to attract attention. 
Attendance at campaign rallies has declined during the period covered 
here, seeming to indicate that candidates must first draw a crowd 
before they can do anything else. As in advertising, they must first get 
the attention of the audience. Such an approach seems to favor issues 
such as Taiwan independence. In recent elections, many DPP candi-
dates made this part of their platform and spoke of it in campaign 
speeches. Most (increasingly so in recent campaigns), however, used it 
as an attention-getter or introduction. They did not define the issue or 
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their position clearly; in fact, most made it an emotional issue rather 
than one they talked about in specific terms or on which they 
broached clear solutions or answers. This seems likely to continue. 
Such campaigning tends to polarize the electorate and even the 
entire society and nation. This has been quite noticeable in recent 
campaigns. It promises to continue, though in some ways the electo-
rate seems to be getting used to it. But, it seems unlikely to exacerbate 
ethnic tension inasmuch as the KMT is a multi-ethnic party and the 
DPP has not moved further in the direction of becoming a single-eth-
nic party. Meanwhile, ethnic differences as well as ethnic identifica-
tion are diminishing. Alternatively, campaigning will accentuate 
ethnic tension, but only temporarily. 
Domestic issues will likely continue to dominate the slate of cam-
paign issues. Economic issues will remain in priority position: GNP 
growth, salaries, worker benefits, insurance, etc. Growth will not be 
an overriding issue as long as it is sustained at the present level or a bit 
lower. A recession, though, would change this. Issues tangential or 
related to the economy will remain important and may become even 
more central. Pollution and traffic are critical issues that are in es-
sence economic; labor is another. 
Foreign policy issues will remain important-more important 
than in most other countries. Taiwan is more sensitive to the foreign 
policies of most other countries because it is an exporting country. It 
is also threatened militarily by the People's Republic of China. Tai-
wan also lacks diplomatic legitimacy. Thus, the electorate's interest in 
foreign policy is quite understandable. Foreign policy issues may even 
increase in importance; or domestic issues and foreign policy issues 
will in some cases merge. Because of this, the DPP must adopt more 
realistic tenets of foreign policy; its naivete is too noticeable. So too 
the KMT will have to abandon its unrealistic "return to the main-
land" policy. Both positions make the parties too vulnerable to attack 
and ridicule by the other. 
The issue of unelected (or chosen more than 40 years ago) dele-
gates to the elected bodies of government, which was a major issue in 
the 1989 election, will not likely be very important in future elections. 
All (or nearly all, assuming the legislation cited here and a subsequent 
high court decision work) will retire before the next election. DPP 
charges about the undemocratic nature of the system will have to 
change. On the other hand, it is likely the DPP and other opposition 
candidates will seek other points for complaint. They will almost cer-
tainly continue to experience disadvantages in running for office, or for 
winning. They will likely continue to rally for democratic change, 
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even if and when the system becomes as democratic as most Western 
democracies. Democracy and the fairness to make it work can always 
be made an issue. 
Constitutional issues will probably remain important. In fact, the 
pitch of complaint may rise. This was more an issue in the 1989 elec-
tion than previous elections, and these structural and fundamental is-
sues seem to be gaining rather than receding in importance. Winning 
elections to a great extent depends on the system in which campaign 
races are conducted, and political candidates realize this. 
Future election issues and the course of political change in elec-
tion politics will, of course, be influenced by the success or failure of 
the present government. President Lee Teng-hui in a sense is able to 
bridge many gaps: he is an old and trusted KMT leader, yet also a 
Taiwanese. He has been a balancer in many respects-offsetting demo-
cratic changes, which have accentuated Taiwan's separation, with 
overtures toward Beijing. Yet he has clearly not been able to satisfy 
everyone, and it is unlikely he can. This means that he will have to 
deal with party politics- both its good and bad sides. He no doubt 
will continue to try to play a balancing role but will not find that easy. 
In conclusion, it is apparent from assessing the last three elections 
that Taiwan's political system has evolved quickly and decisively to-
ward a fully democratic one. Elections have played a central and even 
indispensible role in that process. The case can be made that Taiwan is 
already a democracy in terms of election campaigns and politics. Yet 
the political system must consolidate the changes which have been 
made and demonstrate that the process as it has evolved can work 
well. 
On the other hand, future elections are likely to be stormy and 
bring further changes in both electoral politics and the system as a 
whole. Change is still in store, although one might anticipate this 
change being more a matter of adjustment or refinement in the system 
than revolutionary or troublesome change. If Taiwan is a democracy, 
it is not a mature democracy. 
But it being the case that Taiwan is a democracy, or close, and 
has done this so quickly and without violence, it should be seen more 
and more as a model of successful democratization. Its electoral poli-
tics and elections must be understood as largely behind or responsible 
for that change. If other developing nations, even communist nations, 
want to democratize with a map in hand, they should certainly look at 
Taiwan's experience in managing and holding elections and the course 
of political party development and party competition in their elections. 

Article 1: 
APPENDIX I 
ELECI'ION AND RECALL LAW - 1989 
Chapter One 
GENERAL PROVISIONS 
The election and recall of public officials during the period of mo-
bilization for, suppressing Communist rebellion shall be governed by 
the provision of this law. Matters regarding their election and recall 
not herein stipulated shall be governed by other relevant and applica-
ble laws and orders. 
Article 2: 
The public officials herein referred to mean the following 
personnel: 
1) Of the Central Government: Members of the National Assembly, 
of the Legislative Yuan, and of the Control Yuan. 
2) Of the local governments: Provincial assemblymen, councilmen of 
cities of provincial status, county councilmen, councilmen of cities of 
county status, hsiang (chen and shih) representatives, magistrates, 
mayors of cities of county status, hsiang (chen and shih) chiefs, village 
leaders and li leaders. 
Article 3: 
The election of public officials shall be conducted on the basis of 
universal suffrage, equality among citizens and direct and secret bal-
lots. Members of the Control Yuan, however, shall be elected with 
secret ballots cast by provincial assemblymen and councilmen of the 
cities of provincial status. The number of names entered on each bal-
lot in the election of the members of the Control Yuan shall not exceed 
one-third of the number of the members to be elected in the same 
election. 
The recalls of public officials shall be decided by the electors of 
their respective constituencies with secret ballots. 
Article 4: 
The deadline day for calculating the ages and the lengths of resi-
dence of the electors and the candidates shall be that immediately pre-
(103) 
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ceding the election day, and the facts concerning their ages and 
residence shall be those recorded on the household registration books. 
The lengths of residence shall begin and shall be calculated from 
the day of registration of the fact of moving into a new residence. In 
reholding a balloting, the balloting day last fixed for the election shall 
be the criterion day for calculating the ages and the lengths of 
residence. 
Article 5: 
The stipulations for the calculation of the various periods herein 
shall be in accordance with the provisions of the civil code, and a fixed 
period shall not be lengthened when its last day is a holiday. 
Chapter Two 
ELECTION AND RECALL ORGANS 
Article 6: 
For the election of public officials, a central election commission, 
provincial election commissions, election commissions of cities of pro-
vincial status, county election commissions, and election commissions 
of cities of county status shall be established. 
Article 7: 
The Central Election Commission shall be in charge of the elec-
tions of the members of the National Assembly, the Legislative Yuan, 
the Control Yuan, the provincial assemblies and the councils of cities 
of provincial status. The Commission shall also direct and supervise 
the related inferior election commissions to conduct these elections. 
The provincial election commissions shall be in charge of the elec-
tion of county councilmen, city councilmen, magistrates and mayors, 
and shall also direct and supervise the county and city election com-
missions to conduct these elections. 
The county election commissions shall conduct the elections of 
the representatives and the chiefs of hsiangs, chens and shihs 
(municipalities). 
The county election commissions shall conduct the elections of 
the leaders of villages and Lis, and the city election commissions shall 
conduct the elections of 1i leaders. 
The elections provided for in Paragraph 2, 3 and 4 shall also be 
under the supervlSlon of the respective superior election 
commission(s). 
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During the election period, the election commissions of the cities 
of provincial status and the election commissions of the counties and 
the cities of county status shall establish offices in the districts, 
hsiangs, chens, and shihs to manage election affairs. 
Article 8: 
The Central Election Commission shall be under the jurisdiction 
of the Executive Yuan and shall consist of several members. The 
number of its members of the same political party shall not exceed 
one-half of the total number of the members of the Commission. The 
members shall be appointed by the President of the Republic upon the 
recommendation of the President of the Executive Yuan. One of them 
shall be designated as its chairman. The organic rules of the Commis-
sion shall be drafted by the Executive Yuan and shall be submitted to 
the President of the Republic for his approval. 
The provincial election commissions and those of the cities of 
provincial status shall be under the jurisdiction of the Central Election 
Commission and shall each consist of several members; they shall be 
appointed by the President of the Executive Yuan upon the recom-
mendation of the Central Election Commission. One member of each 
commission shall be designated as its chairman. 
The county election commissions and those of the cities of county 
status shall be under the jurisdiction of the provincial election com-
mission and shall each consist of several members; they shall be ap-
pointed by the Central Election Commission upon the 
recommendation of the provincial election commission. One member 
of each commission shall be designated as its chairman. 
The organic rules of all election commissions shall be drafted by 
the Central Election Commission and shall be subject to the approval 
of the Executive Yuan. 
All members of election commissions at all levels shall discharge 
their functions and duties impartially and in accordance with the law. 
Article 9: 
The recalls of public officials shall be handled by appropriate elec-
tion commissions. For the purpose of handling recalls, Article 7 shall 
be applied mutatis mutandis. 
Article 10 
During the time of conducting an election or recall, the related 
election commission of any level shall be competent to have the staff 
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members of any government agencies transferred and placed under its 
supervision to do election or recall business. 
Article 11: 
The election commissions of all levels shall be in charge of the 
following affairs: 
1) The proclamation of elections and recalls. 
2) The procedures and plans for elections and recalls. 
3) The screening of the qualifications of candidates. 
4) The planning for election publicity. 
5) The inspection of election and recall activities. 
6) The establishment and management of ballot casting and opening 
stations. 
7) The examination of the results of elections and recalls. 
8) The preparation and issuance of election certificates. 
9) Other affairs related to elections and recalls. 
Article 12: 
The Central Election Commission shall opt several impartial per-
sons who have the right to vote as inspectors at large. They shall be 
appointed by the President of the Executive Yuan upon the recom-
mendation of the Central Election Commission. One of them shall be 
designated as convener. The election commissions of the cities of pro-
vincial status, counties, and the cities of county status shall each have 
an inspection group of several members. The respective election com-
missions shall recommend impartial persons having voting rights to 
the Central Election Commission or the provincial election commis-
sions for appointment. One member of each group shall be designated 
as its convener. Each inspection group shall execute the following 
affairs: 
1) To see if there is violation of any law and regulation regarding elec-
tion and recalls by any candidate, campaign assistant, recall sponsor 
or public official under recall process. 
2) To see if there is violation of any law or regulation regarding elec-
tions and recalls by an elector or a recall sponsor. 
3) To see if there is any law violation by the persons executing elec-
tion or recall business. 
4) To oversee other affairs related to elections and recalls. 
All inspectors shall be honorary without salary. The terms of of-
fice and the number of members shall be stipulated in the organic rules 
and regulations of the Central Election Commission, of the election 
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commissions of the cities of provincial status, and of the election com-
missions of counties and the cities of county status. 
The election commissions of the cities of provincial status and of 
the counties and the cities of county status shall each opt impartial 
persons having voting rights as inspectors to work in the meeting of 
political views presentation. 
The work code for inspectors and inspection groups of all levels 
shall be fixed by the Central Election Commission. 
Article 13: 
The budgets of the election commission of all levels shall be made 
by the central, provincial (city) and county (municipal) governments 
in accordance with the law. 
Section 1 Electors 
Article 14: 
Chapter Three 
ELECfiONS 
All nationals of the Republic of China who have attained the age 
of 20 and who do not have any of the following disqualifications shall 
be eligible to vote: 
1) His civil rights have been deprived and have not been restituted. 
2) He has been declared incompetent and the declaration has not been 
abrogated. 
Article 15: 
In an election of public officials representing geographical areas, a 
person having the right to vote shall be an elector either in the place of 
his or her domicile of origin or in the constituency where he has re-
sided continuously for six months or longer. 
The provision regarding domicile of origin in the above para-
graph shall not apply to the elections of representatives of hsiangs 
(chens and shihs) or to the election of the leaders ofhsiangs (chens and 
shihs)) villages and lis. 
In the election of public officials of the cities of provincial-status, 
the counties, the cities of county status, hsiangs, chens, and shihs, the 
length of residence of a person as provided for in Paragraph 1 shall be 
the length of his or her residence in the administrative district where 
he lives even when a new constituency is created therein. A person 
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who moves into a new constituency after an election proclamation is 
made, however, shall have no right to vote in the election. 
Article 16: 
The electors in an election of the public officials with special life 
habits shall be the electors also with special life habits who have the 
other qualifications set forth in Article 15. 
The electors in an election of the public officials representing an 
occupational or a women organization shall be the electors who have 
been members of their organization for at least six months and also 
have the other qualifications set forth in Article 15. 
The electors in an election of the members of the Control Yuan 
shall be the provincial assemblymen and the councilmen of the cities 
of provincial status. 
Article 17: 
A person having the right to vote who in one category of election 
has two or more capacities to cast ballots shall choose one of them to 
exercise his right to vote. 
Article 18: 
A person having the right to vote shall choose a place to exercise 
this right in accordance with the following provisions: 
1) A person qualified to vote both in the place of his domicile of origin 
and in the place of his residence shall exercise his right to vote in the 
latter place unless he, twenty-five days before the balloting day, files a 
declaration with the household office of the hsiang (chen, shih, dis-
trict) of his domicile of origin to the effect that he will exercise this 
right in the place of his domicile of origin. 
2) A person qualified to vote both in an occupational or a women-
organization and in a geographical constituency shall exercise the 
right to vote in the occupational or women organization unless he 
(she), sixty days before the balloting day, files a declaration with his 
(her) organization to the effect that he (she) will exercise this right in 
the geographical constituency. 
3) A person qualified to vote both in an occupational organization and 
in a women organization shall exercise the right to vote in the women 
organization unless she, sixty days before the balloting day, files a dec-
laration with the occupational organization to the effect that she will 
exercise this right in the occupational organization. 
4) A person qualified to vote in two or more occupational organiza-
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tions shall, sixty days before the balloting day, file a declaration with 
the organization of his choice to the effect that he will vote in this 
organization, and he shall inform the other organizations he belongs of 
this fact. The one who does not declare shall vote in the organization 
to which he was admitted earlier. If he was admitted to two more 
organizations on the same day, he shall exercise the right to vote in his 
geographical constituency. 
5) A person with special life habits and qualified to vote both in an 
occupational organization and in a women organization shall exercise 
the right to vote in the constituency of persons with special life habits 
unless he (she), sixty days before the balloting day, files a declaration 
with the organization of his (her) choice to the effect that he (she) will 
exercise this right in the occupational (women) organization. 
Article 19: 
If a member of an occupational organization or a women organi-
zation loses its membership 20 days before the balloting day, he or she 
shall not be qualified to vote in the occupational or women organiza-
tion. But he or she may exercise the right to vote in his (her) geo-
graphical constituency or the constituency of persons with special life 
habits in accordance with the law. 
Article 20: 
Unless stipulated otherwise, an elector shall cast his ballot at the 
poll in the place of his or her household registration. 
Electors of occupational and women organizations and the work-
ers of the polls may cast their ballots either in the place of their house-
hold registration or place of work. Members of occupational and 
women organizations, who choose to cast their ballots in the their 
working place however, shall be required to file, sixty days before the 
balloting day, declarations with their affiliated organizations, to the 
effect that they will vote in their working place. 
When elections for two or more categories of public officials are 
held simultaneously, those who choose to exercise their right to vote 
as members of the organization(s) according to the relevant regula-
tions shall have to cast their ballots at the same polls for ordinary 
electors. Those who choose to vote in their working places shall also 
be so required. 
Electors who shall elect the member of the Control Yuan shall 
cast their ballots at the polls set up by the election meetings held by 
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the provincial assemblies and by the councils of the cities of provincial 
status. 
Article 21: 
An elector shall obtain his ballot in the poll on the presentation of 
his identification card. 
In the election of the members of the Control Yuan, an elector 
shall obtain his ballot in the poll on the presentation of his credential 
identifying his provincial assemblymanship or city councilmanship. 
Article 22: 
All electors shall go to the poll to obtain and cast their ballots in 
the prescribed time. After the deadline no one shall be permitted to 
enter the poll. Those who have entered timely but do not yet cast their 
ballots may proceed to cast the ballot. 
Section Two Electoral Registers 
Article 23: 
The electoral register of a geographical constituency shall be 
compiled by the household office of a hsiang (chen, shih, district) 
based on the household registration books. All those who have duly 
registered and in accordance with the law have the right to vote shall 
be included in the register. Those who have moved away from their 
registered residences or changed their domicile registration on any of 
the twenty days before the balloting day shall exercise the right to vote 
in the constituency where they are originally qualified to vote. 
Article 24: 
The electoral register of an occupational or a women organization 
shall be compiled by the household office in conformity with the provi-
sions of Article 23 above and based on the membership roster made 
and reported by the occupational or women organization. Those who 
have lost their membership on any of the twenty days before the bal-
loting day shall exercise the right to vote in the organization in which 
they are originally qualified to vote. 
There shall be compiled separate electoral registers of the electors 
of occupational and women organizations who have declared to the 
effect that they will cast their ballots in the place where they work. 
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Article 25: 
The electoral register of the citizens with special life habits shall 
be compiled by the household office in accordance with the provisions 
of Article 23 above, and the identification of a citizen as one having 
special life habits shall be based on the record in the household regis-
tration books. 
Article 26: 
When elections of two or more categories of public officials are 
held at one and the same time, the electoral registers may, according 
to the actual need, be compiled either separately for different elections 
or jointly for all the elections. 
Article 27: 
The electoral registers for the election of the members of the Con-
trol Yuan shall be compiled by the civil affairs departments of the pro-
vincial governments and the governments of the cities of provincial 
status based on the names listed of provincial assemblymen and city 
councilmen. 
Article 28: 
The electoral registers of occupational and women organizations 
shall be compiled by the respective organizations and shall be dis-
played publicly at the office of each organization 50 days before the 
balloting day for five days for their members to read. Any member 
who finds a mistake or an omission on the register may apply for cor-
rection during the period of display. 
Article 29: 
Upon completion of the compilation of the electoral registers the 
household offices shall submit them to the hsiang (chen, shih district) 
office for transmittal to the election commission of the city of provin-
cial status or county or city of county status for reference. At the 
same time it shall send a copy to the respective village or li office. The 
village or li office shall put the copy on display in the office for five 
days. Any citizen who finds a mistake or an omission on the copy may 
apply for correction during the period of display. 
Article 30: 
At the expiration of public display days the village or li leader 
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shall immediately submit the electoral registers together with a report 
on the applications for corrections, if any, to the hsiang (chen, shih, 
district) office for transmittal to the household office for re-checking 
and re-correcting purposes. 
The electoral registers shall be finally established and fixed after 
public display and corrections, and the election commissions of the 
cities of provincial status and of the counties shall proclaim the num-
bers of electors. 
Section Three Candidates 
Article 31: 
The elector who has attained the age of 23 may register as a can-
didate for a public office, but to be a candidate for county magistrate 
or for mayor of a city of county-status one must attain the age of 30, 
and to be a candidate for chief of a hsiang (chen or shih) one must be 
at least twenty-six years of age. 
An elector who has attained the age of 35 may register as a candi-
date for member of the Control Yuan either in the place of his (her 
domicile of origin or the administrative district where he (she) has 
resided continuously for six months or longer. 
A person whose nationality of the Republic of China has been 
restored for three years or who has been naturalized in the Republic of 
China for ten years shall be eligible to register as a candidate in ac-
cordance with the provisions of the preceding two paragraphs. 
Article 32: 
A person who applies for registration as a candidate in an election 
of public officials shall be required to have the following scholastic 
background and experience: 
1) A candidate for member of the National Assembly or the Legisla-
tive Yuan: a senior high school or higher school graduate; or having 
passed an ordinary or a higher civil service examination; or having 
served as a provincial assemblyman or a councilman of a city of pro-
vincial status or as a higher-level public official for at least one term. 
2) A candidate for member of the Control Yuan: a junior college or 
higher learning school graduate, or having passed a higher civil service 
examination together with four or more years of experience in admin-
istrative or judicial work: or having taught at a junior college or 
school of higher learning or having practiced as a lawyer or account-
ant for four years or having served as a provincial assemblyman or 
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councilman of a city of provincial status or a higher-level public offi-
cial for at least one term. 
3) A candidate for provincial assemblyman or councilman of a city or 
provincial status: a senior high school or higher learning school grad-
uate; or having passed an ordinary or higher civil service examination; 
or having served as a councilman of a county or a city of county status 
or a higher-level public official for at least one term. 
4) A candidate for councilman of a county or a city of county status: 
a junior high or higher school graduate; or having passed a grade D 
special examination; or having served as a representative of a hsiang 
(chen or shih) or a higher-level public official for at least one term. 
5) A candidate for representative of a hsiang (chen or shih): a junior 
high or higher school graduate; or having passed a grade D special 
examination; or having served as a representative of hsiang (chen or 
shih) or a higher-level public official or leader of a village or a li for at 
least one term. 
6) A candidate for magistrate or mayor of a city of county status: a 
junior college or higher learning school graduate; or having passed a 
high civil service examination together with four or more years' expe-
rience in public administration; or having taught as a lecturer at a 
junior college or a higher learning school for four or more years; or 
having practiced for four or more years a profession with a qualifica-
tion certified by the passing of a high civil service examination; or hav-
ing graduated from a senior high school or passed an ordinary civil 
service examination together with experience as a councilman of a 
county or a city of county status or as a chief of a hsiang (chen or shih) 
or higher-level public official for at least one term. 
7) A candidate for chief of a hsiang (chen or shih): a junior high 
school graduate or having passed an ordinary civil service examination 
together with four years' experience in public administration or to-
gether with experience as a representative ofhsiang (chen or shih) or a 
higher-level public official for at least one term. 
8) A candidate for leader of a village or li : an elementary school grad-
uate or having passed grade D special examination; or having served 
as representative of a hsiang (chen or shih) or a village or li, for at least 
one term. 
Qualifications set forth in the above paragraphs regarding candi-
dates' scholastic background and experience shall be determined 
through a screening process. The rules concerning the screening pro-
cess shall be determined by the Examination Yuan. 
A person who has been qualified through a screening process as a 
candidate for a certain public office before this law is put into effect 
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shall be eligible for election to that office without having to go once 
again through another screening process. 
A person who has been qualified through a screening process as a 
candidate for one of the two categories of central government officials 
as stipulated in Item 1 of Paragraph 1 above, shall be an eligible candi-
date for the other category of official specified in the same Item 1 
above and also an eligible candidate for an official specified in Items 3, 
4 and 5; a person who has been qualified through a screening process 
as a candidate for public office specified in Item 2 shall be eligible for 
the public offices specified in Items I, 3, 4 and 5; a person who has 
been qualified through a screening process as a candidate for public 
office specified in Item 3 shall be eligible for the offices specified in 
Items 4 and 5; a person who has been qualified through a screening 
process as a candidate for public office specified in Item 4 shall be 
eligible for the office specified in Item 5; a person who has been quali-
fied through a screening process as a candidate for public office speci-
fied in Item 6 shall be eligible for the offices specified in Items 7 and 8; 
and a person who has been qualified through a screening process as a 
candidate for public office specified in Item 7 shall be eligible for the 
offices specified in Item 8. 
Article 33: 
When elections of two or more categories of public officials are 
held simultaneously, a person shall be permitted to register as candi-
date only for one of them. A person who has two or more qualifica-
tions of candidacy in the election of one category of public officials 
shall be permitted to register only one candidacy. 
The registration of a person who has registered simultaneously as 
a candidate for two or more different public offices or as two candi-
dates for one public office shall be null and void. 
Article 34: 
The following persons shall not be permitted to register as 
candidates: 
1) Those who have committed treason or sedition and have been 
convicted. 
2) Those who have committed the offense of graft and have been 
convicted. 
3) Those who have violated any of Articles 87, 88, 89, 90 and 91 of 
this law, or Article 142 or Article 144 of the Criminal Law and have 
been convicted. 
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4) Those who have committed a crime other than the offenses set 
forth in the preceding three paragraphs and have been convicted and 
sentenced to a fixed prison term which has not been or entirely been 
served. This clause shall not apply to those who have been reprieved. 
5) Those who are confined under peace and safety preservation meas-
ures or have been ordered to receive reformatory education and have 
not yet finished the confinement or education. 
6) Those who have been declared bankrupt and whose rights have not 
been restored. 
7) Those who have been suspended from official appointment or from 
official duty in accordance with the law and the period of suspension 
has not expired. 
8) Those who have been deprived of their civil rights and whose rights 
have not been restored. 
9) Those who have been declared unfit to dispose of their property 
and whose rights have not been restored. 
Article 35: 
The following persons shall not be permitted to register as 
candidates: 
1) Military men or policemen in active service. 
2) Students currently attending schools. 
3) Persons handling election affairs. 
The above Item 1 shall not apply to the military men in active 
service who are in the reserves or militia men on call before they are 
ordered to enlist for active service, or when they are on educational, 
service or muster duties. 
The above Item 2 shall not apply to the students who are incum-
bent public officials taking advanced courses. 
An incumbent functionary shall not be permitted to register in 
the constituency where his main office is located as a candidate for 
member of the National Assembly. 
Article 35-1: 
All legally established political parties may recommend candi-
dates to participate in the elections for public officials. To complete 
the registration a candidate thus recommended shall submit his (her) 
party's letter of recommendation. 
Article 36: 
When any of the following disqualifying facts is discovered, either 
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before the name lists of registered candidates are made public or 
before the balloting is conducted, the registered candidacy shall be 
canceled by the election commission. The election commission shall 
also bring a lawsuit against an elected person to invalidate his election 
if a disqualifying fact is found after the balloting under Article 103-1 
of this law: 
1) The qualifications of the candidate are not accordant to the re-
quirements specified in Article 31, or the qualification acquired 
through the screening process has been nullified. 
2) The candidacy is in violation of Article 34 or Paragraphs 1 and 3 of 
Article 35. 
3) Candidacy registration is forbidden by Paragraph 1 of Article 85. 
Article 37: 
Persons who have registered as candidates may not withdraw 
their candidacy registration after the end of the registration period. 
Persons who withdraw their candidacy registration before the end of 
the registration period may not reapply for registration as candidates 
for the same category of candidacy. 
Political parties may withdraw their recommendation before the 
end of the registration period. 
After the end of the registration period, the registered candidates 
who move out of, or disenroll household registration in their current 
constituencies or forfeit their membership in a professional organiza-
tion or women organization, shall retain their registered candidacies 
and shall have to exercise their right to vote in their respective constit-
uencies or organization. 
Article 38: 
At the time of registration, a candidate shall make a security de-
posit, the amount of which shall be duly announced by the election 
commission before the balloting day. Candidates for village and li 
leaders, however, are exempt from doing so. 
The amount of the security deposit of a candidate recommended 
by a political party shall be reduced one half. If the party withdraws 
its recommendation, however, the candidate shall pay the total 
amount. 
The security deposit referred to in the preceding two paragraphs 
shall be refunded within ten days after the announcement of the list of 
the elected. However, no refund shall be made to a candidate for 
member of the Control Yuan who receives no vote, or to any candi-
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date for other post who fails to win 10% of the quotient resulting from 
dividing the total number of eligible electors in the candidate's constit-
uency by the total number of officials therein to be elected. 
Section Four Constituencies 
Article 39: 
For the election of public officials, the constituencies shall be de-
marcated in accordance with the following provisions: 
1) For members of the National Assembly to be elected by cities of 
provincial status and counties (cities of county status): the administra-
tive areas to which they belong, shall be their respective constituen-
cies. An administrative area may be divided into several 
constituencies. 
2) For members of the Legislative Yuan to be elected by provinces 
and cities of provincial status: the administrative area, to which they 
belong, shall be their respective constituencies. An administrative 
area may be divided into several constituencies. 
3) For provincial assemblymen to be elected by counties and cities of 
county status, the administrative areas, to which they belong, shall be 
their respective constituencies. For councilmen of the cities of provin-
cial status: the administrative areas, to which they belong, shall be 
their respective constituencies. An administrative area may be divided 
into several constituencies. 
4) For councilmen of a county or a city of county status, and for rep-
resentatives of a hsiang (chen or shih): the administrative areas, to 
which they belong, shall be their respective constituencies. An admin-
istrative area may be divided into several constituencies. 
5) For magistrates of counties, mayors of cities of county status, 
chiefs of hsiangs (chens and shihs) and leaders of villages and lis: the 
administrative areas, to which they belong, shall be their respective 
constituencies. 
Article 40: 
For members of the National Assembly and the Legislative Yuan 
to be elected by occupational organizations, all occupational organiza-
tions of the same category shall constitute a constituency. 
For members of the National Assembly to be elected by women 
organiz~ti~ns, the women organizati?n of a province and that of a city 
of provmc1al status shall each constitute a constituency. 
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Article 41: 
For members of the National Assembly, the Legislative Yuan, the 
provincial assemblies, and councils of cities of provincial status or for 
representatives of a hsiang, chen or shih to be elected by citizens with 
special life habits, the constituencies shall be fixed in accordance with 
the following provisions: 
1) For members of the National Assembly and the Legislative Yuan 
this group of citizens shall be divided into a constituency of those liv-
ing on the plains and a constituency of those living in the mountainous 
areas. 
2) For provincial assemblymen, councilmen of the cities of provincial 
status, county councilmen and councilmen of the cities of county sta-
tus and for hsiang, chen and shih representatives to be elected by the 
citizens with special life habits, the citizens of this group in the admin-
istrative area of a province, a city of provincial status, a county, a city 
of county status, a hsiang, a chen or a shih shall each constitute a 
constituency. These citizens in any administrative area may also be 
divided into a constituency of those living in the plains and a constitu-
ency of those living in the mountainous areas. 
Article 42: 
The constituencies provided for in Paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 of Arti-
cle 39 and Paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article 41 for the election of provin-
cial assemblymen and councilmen of cities of provincial status shall be 
demarcated by the Central Election Commission. The constituencies 
set forth in Paragraph 4 of Article 39 and Paragraph 2 of Article 41 
for the election of councilmen of a county or a city of county status 
shall be demarcated by the provincial election commission. The con-
stituencies set forth in Paragraph 2 of Article 41 for hsiang (chen and 
shih) representatives shall be demarcated by the county election com-
mission. The proclamation of constituency demarcation shall be made 
simultaneously together with the election proclamation. When there 
is a change in the demarcation of a constituency, the proclamation 
shall be made six months before the expiration of the terms of office of 
the public officials concerned, or before the prescribed dates. In mak-
ing the above demarcation of constituencies administrative districts, 
population distribution, geographical environment, communications 
circumstances and the number of public officials to be elected shall be 
all taken into account. 
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Article 43: 
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The election commissions shall issue various proclamations in ac-
cordance with following provisions: 
1) An election proclamation shall set forth the category of election, 
the number of public officials to be elected, the demarcation of constit-
uencies, the election date and the time of balloting. The proclamation 
shall be issued forty days before the expiration of terms of office of 
public officials concerned or before the prescribed dates, but in rehold-
ing an election or a balloting and in supplementary elections the forty 
days stipulation shall not apply. 
2) Days for candidates registration shall be proclaimed twenty days 
before the election day. The duration of registration shall not be less 
than five days. But in the elections of representatives of hsiangs, chens 
or shihs, chiefs of hsiangs, chens or shihs, and leaders of villages and 
lis, the duration shall not be less than three days. 
3) The name lists of the electors shall be proclaimed fifteen days 
before the election day and shall be for public reading for at least five 
days. 
4) The name lists of registered candidates shall be proclaimed one day 
before the beginning of campaign activities. 
5) The number of electors shall be proclaimed three days before the 
election day. 
6) The name lists of persons elected shall be proclaimed within seven 
days after the election. 
When no candidate is registered in a constituency during the du-
ration provided for in Paragraph 1, Article 2, a second proclamation 
for candidates registration shall be issued for a duration of not less 
than two days. 
Article 44: 
The elections of public officials shall be completed ten days before 
the expiration of the respective terms of office or before the prescribed 
dates. But this provision shall not apply in reholding an election, or a 
balloting or in supplementary elections. 
Section Six Election Activities 
Article 45: 
The duration of campaign activities of the candidates for public 
offices shall be in accordance with the following provisions: 
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1) Fifteen days for the candidates for members of the National As-
sembly, the Legislative Yuan and the Control Yuan. 
2) Ten days for the candidates for members of provincial assemblies, 
councilmen of the cities of provincial status, county councilmen, coun-
cilmen of the cities of county status, magistrates and mayors. 
3) Five days for the candidates for representatives of hsiangs, chens 
and shihs, and for the candidates for chiefs of hsiangs, chens and 
shihs. 
4) Three days for the candidates for village and li leaders. 
Campaign activities shall end on the day immediately before the 
election day. The duration of campaign activities referred to in this 
article shall be counted backward from the concluding date. The be-
ginning and closing times of each day of campaign activities shall be 
decided by the election commissions. 
Article 45-1: 
The maximum campaign expenditures of the candidates for pub-
lic office shall be set by the election commission and announced simul-
taneously together with the election proclamation. 
The maximum amounts of campaign expenditures referred to in 
the paragraph above shall be the following amounts: (1) a basic 
amount prescribed with consideration given to the categories of the 
public offices concerned, the duration of campaign, the programs of 
activities, the sizes of the constituencies, the communications circum-
stances, campaign activities and their overhead costs, and the price 
index of daily life necessities, and (2) an amount resulting from first 
dividing the total population of the constituency concerned by the 
number of public officials to be elected and then multiplying the basic 
amount. 
Article 45-2: 
No candidate may accept contributions of campaign expenditures 
from the following sources: 
1) Foreign groups or juridical persons or individuals, or groups or ju-
ridical persons whose main membership is composed of foreigners. 
2) Other candidates of the same category of public officials in the 
same election. 
Article 45-3: 
A candidate or his designated person shall keep records of cam-
paign funds. 
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Within 30 days after the election, the candidate shall report the 
receipts and expenditures to the related election commission. The re-
port shall be signed by one of the said persons. 
If the election commission, in view of the facts on hand, suspects 
the truth of the report it may require the candidate to file proof or 
documentation. 
These shall be kept on file for six months after the submission of 
the report. In the event of a lawsuit involving him, the proof and or 
documentation shall be kept for three more months from the time of 
judgment. 
The rules for checking campaign receipts and expenditure shall 
be decided by the Central Election Commission. 
Article 45-4: 
When a candidate's total campaign expenditure is within the 
maximum amount prescribed by Article 45-1, the portion of it not 
contributed by any one may be entered in the income tax report of the 
election year for claiming tax deduction. 
An individual's contribution of campaign expenditures to any sin-
gle candidate may not exceed 20,000 yuans. A profit-seeking enter-
prise's contribution to any single candidate may not exceed 300,000 
yuans. The total amount of contributions accepted by a candidate 
may not exceed the maximum amount prescribed by Article 45-1. 
An individual's contributions to a legally established political 
party (ies) may not exceed both 20 percent of his (her) annual total 
income and the total amount of 200,000 yuans. A profit-seeking enter-
prise's contributions may not exceed both 10 percent of its annual to-
tal income and the total amount of 3,000,000 yuans. 
An individual's contributions mentioned in the above two 
paragraphs may be entered in his (her) income tax report of the elec-
tion year for tax reduction purpose. A profit-seeking enterprise's con-
tribution may be entered in its annual income report as expenses or 
losses during the election year. 
A profit-seeking enterprise which has lost money for three or 
more successive years may not make any campaign contribution. 
Article 45-5: 
A candidate for public office who receives ballots three quarters 
more than the minimum total ballots needed for his/her election shall 
receive a campaign expenditure subsidy to be calculated at 10 yuans 
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per ballot. However, the maximum amount of campaign expenditures 
prescribed for his (her) constituency. 
If the elected individual winning the minimum ballots needed for 
his/her election, referred to in the above paragraph, is a woman and 
wins a seat reserved only for women, the number of ballots won by the 
elected immediately larger then hers shall be taken as the minimum 
number of ballots needed for election. 
The expenditures for the subsidy set in Paragraph 1 above shall 
be listed in the budgets of the election commissions in accordance with 
the law. 
Article 46: 
Except in the election of the member of the Control Yuan, each 
candidate during the period of campaign activities may set up in his 
(her) constituency campaign headquarters and may employ campaign 
assistants. 
Regulations pertaining to campaign headquarters and the em-
ployment of campaign assistants shall be fixed by the Central Election 
Commission. 
Article 47: 
The following persons shall not be qualified for campaign 
assistants: 
1) Registered candidates. 
2) Public functionaries. 
3) Those who have any of the disqualifications set forth in Article 34 
and those listed in Item of Article 35 above. 
One person shall not serve as a campaign assistant for two 
candidates. 
Article 48: 
(deleted) 
Article 49: 
With the exception of the political views presentation meetings of 
the candidates for members of the Control Yuan, all of which shall be 
sponsored by the election commission, political views presentation 
meetings shall be divided into candidate-sponsored meetings and elec-
tion commission-sponsored meetings. Candidate-sponsored meetings 
shall be held before election commission-sponsored meetings, and the 
number of days for the latter shall not exceed those for the former. 
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The election commission-sponsored meetings shall be held by the 
election commission during the days set for them. The candidates 
concerned shall personally attend any or all meetings to present their 
views. Whether election commission-sponsored meetings in the elec-
tion of village and li leaders are held or not shall be decided by the 
election commission in accord with the situation. 
The candidate-sponsored meetings shall be held by the candidates 
on the days specified. No more than six meetings shall be held in any 
single day, and each meeting shall last no more than two hours. Can-
didates concerned shall be present. No one other than the candidate 
and his campaign assistant(s) shall make speeches at the meeting. The 
time and place of a meeting shall be reported to the election commis-
sion in charge for its approval two days in advance. 
The election commission may send authorized inspectors to over-
see the proceedings at the political views presentation meetings. 
Article 50: 
The election commission shall compile the candidates' political 
views and pledges, serial numbers photographs, names, ages, sexes, 
domiciles of origin, birthplaces, party affiliations, scholastic back-
grounds, experiences, occupations, addresses, and balloting day and 
places, etc., shall print all these in a gazette and shall distribute them 
to all households in the constituencies or to the provincial assembly-
men and councilmen of cities of provincial status, and meanwhile post 
them in appropriate places two days before the balloting day. 
When registering their candidacies, the candidates shall submit 
the above-mentioned political views and pledges, and personal data to 
the relevant election commission. 
If the content of political views and pledges of a candidate vio-
lates any of the provisions of Article 54 above, the election commis-
sion shall notify him and ask him to correct them within a fixed 
period. When the period expires, if he (she) does not correct them or 
after revision the content still violates any of those provisions the 
points which violate the provisions will not be printed in the gazette. 
Candidates shall be held responsible for their own personal data. 
If the election commission in the course of carrying on its official du-
ties knows any personal datum (data) to be untrue, or upon inquisition 
finds it (them) untrue, it (they) will not be printed in the gazette. 
Candidates recommended by their political parties shall have 
party recommendation published those not recommended by any 
political party or whose parties shall have party recommendation pub-
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lished ; those not recommended by any political party or whose party 
recommendation has been withdrawn shall have only party affiliation 
published. 
The election commissions may, to meet the actual needs, make 
use of television and other means of mass communications to conduct 
election activities for the election of public officials of certain 
categories. 
Article 51: 
Campaign propaganda materials with words or pictures to be 
printed and distributed shall be personally signed by the candidates. 
Campaign propaganda materials mentioned in the above para-
graph shall be posted only in places supplied or specified by the elec-
tion commission. The size of posted materials shall be decided by the 
election commission. 
Candidates' hanged and standing placards, billboards, pennants, 
banners, or other advertising items, except those placed on campaign 
vehicles, shall not be placed 30 meters off the campaign headquarters 
of the respective candidates. 
Article 51-1: 
During the period of campaign activities, political parties may 
hold political rallies and print and distribute campaign propaganda 
materials for the candidates they have recommended. 
At the political rallies referred to in the above paragraph, in addi-
tion to the candidates and their assistants, other individuals, having 
been duly reported to the election commission by their own party (ies) 
may also speak. 
The propaganda materials printed and distributed by political 
parties shall clearly bear the responsible political party's name. 
Political rallies referred to in Paragraph 1 above shall be held 
only during the period specified for candidate-sponsored political ral-
lies, and shall be regulated by the provisions of Paragraphs 3 and 4 of 
Article 49. 
Article 52: 
Except those in the election for members of the Control Yuan, 
any candidate may use campaign vehicles and loudspeakers during the 
period for campaign activities. 
The vehicles used by the candidates for campaign activities shall 
fly pennants prepared and issued by the election commission. Each 
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candidate shall use no more than five vehicles. A candidate whose 
constituency is a city of provincial status or a county, or a city of 
county status shall use no more than three campaign vehicles. A can-
didate whose constituency is a hsiang (chen, shih) shall use no more 
than ten campaign vehicles. A candidate whose constituency is a vil-
lage or li shall use no more than one campaign vehicle. 
Loudspeakers used by candidates for campaign activities shall be 
installed on the campaign vehicles and used only at candidate-spon-
sored political rallies and campaign headquarters, and shall be used in 
such a proper way as not to interfere with the presentation of political 
views and pledges by other candidates. 
Article 53: 
(deleted) 
Article 54: 
The utterances of a candidate and of his campaign assistants shall 
not commit any of the following offenses: 
1) Instigating persons to commit offenses against the internal security 
or external security of the state. 
2) Inciting persons to undermine social order with violence. 
3) Committing other offenses set forth in the criminal code. 
Article 55: 
The campaign activities of a candidate and his assistants shall not 
include any of the following acts: 
1) Making public speeches in any place other than the place of polit-
ical rallies. 
2) Conducting campaign activities beyond the prescribed hours of the 
prescribed days. 
3) Assembling a crowd for a demonstration. 
4) Organizing electors for a signing drive, or using radio or television 
to broadcast campaign advertising. 
5) Setting off firecrackers. 
Article 55-1: 
During the period prescribed for campaign activities, no political 
party shall be allowed to engage in any of the following activities: 
1) Except at political rallies, campaigning on behalf of any candidate 
by making public speeches. 
2) Establishing campaign headquarters or hiring campaign assistants. 
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3) Except at political rallies, campaigning on behalf of any candidate 
by using campaign vehicles or amplifiers. 
4) Assembling a crowd for the purpose of campaigning for a 
candidate. 
5) Campaigning for a candidate by posting campaign materials, hang-
ing or erecting such advertising media as placards, billboards, flags, or 
banners 30 meters off the political party's office. 
6) Mobilizing electors for a signing drive or using radio or television 
to broadcast campaign advertising for a candidate. 
7) Setting off firecrackers. 
Article 56: 
During the period prescribed for campaign activities, no person 
other than the candidates, their assistants, and their political parties 
may carry on campaign activities in accordance with the law and en-
gage in any of the following acts: 
1) Campaigning for a candidate by making public speeches or by pub-
licly broadcasting or playing audio or video tapes of speeches. 
2) Campaigning for a candidate by printing and distributing or post-
ing campaign materials, or hanging or erecting such advertising media 
as placards, billboards, pennants or banners. 
3) Campaigning for a candidate by using campaign vehicles or ampli-
fiers which have not been approved for campaign activities. 
4) Campaigning for a candidate by assembling a crowd for a 
demonstration. 
5) Campaigning for a candidate by mobilizing electors for a signing 
drive or broadcasting or placing advertisements in the mass media. 
6) Setting off firecrackers on behalf of a candidate. 
Section Seven Casting and Opening of Ballots 
Article 57: 
In the election of public officials, polls shall be established in the 
office buildings, schools, public places, and other appropriate places in 
keeping with the size of the constituency and the geographical distri-
bution of electors. 
In the election of the members of the Control Yuan, the poll shall 
be established at the provincial assemblies or the councils of cities of 
provincial status. 
Upon completion of balloting, a poll shall be turned into a ballot-
opening station and the ballots shall be counted aloud in the presence 
of spectators. After all the ballots are opened and counted the chief 
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administrator and the chief inspector of the ballot-opening station 
shall proclaim together in writing the result of the opening of the 
ballots. 
Article 58: 
Each poll and each ballot-opening station shall have one chief 
administrator and several administrators appointed by the election 
commission to take charge of ballot casting and opening business. 
Article 59: 
Each poll and each ballot-opening station shall have one chief 
and several inspectors to inspect the casting and opening of ballots. 
Each candidate shall be entitled to recommend a number of in-
spectors according to the actual need. The election commission in 
charge shall appoint the recommended and qualified inspectors after 
screening. However, this recommending right of the party-recom-
mended candidate shall be exercised only by that political party. The 
candidate or the political party may assign the inspectors so recom-
mended to his or its designated poll and ballot-opening stations to in-
spect the casting and opening of ballots. If the assigned inspectors are 
more than the prescribed number for a poll or ballot-opening station, 
the choices shall be determined by drawing lots. However, it must not 
be that all the inspectors at a poll or ballot-opening station are mem-
bers of the same political party. 
When the recommended chief inspectors and inspectors are less 
than needed, the election commission in charge shall opt and appoint 
inspectors from among the following personnel: 
1) Local impartial individuals. 
2) Personnel of government offices, private organizations and schools 
3) Adult students of the colleges and universities. 
The rules governing the recommendation of inspectors and their 
service shall be decided by the Central Election Commission. 
Article 60 
The ballots shall be printed and distributed by the election com-
mission, taking into account the different constituencies. The ballots 
shall bear the serial numbers, names and photographs of all 
candidates. 
The above-mentioned ballots shall be delivered to the chief ad-
ministrators of the polls the day before the balloting day. Each chief 
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administrator shall count the ballots together with the chief inspector 
in the presence of spectators. 
Article 61 
Before casting his ballot an elector shall vote for a single candi-
date with a marking tool prepared by the election commission. In the 
election for members of the Control Yuan, an elector shall vote for a 
number of candidates not exceeding the number provided for in Para-
graph 1 of Article 3. 
After marking his ballot the elector shall not show it to anyone. 
Article 62 
A ballot shall be invalid in any of the following instances: 
1) It is not prepared and distributed by the election commission in 
charge. 
2) It is marked for two or more candidates or in the case of the elec-
tion for members of the Control Yuan for a number of candidates ex-
ceeding the number stipulated. 
3) The mark is put in such a place that the elector's choice cannot be 
ascertained. 
4) The mark is altered. 
5) The ballot bears a signature, name chop, fingerprint, words or any 
other writing sign. 
6) The ballot is tom. 
7) The ballot is so stained that the elector's choice cannot be 
ascertained. 
8) The ballot is not marked with the tool prepared by the election 
commission in charge. 
Any question regarding the validity of a ballot shall be deter-
mined by the chief administrator together with the chief inspector of 
the ballot-opening station. If there is a disagreement between them, it 
shall be voted upon and decided by all inspectors. In the event of a tie, 
the ballot shall be declared valid. 
Article 63: 
The chief administrator together with the chief inspector shall or-
der a person to leave the poll or that ballot-opening station if any of 
the following facts exists: 
1) He has made a din or has interfered with or persuaded others to 
vote or not to vote, in defiance of interdiction. 
2) He carries a weapon or dangerous articles into the poll. 
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3) He has other improper acts and has defied interdiction. 
If any of the above-mentioned circumstances happens to an elec-
tor and he is ordered to leave, the ballot at his hand shall be taken 
back and the incident shall be recorded under his name in the electoral 
register. If the case is serious, a specific report shall be made to the 
election commission. 
Article 64: 
If the casting or opening of ballots is prevented by a natural ca-
lamity or other acts of Heaven, the chief administrator of the poll or 
ballot-opening station shall report the situation to the election com-
mission of a city of provincial status or that of a county (or city of 
county status), and shall ask for approval to change the date or place 
for casting or opening the ballots. If it is an election of public officials 
of the Central government, provincial assemblymen (or councilmen of 
a city of provincial status), county councilmen (or councilmen of cities 
of county status), magistrates or mayors, the case shall also be re-
ported and transmitted to the Central or provincial election commis-
sion for reference. Section Eight Election Results 
Article 65: 
In an election of public officials there shall be a prescribed 
number of vacancies. The candidates in a constituency who have won 
a plurality of ballots shall be elected. When two or more candidates 
have received an equal number of ballots the winner shall be deter-
mined by drawing lots. 
In an election of public officials when there is a women quota and 
when the women elected are less than the quota, the ballots obtained 
by the female candidates shall be separated from those obtained by 
male candidates and shall also be counted separately. The female can-
didate(s) who has (have) won a plurality of ballots shall be declared 
elected. 
Article 66: 
Where the number of candidates does not exceed or is less than 
the number of vacancies up for election in a constituency, only the 
candidates who have received the following stipulated number of bal-
lots shall be declared elected. In elections for members of the Control 
Yuan or for villages and li leader, however, this provision does not 
apply. 
1) In elections for members of the National Assembly and the Legisla-
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tive Yuan, provincial assemblymen, councilmen of a city of provincial 
status, county councilmen, councilmen of a city of county status and 
hsiang (chen or shih) representatives: 10 percent of the quotient re-
sulting from dividing the total number of electors in the constituency 
by the number of public officials to be elected in the same 
constituency. 
2) In elections for county magistrates, mayors of cities of county sta-
tus and hsiang (chen and shih) chiefs: 20 percent of the total number 
of electors in the constituency. 
If, in pursuance with the above provisions, no one is elected or the 
number of the elected does not reach the number of public officials to 
be elected, and if this is related to a magistrate (mayor of a city of 
county status) or hsiang (chen or shih) chief, a new election shall be 
proclaimed and held within a fixed period after the balloting day. If 
this is related to members of the National Assembly and the Legisla-
tive Yuan, provincial assemblymen, councilmen of a city of provincial 
status, county councilmen, councilmen of a city of county status, 
hsiang (chen or shih) representatives, their vacancies shall be left un-
filled. When the vacancies reaches one half of the total number of 
public officials to be elected in any one constituency, a date shall be 
fixed for a hi-election. 
Article 67: 
When an elected person dies or when his election is declared null 
and void before his taking office, the case shall be handled in accord-
ance with the following provisions: 
1) In the case of a magistrate, a mayor of a city of county status, a 
chief of a hsiang (chen or shih), a leader of a village or a li, a hi-
election shall be held within a fixed period. 
2) In the case of a member of the National Assembly, the Legislative 
Yuan, the Control Yuan, a provincial assembly, the council of a city of 
provincial status, a county council, the council of a city of county sta-
tus, or the board of hsiang (chen or shih) representatives, it shall be 
deemed as vacancies still left unfilled. If the unfilled vacancies reach 
one half of the total number of the public officials to be elected in any 
one constituency, a vacancy-filling election shall be held within a fixed 
period. 
Article 68: 
The persons duly elected in an election shall take office at a stipu-
lated date. Any person elected in a hi-election or after a reballoting in 
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an election and thus cannot take office at the stipulated date, his term 
of office shall also begin from the stipulated date. 
Chapter Four 
RECALL 
Section One Initiation of a Recall Case 
Article 69: 
The recall of a public official may be initiated by an elector of the 
official's constituency. It shall be brought to the election commission. 
An elected official who has not yet served one full year after taking 
office shall not be subjected to recall process. 
Article 70: 
A recall paper shall be accompanied with a statement of rea-
son(s), and the initiation shall be made by electors of the official's con-
stituency. The number of the initiators shall have to conform with the 
following provisions: 
1) In the case of a member of the National Assembly, the Legislative 
Yuan, a provincial assembly, the council of a city of provincial status, 
a county council, the council of a city of county status, or of hsiang 
(chen or shih) representatives, the number of initiators shall be 5 per 
cent or more of the quotient obtained by dividing the total number of 
the electors in the official's constituency with the number of the public 
officials to be elected in the constituency. 
2) In the case of a member of the Control Yuan the number of initia-
tors shall be 10 per cent or more of the total number of the members of 
the provincial assembly or the council of a city of provincial status, 
which has elected that member. 
3) In the case of a magistrate, a mayor of a city of county status, or a 
hsiang (chen or shih) chief, or a village or 1i leader, the number of 
initiators shall be 2 percent or more of the total number of electors in 
the official's constituency. 
In any of the above-mentioned recall cases, no more than one 
person shall be listed in one proposal, but if in the same constituency 
there are two cases of recall, they may be voted on at the same time. 
Article 71: 
No military man in active service, policemen or functionary can 
serve as an initiator of a recall proposal. 
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Article 72: 
A recall proposal may be withdrawn from the election commis-
sion with a written application with the concurrence of two-thirds of 
the initiators before cosigners are solicited. 
Section Two Establishment of a Recall Case 
Article 73: 
After having received a recall proposal, the election commission 
shall examine the initiators of the proposal within fifteen days. If they 
are found in conformity with the provisions of the law, the commis-
sion shall notify the leading initiator to take a book or books of cosign-
ers from the commission in ten days and to solicit cosigners within a 
fixed period. 
If any of the initiators is found not in conformity with the provi-
sions of the law, his name shall be cancelled and the election commis-
sion shall notify the leading initiator to make up the number of 
initiators in five days. Any making-up beyond this time limit shall be 
inadmissible. 
Article 74: 
In cosigning a recall proposal, the cosigners must be the electors 
of the constituency of the official to be recalled, and the number of the 
cosigner must be in conformity with the following provisions: 
1) In proposing to recall a member of the National Assembly, the 
Legislative Yuan, a provincial assembly, the council of a city of pro-
vincial status, a county council, the council of a city of county status, 
or of a hsiang (chen or shih) representative, the number of cosigners 
shall be 15 percent more of the quotient obtained by dividing the total 
number of electors of the official's constituency with the prescribed 
total number of the public officials to be elected in the constituency. 
2) In proposing to recall a member of the Control Yuan, the number 
of cosigners shall be 20 per cent or more of the total number of mem-
bers of the provincial assembly or the council of a city of provincial 
status, which has elected that member. 
3) In proposing to recall a magistrate, a mayor of a city of county 
status, a chief of a hsiang (chen or shih), or a leader of a village or li, 
the number of cosigners shall be 18 per cent or more of the total 
number of electors in the official's constituency. 
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Article 75: 
The total number of electors referred to in Articles 70 and 74 
above means the total number of electors of the constituency of the 
official to be recalled at the time of his election. The criterion day for 
determining both the ages and the periods of residence of the electors 
referred to above shall be the day when the case of recall is initiated. 
Article 76: 
After having found that the cosigning for the case of recall con-
forms with the law, the election commission shall proclaim the case of 
recall established. If the case of recall is found inconsistent with the 
law and is proclaimed that it is not established, the original initiator 
shall not initiate another recall proposal against the same person 
within a year beginning from the day when the case of recall is pro-
claimed not established. 
Article 77 
After a case of recall has been proclaimed and established, a copy 
of the statement of reason or reasons shall be sent to the official to be 
recalled and he shall submit a statement of reply in ten days. 
Article 78: 
The election commission shall proclaim the following items 
within five days after the official to be recalled has submitted a state-
ment of reply: 
1) The date and the beginning and ending time of balloting on the 
case of recall. 
2) The statement of reason or reasons for recall. 
3) The statement of reply. 
The statement of reply shall not be proclaimed if it is not submit-
ted by the official to be recalled within the stipulated time. 
Article 79: 
Except in a proposal to recall a member of the Control Yuan, the 
initiators of the recall proposal may, while soliciting co-signers, set up 
a recall headquarters and employ a staff. 
Except for the soliciting of co-signers, there shall be no activities 
favoring or opposing the recall during the proceedings. 
Regulations regarding the establishment of the recall headquar-
ters, the employment of staff and the soliciting of co-signers shall be 
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decided by the Central Election Commission. Section Three Balloting 
on a Recall Case 
Article 80: 
The balloting on a recall case shall be held within 30 days after 
the establishment of the case has been proclaimed. 
Article 81: 
A recall ballot shall have two printed columns: One bearing the 
wording "agree to recall" and the other "disagree to recall" to be 
marked by the electors with tools prepared by the election commission 
in charge. 
The elector shall not show his marked ballot to any one. 
Article 82: 
The provisions of this law regarding the ballot casters, ballot cast-
ing, and ballot opening shall apply mutadis mutantis on the ballot 
casters, ballot casting, and ballot opening in the case of balloting on a 
recall case. 
Article 83: 
A case of recall shall be carried when the ballots agreeing to recall 
outnumber the ballots disagreeing to recall, but the number of ballot 
casters shall have to be in conformity with the following provisions: 
1) In the case of recalling a member of the National Assembly, the 
Legislative Yuan, a provincial assembly, the council of a city of pro-
vincial status, a county council, a city of county status, or of a hsiang 
(chen or shih) representatives, one-third or more of the electors in the 
official's constituency shall have cast their ballots. 
2) In the case of recalling a member of the Control Yuan, one half or 
more of the total number of the members of the provincial assembly or 
the council of a city of provincial status which has elected him shall 
have cast their ballots. 
3) In the case of recalling a magistrate, a mayor of a city of county 
status, a hsiang (chen or shih) chief or a village or li leader, one half or 
more of the electors of the official's constituency shall have cast their 
ballots. 
If the electors who have cast their ballots on the recall case do not 
reach the respective numbers set forth in the above provisions or if the 
ballots agreeing to recall do not outnumber the ballots disagreeing to 
recall, the case shall be rejected. 
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Article 84: 
Within seven days beginning from the balloting day, the election 
commission shall proclaim the result of balloting on the recall case. If 
the case is carried, the recalled person shall be relieved of his official 
duty on the day of proclamation. 
Article 85: 
After the case of recall is carried, the recalled person shall not be 
permitted to be a candidate for the same public office in four years 
beginning from the day of the deprivation of official duty. This provi-
sion also applies to a person who has resigned in consequence of the 
establishment of a case of recalling him. 
If the case of recall is rejected, no more recall proposal against the 
same official shall be permitted during his term of office. 
Chapter Five 
PUNISHMENT OF OFFENSES AGAINST ELECI'ION AND 
RECALL 
Article 86: 
Violators of the provisions of Item 1 of Article 54 shall be sen-
tenced to a prison term of not less than seven years. Violators of Item 
2 of Article 54 shall be sentenced to a prison term of not less than five 
years. The penalty for a violation of Item 3 of Article 54 shall be 
decided in accordance with each of the relevant laws governing 
punishment. 
Individuals who, in the text of their speeches delivered at the 
political rallies convened by political parties, violate the provisions of 
Article 54, shall be dealt with in accordance with the provision in the 
preceding paragraph. 
Article 87: 
Any person who during campaigning or assisting in a campaign 
openly assembles a crowd and incites a riot to disturb public order 
shall be sentenced to a prison term of not less than seven years. The 
chief conspirator shall be sentenced to life imprisonment or a prison 
term of not ~ess than ten years. 
Any person who attempts to commit the above offense shall also 
be punished. 
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Article 87-1: 
During the period of election or recall any person who commits 
acts of violence or duress against a public servant executing his official 
duties shall be sentenced to a prison term of not more than five years. 
In the event of the death of a public servant is resulted from that 
violence or duress, the punishment shall be life imprisonment or a 
prison term of not less than seven years. If the public servant is se-
verely injured, the offender shall be sentenced to a prison term of not 
less than three years but not more than ten years. 
Article 87-2: 
For those who openly assemble a crowd to commit offenses de-
scribed above, they shall be sentenced to a prison term of not more 
than three years, a detention at hard labor or a fine of not more than 
30,000 yuans. The principal leader and the perpetrators shall be sen-
tenced to prison terms of not more than ten years and not less than 
three years. 
Of those who commit offenses described in Paragraph 1, the 
leader and perpetrators who put a public servant(s) to death shall be 
sentenced to life imprisonment or to a prison term of not less than 
seven years; and those who severely injure a public servant(s) shall be 
sentenced to a prison term of not less than five years and not more 
than twelve years. 
Article 88: 
Violators of the provisions governing contributions acceptance set 
forth in Item 1 of Article 45-2 shall be sentenced to a prison term of 
not more than five years. Violators of the provisions governing contri-
butions acceptance set forth in Item 2 of article 45-2 shall be sentenced 
to not more than one year's imprisonment, or detention with forced 
labor or a fine of not more than 10,000 yuans. 
The property accepted as contributions by those who commit the 
offenses listed in the preceding paragraph shall be confiscated. If the 
whole or a part of the property in question cannot be confiscated, a 
fine shall be ordered to make up the difference. 
Article 89: 
A person who offers, agrees to pay or pays a bribe or offers other 
improper benefits to a candidate to make him withdraw from the elec-
tion or engage in certain campaign activities shall be sentenced to a 
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prison term of not more than five years and a fine of not more than 
50,000 yuans. 
The above provisions shall apply to a candidate who demands, 
agrees to accept or accepts a bribe or other improper benefits in ex-
change for his promise to withdraw from the election or to engage in 
certain campaign activities. 
The bribe or other improper benefits the candidate has accepted 
and thus has committed one of the foregoing two crimes shall be con-
fiscated. If the whole or a part thereof cannot be confiscated, the value 
thereof shall be collected from the offender. 
Article 90: 
A person who has committed one of the following offenses 
through violence, duress or other illegal means shall be sentenced to a 
prison term of not more than five years: 
1) Interfering with other's campaign or forcing others to withdraw 
from the campaign. 
2) Obstructing others to initiate or cosign a case of recall or to force 
others to initiate or cosign a case of recall. 
An unaccomplished offence specified in the preceding paragraph 
shall be punished. 
Article 91: 
A person who has committed any of the following offenses shall 
be sentenced to a prison term of not more than five years and a fine of 
not more than 50,000 yuans thereto be imposed: 
1) To offer, to pay or to agree to pay money and material thing or 
other improper benefits to an organization or office in the constituency 
under the pretext of donation in order to induce the members of the 
organization or office not to exercise their right to vote or to exercise it 
in a certain manner. 
2) To offer, to pay or to agree to pay money and material thing or 
other improper benefits to an initiator or cosigner of a case of recall in 
order to induce him to refrain from initiating or cosigning the case or 
to proceed to initiate or cosign it in a certain manner. 
Article 92: 
With an intent to influence the outcome of an election, anyone 
employing written words, pictures, audio-tapes, audio-video tapes, 
speeches or other methods to circulate trumped-up stories sufficient to 
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damage a public servant or other person(s) shall be sentenced to a 
prison term of not more than five years. 
Article 93: 
A person who has committed any of the offenses set forth in Para-
graph 2 of Article 61, Paragraph 2 or Article 81, or Paragraph 1 of 
Article 63 and has refused to leave the polling place or the ballot open-
ing station after being ordered to do so shall be sentenced to a prison 
term of not more than two years or a fine of not more than 20,000 
yuans. 
Article 94: 
During the recall process, a person who agitates the crowd on the 
spot where others are committing any of the following offenses shall be 
sentenced to a prison term of not more than a year or a fine of not 
more than 10,000 yuans, and the principal leader and the perpetrators 
of any of these offenses shall be sentenced to a prison term of not more 
than five years: 
1) To assemble a crowd to beseige the person involved in the recall, 
the initiators of cosigners of a recall, the staff officers, their recall head-
quarters, their domiciles or their residences. 
2) To obstruct by violence, duress or other illegal means the perform-
ance of duty by the person under recall process and the initiators and 
co-signers of recall process and their staff members. 
Article 95: 
A person who, with an intent to hinder or disrupt ballot casting 
and opening by withholding, destroying, concealing, exchanging' or 
seizing a ballot box, an election ballot, a recall ballot, and electoral 
register, a ballot-casting report, a ballot-opening statistics sheet or a 
ballot-marking tool shall be sentenced to a prison term of not more 
than five years. 
Article 95-1: 
A person whose campaign expenditure exceeds the maximum set 
forth by the election commission in charge in accordance with the pro-
visions of Paragraph 1 of Article 45-1 shall be fined not less than 
10,000 yuans and not more than 50,000 yuans. 
Article 96: 
A person who has violated the provisions set forth in Paragraph 3 
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of Article 49, Item 1 of Article 55 or Item 1 of Article 56 and has 
refused to conform after being restrained by an inspector shall be sen-
tenced to a prison term of not more than one year. 
Article 96-1 : 
When a political party violates the provtstons set forth in 
Paragraphs 2 and 4 of Article 51-1, Item 1 of Article 55-1, or Item 1 of 
Article 56, and does not obey inspector's attempt to curb the offending 
behavior, the perpetrators shall be punished in accordance with the 
provisions set forth in Article 96, and the political party in question 
shall also be fined not less than 10,000 yuans and not more than 
50,000 yuans. 
Article 97: 
Violators of the provisions set forth in Paragraphs 1, 2, and 4 of 
Article 45-3, Paragraphs 1 and 3 of Article 51, or Paragraph 3 of Arti-
cle 51-1, shall, in accordance with the criteria provided in Paragraph 5 
of Article 45-3, or the provisions governing the location and size for 
posting bills set forth in Paragraph 2 of Article 51, be fined not less 
than 1,000 yuans and not more than 10,000 yuans. 
Violators of the provisions set forth in Paragraphs 2 and 3 of Ar-
ticle 52, Items 2, 3, 4 and 5 of Article 55, Items 2 through 7 of Article 
55-1, Items 2 through 6 of Article 56, or Paragraph 2 of Article 79, 
shall, in accordance with the provisions covering ways and means set 
forth in either paragraph 2 of Article 46 or Paragraph 3 of Article 79, 
in case they do not obey inspector's attempt to curb the offending be-
havior, be rendered the same punishment stated in the preceding 
paragraph. 
A person who puts anything other than an election ballot or a 
recall ballot into a ballot box, or who takes an election ballot or a 
recall ballot away from the polling place, or deliberately tears up an 
election or recall ballot, shall be fined not less than 500 yuans and not 
more than 5,000 yuans. 
Article 97-1 
A person who has committed the crime described in Paragraph 2 
of Article 89 or Paragraph 1 of Article 143 of the Criminal Law, but 
who surrenders within three months after committing the criminal act 
shall be exempted from punishment. If the person surrenders three 
months after the commission of the criminal act, the punishment may 
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be commuted or exempted. If the person admits of the crime during 
the investigation or trial, the punishment may be commuted. 
A person who surrenders as described in the previous paragraph 
but fabricates stories with an intent to have someone else punished 
shall be punished in accordance with the criminal law provisions re-
garding false accusation. 
Article 98: 
Where other laws provide for more severe penalties for offenses 
listed in this chapter, their provisions shall govern. 
Any election or recall official who makes use of his official power, 
opportunity or means of duty to commit the crimes listed in this 
Chapter shall receive a penalty(ies) one and a half times more severe 
than that (those) herein prescribed. 
A person sentenced to a prison term for an offense listed in this 
Chapter or offenses of interference with voting contrary to the special 
provisions of the Criminal Law shall be deprived of civil rights. 
Article 99: 
An incumbent functionary who has registered as a candidate and 
has committed any of the following offenses and the commission has 
been proved true by an election commission, the commission shall first 
notify the competent office of the offending functionary to suspend his 
duties and at the same time to handle the case in accordance with the 
law: 
1) Rejecting without justifiable reason the election commission's re-
quest for assisting in certain matters or for assigning staff members. 
2) Interfering in the personnel or operations of the election 
commission. 
3) Using public fund to pay campaign expenses under a pretext. 
4) Demanding an organization and its head subordinate to him or 
under his command or his supervision to support his campaign. 
5) Abusing his power to make campaign personnel arrangements by 
transferring persons without due reason. 
Article 100: 
In the election of public officials of the Central Government the 
chief prosecutor of the Supreme Court shall head the prosecutors of all 
levels, and in the election of local public officials the chief prosecutors 
of the competent courts of law shall head his subordinate prosecutors. 
Their duties shall be to monitor and to prosecute on their own initia-
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tives the criminal cases regarding interference in an election or a re-
call, and meanwhile to dispose of the accusation, complaint or 
surrender to justice brought by an office, organization or individual. 
Each prosecutor shall make prompt investigations and take necessary 
measures. 
In conducting the above-mentioned investigation, a prosecutor 
may command the judicial police in accordance with the provisions of 
the Code of Criminal Procedure and the Statute for Transferring and 
Directing the Judicial Police. 
Article 10 1 : 
Chapter Six 
ELECTION AND RECALL SUITS 
When an election commission has violated the law so as to affect 
the results of an election or a recall, a prosecutor, a candidate, the 
person under recall process and the initiator of a recall case may, 
within 15 days after the proclamation of the name list of the elected 
persons or the proclamation of the result of a recall is made, bring a 
suit against that election commission before a competent court of law 
to request nullifying the election or recall. 
Article 102: 
In a suit of nullifying the result of an election or a recall balloting, 
when the law court has adjudicated and declared the invalidity of the 
election or recall, the election or recall shall be null and void. A pe-
riod of time then shall be set in which a hi-election or recall be held. If 
the law violation involves only a part of the election or the recall pro-
cess, the part of the election or the recall process involved shall be null 
and void, and a reballoting on the nullified part shall be held within a 
fixed period. But this shall not apply to a situation in which the nulli-
fied part obviously has not affected the result of the election or recall. 
Article 103: 
When an elected official has one of the following deeds, the elec-
tion commission, the prosecutor or the candidate(s) of the same con-
stituency may, within 15 days after the proclamation of the list of the 
elected officials, sue for the nullification of the election in a court with 
competent jurisdiction: 
1) The number of ballots won by the elected official is so inaccurate as 
to have affected the election result. 
2) A violation of the provisions set forth in Paragraph 3 of Article 49 
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or Items 1 and 3 of Article 55 has occurred, and the violator(s) does 
(do) not obey inspector's attempt to curb the offending behavior. 
Article 103-1 : 
An election commission, a prosecutor and a candidate of the con-
stituency of the elected official may each, within the prescribed various 
dates, bring a suit against the elected official before a competent court 
of law to request nullifying his qualification as an official elect under 
any of the disqualifying facts set forth in Article 36. 
Article 104: 
The election of a person shall be null and void after a law court 
has adjudicated the suit for nullifying his being elected and has de-
clared his election invalid. 
Article 105: 
A judgment on the invalidity of an election or of the election of a 
candidate shall not affect his performance of official duties undertaken 
after his taking office. 
Article 106: 
After the approval or rejection of a recall case, if the number of 
ballots is found inaccurate enough to affect the balloting result, the 
election commission, the prosecutor, the recalled person and the initia-
tor of the recall case each may, within fifteen days after the proclama-
tion of the balloting result, bring a suit against the initiator of the 
recall case or the recalled person before a competent law court to ap-
ply for nullifying the approval or rejection of the recall case. 
After the law court has adjudicated and declared that the ap-
proval or rejection of the recall case is null and void, the approval or 
rejection of the recall case shall be null and void, and a period of time 
shall be set in which a re-balloting shall be held. 
After the nullification of the approval of recall case, the official 
duties of the recalled person shall be restored. 
Article 107: 
When an elector discerns a fact that may invalidate an election, 
the election of a candidate, the recall of an official, or the approval or 
rejection of a recall case, he may, within seven days after the procla-
mation of the name list of the elected persons or the balloting result on 
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a recall case, file an accusation with a prosecutor or an election com-
mission together with the support of evidence. 
Article 108: 
The following courts possess jurisdiction over election and recall 
suits: 
1) The district court and its branch courts located in the constituency 
where the election or recall suit arises have jurisdiction over its first 
trial. When the act(s) or situation(s) straddle(s) two or more constitu-
encies all the district courts and their branch courts shall each have 
jurisdiction over the suit. 
2) In election and recall suits where one party refuses to accept the 
verdict of a district court or a branch district court and lodges an ap-
peal, then the respective high courts and branch high courts superior 
to the above said courts shall each have jurisdiction over the appeal of 
election and recall suits. 
Article 109: 
To try election and recall suits, the trying court shall establish a 
provisional chamber consisting of a number of judges and to try the 
case en bane. The court shall try such cases before handling any suits 
of other kinds. Election and recall suits shall be finally adjudicated in 
the court of second instance. The court trying cases of appeals shall 
have to deliver its verdict(s) within three months at most from the 
beginning of the proceedings. 
Article 110: 
In addition to the provisions regarding procedures for election 
and recall suits set forth in this law, those in the Code of Civil Proce-
dure shall apply mutatis mutandis. But those provisions relating to 
the effect of abandonment, acceptance of liabilities and admission of 
undisputed facts that do not apply to the actions shall not apply. 
Article 111 : 
Chapter Seven 
SUPPLEMENTARY PROVISIONS 
The fines stipulated in this law shall be ruled by the election com-
mission. When a fine is not paid in time after notification, the case 
shall be referred to a law court for compulsory execution. 
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Article 112: 
The enforcement rules for this law shall be drawn up by the Min-
istry of the Interior and it shall submit them to the Executive Yuan for 
approval. 
Article 113: 
This law shall be put into execution on the day of its 
promulgation. 
APPENDIX II 
CIVIC ORGANIZATIONS LAW DURING THE PERIOD OF 
NATIONAL MOBILIZATION FOR THE SUPPRESSION OF 
COMMUNIST REBELLION 
Revisions in the Title and the 67 Articles as Promulgated 
by the President 
January 27, 1989 
[Excerpts] 
Article 2: 
Civic organizations and their activities may neither violate the 
Constitution nor advocate communism or the division of the national 
territory. 
Article 3: 
The offices responsible for civic organizations are: the Ministry of 
the Interior (central government), the provincial or city governments' 
Departments or Bureaus of Social Affairs (provinces, municipalities, 
and provincial-level cities), and the county or city governments (coun-
ties or county-level cities). 
However, the various areas that civic organizations are active in 
shall be under the guidance and oversight of the offices normally re-
sponsible for those areas. 
Article 4: 
There are three categories of civic organizations: 
1) professional organizations; 
2) social organizations; 
3) political organizations. 
CHAPTER 9 
Political Organizations 
Article 44: (Goals of political organizations) 
Political organizations are groups formed in the Republic of 
China whose goals are to use commonly-held, democratic political 
concepts to aid in the crystallizaton of the people's political will and 
the enhancement of political participation. 
(145) 
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Article 45: (Definition of a political party) 
That which conforms to either of the following provisions is a 
political party: 
1) National political organizations whose goal is to nominate 
candidates to participate in elections for public office, who establish a 
political party in accordance with the law, and who apply for registra-
tion to the responsible offices in the central government; 
2) National political parties which are already registered and 
whose goal it is to nominate candidates to participate in elections for 
public office. 
Article 46: (Registration of political parties) 
Those which establish political parties in accordance with Para-
graph 1 of Article 45 shall, within thirty days after their founding con-
vention, prepare a copy of their charter and a list of the responsible 
persons for presentation to the responsible offices of the central gov-
ernment for registration and the issuance of a certificate and seal. 
Political parties according to Paragraph 2 of Article 45 shall, the 
day before elections are announced, prepare a copy of their charter 
and a list of responsible persons for presentation to the responsible 
offices of the central government for registration. 
Article 47: (Territorial organization of political parties) 
Political parties shall take the administrative divisions of the en-
tire country as their organization's territory. No regional parties shall 
be established; however, regional branch offices may be set up. 
Article 48: (Political parties may nominate candidates) 
Political parties established in accordance with Article 46 may 
nominate candidates to participate in elections for public offices in ac-
cordance with the provisions of the Public Officials Election and Re-
call Law During the Period of National Mobilization for the 
Suppression of Communist Rebellion. 
Article 49: (Democratic principles of organization and operation) 
Political organizations shall follow democratic principles to or-
ganize and operate. Specific provisions concerning items such as the 
titles, numbers, length of office, dates for taking and leaving office, 
meetings, and expenses of their elected members shall be separately 
established in their charter. 
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Article 53: (Equality of political parties) 
Political parties shall have the right of equal access to public 
grounds and public mass media according to law. 
Article 51: (Prohibition on donations from foreigners) 
Political organizations are forbidden to accept donations from 
foreign organizations or from organizations whose main membership 
consists of foreign organizations or corporations. 
Article 52: (Political party review board) 
The Executive Yuan shall establish a political party review board 
to deliberate matters of disciplinary action against politcal parties. 
The Political Party Review Board is to be composed of impartial peo-
ple; people from the same party may not comprise more than one-half 
of the total number of people on the Political Party Review Board. 
The organization of the Political Party Review Board is to be set by 
the Executive Yuan. 
CHAPTER 10 
Supervision and Penalties 
Article 53: (Denial of approval and revocation of approval) 
Applications for approval to establish a civic organization shall 
be denied where the said organization has violated Article 2 or other 
legal provisions. If the violation of the law takes place after approval 
has been granted, the approval shall be revoked. 
Article 54: (Reporting changes in the organization's charter for 
examination and recording) 
After a civic organization has been checked, ratified, and regis-
tered, if there are changes in its charter, or in the biographical infor-
mation on its chosen functionaries, or the register of names of the 
responsible person or persons, in such cases a report shall be made 
within thirty days to the responsible office for the purposes of exami-
nation and recording. 
Article 55: (Revocation of approval) 
Failure to establish a civic organization more than six months 
after having received approval to do so shall result in the revocation of 
the approval. Those who reported to the responsible office for check-
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ing and approval, however, may have this period extended to a maxi-
mum of an additional three months. 
Article 56: (Merger and division of civic organization) 
In cases where it is necessary for civic organizations to merge or 
divide because of a change in the organization's territory or other rea-
sons, then they may apply to the responsible office for appraisal and 
approval. 
Article 57: (Encouraging civic organizations) 
The responsible office may reward civic organizations for excel-
lence, the types of reward to be decided by the central responsible 
office. 
Article 58: (Penalizing civic organizations) 
In situations where a civic organization violates laws or regula-
tions or impairs the public welfare, the responsible office may take the 
following actions against it: 
1) issue a warning; 
2) annul the organization's decisions; 
3) suspend a part or the whole of the organization's operation; 
4) relieve the organization's staff members from their posts; 
5) impose a time limit in which to rectify the problem; 
6) revoke the approval; 
7) order the organization disbanded. 
Penalties stated in Paragraphs 1 through 3 above may also be im-
posed by the office in charge of the target industry. The penalties 
stated in Paragraphs 2 and 3, however, shall only be imposed after 
consultation with the responsible office. 
Penalties imposed on political parties shall be limited to warnings 
and orders to disband. The Political Party Review Board shall delib-
erate on the imposition of these penalties. 
Article 59: (The disbanding of civic organizations) 
In any of the following situations civic organizations shall be 
disbanded: 
1) the responsible office revokes approval; 
2) the organization goes bankrupt; 
3) the organization merges or divides; 
TAIWAN'S RECENT ELECTIONS 149 
4) the organization fails to rectify a problem within the specified 
time limit; 
5) a decision is made by the organization's decision-making body 
(or its representatives) to disband. 
Article 60: (Penalties I) 
A person or persons who establish a civic organization without 
applying for permission or registering in accordance with the law, and 
then fail to disband within the specified time limit after notification by 
the responsible office shall be fined not more than NT$20,000. 
A civic organization which has had its approval revoked or has 
been disbanded by the responsible office, but which after notification 
has failed to disband within the specified time limit, or which has vio-
lated the regulations stated in Article 65 and after notification by the 
responsible office failed to register within the time allotted, shall re-
ceive the same fine. 
Article 61: (Penalties II) 
In a case where a civic organization is established without apply-
ing for permission or registering in accordance with the law, and there 
is a failure, after notification by the responsible office, to disband 
within the specified time limit, and business continues to be conducted 
under the name of that organization, and there is a failure to obey the 
responsible public servant's attempt to curb the offending behavior, 
. then the ringleaders shall be sentenced to not more than two years of 
imprisonment or forced labor. 
In a case where a civic organization which has had its approval 
revoked or has been disbanded by the responsible office, but which 
after notification has failed to disband within the specified time limit, 
or which has violated the regulations stated in Article 65 and after 
notification by the responsible office failed to register within the time 
allotted and continues to conduct business under the name of that or-
ganization, and fails to obey the responsible public servant's attempt to 
curb the offending behavior, the ringleaders shall be subject to the 
same penalties stated in the preceding paragraph. 
Article 62: (Penalties Ill) 
Those who accept donations in violation of the provisions stated 
in Article 51 shall be sentenced to not more than two years of impris-
onment, forced labor, or fined not more than NT$20,000. 
Those who commit the crime stated in the preceding paragraph 
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shall have the donations they accepted confiscated, then repayment of 
their monetary value will be demanded. 
Article 63: (Enforcing the payment of fines) 
Those who fail to pay fines imposed in accordance with this law 
within the specified time limit shall have their cases referred to the 
court for enforcement. 
APPENDIX III 
STATUTE ON mE VOLUNTARY RETIREMENT 
OF SENIOR PARLIAMENTARIANS 
Promulgated by the President 
February 3, 1989 
Article 1: (Applicability of the law) 
The voluntary retirement of senior parliamentarians elected to 
the parliamentary organs in the first national elections shall be gov-
erned by this law. 
Article 2: (Meaning of senior parliamentarians) 
The senior parliamentarians elected to the parliamentary organs 
in the first national elections are: 
1) Members of the National Assembly, Legislative Yuan, and 
Control Yuan who were elected in the 1947 elections. 
2) Members of the National Assembly, Legislative Yuan, and 
Control Yuan who were elected in the 1969 elections for additional 
representatives and supplementary elections to fill vacancies. 
3) Members of the National Assembly and Legislative Yuan who 
filled vacancies in their respective parliamentary organs in accordance 
with the law. 
Article 3: (Application for voluntary retirement) 
Delegates mentioned in the preceding article shall apply for vol-
untary retirement with their respective parliamentary organs in ac-
cordance with the provisions of this law. 
Article 4: (Considered as seeking voluntary retirement) 
Delegates mentioned in Article 2 who meet one of the following 
conditions shall be considered as seeking voluntary retirement: 
1) Those who are seriously ill and have been unable to fulfill their 
responsibilities for a continuous period of one or more years. 
2) Those who have resided abroad continuously for six months 
or more for reasons unrelated to work. 
Delegates who are considered as seeking voluntary retirement in 
accordance with the preceding paragraph shall be notified by their re-
spective parliamentary organs. In the event that they do not apply for 
voluntary retirement six months from the month following the notifi-
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cation, their respective parliamentary organs shall file the applications 
on their behalf. 
Article 5: (Payment of retirement compensation) 
Delegates retiring under this law shall be given retirement com-
pensation in accordance with the following provisions: 
1) Delegates who have served less than 15 years in parliament 
shall receive a lump sum retirement compensation. 
2) Those who have served 15 years or more shall select one of the 
following methods for payment of the retirement compensation: 
a) In a lump sum 
b) In monthly installments 
c) Half the compensation in a lump sum, and the other 
half in monthly installments. 
For members of the Legislative and Control Yuan, the lump sum 
retirement compensation in the preceding paragraph shall be calcu-
lated according to the base units of the annuities and supplemental 
subsidies they received during their last month in office. For members 
of the National Assembly, the calculation shall be based on the re-
search stipends and supplemental subsidies they received during their 
last month in office. Every six months of service shall be calculated as 
one base unit. Periods shorter than six months shall also be consid-
ered one base unit. The maximum number of base units is 61. 
For retirement compensation that is paid in monthly install-
ments, the supplemental subsidies shall be paid in full, in addition to 
which delegates who have been in public service for 15 years or more 
shall receive an amount based on the monthly-paid annuities of incum-
bent members of the Legislative and Control Yuan. Members of the 
National Assembly shall receive 75 percent of the monthly research 
stipends paid to incumbent members of the National Assembly, with 
an annual increment of one percent. The maximum limit is set at 90 
percent. 
Retirement compensation to be paid in a lump sum and monthly 
installments in accordance with Item (c) of Clause 2 of Paragraph 1 
shall be calculated proportionately. 
Article 6: (Calculation of the length of service) 
Delegates retiring under this law shall have the length of service 
include their military, public, and teaching service. 
The length of service shall be calculated on the condition that the 
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institutions where the delegates served provide documents proving 
that the delegates concerned did not receive retirement pensions, re-
tirement compensation, retirement benefits, severance pay, military 
pensions, or retirement entitlements. 
Delegates who have concurrently been in military, public, or 
teaching serivce during their tenure as members of the National As-
sembly shall select one of these services for calculating the length of 
service when they resign, retire, or are discharged from military 
service. 
Article 7: (Handling of retirement compensation and calculation of 
length of service for delegates who return to parliament or 
hold other public offices after retirement) 
Delegates who return to parliament or to military, public, or 
teaching service after receiving their retirement compensation in ac-
cordance with this law shall not have to return the said compensation. 
The length of service before their first retirement shall not be included 
when they resign, retire, or are discharged from military service the 
second time. 
When delegates who have received retirement pensions, retire-
ment compensation, retirement benefits, severance pay, military pen-
sions, or retirement entitlements apply for retirement under this law, 
the length of service for calculating the retirement compensation shall 
include the length of service previously calculated, with the maximum 
limit not exceeding the provision in Clause 2 of Article 5. In the event 
that the length of service exceeds the maximum limit, retirement com-
pensation shall not be paid for the length of service exceeding the 
limit. In the event that the length of service does not reach the maxi-
mum limit, retirement compensation shall be paid for the length of 
service only. 
Members of the National Assembly who had been in military, 
public or teaching service shall not be required to return retirement 
pensions previously received when they apply for retirement under 
this law, and the retirement compensation shall be calculated on the 
basis of the actual length of service in the National Assembly. 
Article 8: (Handling of payment of retirement compensation) 
The relevant parliamentary organ shall handle the payment of the 
retirement compensation. 
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Article 9: (Payment of retirement compensation) 
Monthly installments of the retirement compensation shall be 
paid starting from the month following the retirement. 
Article 10: (Fund for retirement compensation) 
Funds for the retirement compensation shall be listed in the 
budget of each parliamentary organ. 
Article 11: (Methods of application for the retirement 
compensation) 
To apply for retirement compensation, two copies of an applica-
tion form shall be filled out and submitted with relevant documents of 
proof. 
The said application forms for retirement compensation shall ex-
plicitly carry the following information: 
1) The applicant's name, sex, provincial origin, date of birth, 
identification card number, and place of residence and domicile; 
2) Name of the institution where the applicant is serving at the 
time of retirement, the position held, his/her monthly-paid annuities 
or research stipends and supplemental subsidies during the month of 
retirement, date of retirement, positions held and length of service 
before retirement, the length of service selected for calculation, and 
titles of relevant documents of proof; 
3) Reasons for retirement; 
4) Type of retirement compensation selected; 
5) Date for the receipt of the retirement compensation. 
Article 12: (Loss of the right to receive retirement compensation) 
Delegates shall forfeit their right to receive retirement compensa-
tion in the event of one of the following occurrences: 
1) Death; 
2) Revocation of civil rights for life; 
3) Conviction of offenses against the internal and external secur-
ity of the state; 
4) Loss of the nationality of the Republic of China. 
Article 13: (Terminating the right to receive monthly installments of 
the retirement compensation) 
Delegates shall have their right to receive the retirement compen-
sation terminated in the event of one of the following occurrences and 
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the right shall be restored when the reasons for the revocation no 
longer exist: 
1) Revocation of civil rights which have not yet been restored; 
2) Regaining of paid public official status. 
Article 14: (Cancellation of validity) 
In the event that the retirement compensation is not received 
within three years starting from the month following retirement, the 
compensation shall be cancelled. But if the right to receive the com-
pensation is not exercised due to reasons beyond control, the period of 
validity shall be interrupted and shall be resumed when the reasons no 
longer exist. 
Article 15: (Consolation compensation) 
For delegates who receive the retirement compensation in 
monthly installments according to stipulations in Items (2) and (3) of 
Clause 2 of Paragraph 1 of Article 5, consolation compensation shall 
be paid to their family members in the event of death. 
The retirement compensation shall be recalculated on the basis of 
the length of service, monthly-paid annuities or research stipends at 
the time of death, and provisions of Paragraph 4 of Article 5 for a 
lump sum payment. The monthly installments of the compensation 
already paid shall be deducted from the amount and the remainder 
shall be paid, with an additional one-year annuities or research sti-
pends as consolation compensation. The same shall apply to those 
who have already received the full amount of their retirement 
compensation. 
In the event that delegates who receive their retirement compen-
sation in monthly installments leave no will upon their death, their 
consolation compensation shall be received by their respective parlia-
mentary organs and used for their funeral or memorial activities. 
Article 16: (Exclusiveness of the right to receive) 
The right to receive retirement compensation shall not be with-
held, transferred, or used as guaranty. 
Article 17: (Date of enforcement) 
The law shall go into effect on the day it is promulgated. 

APPENDIX IV 
ELECfiON STATISTICS 
ELECI'IONS FOR SUPPLEMENTARY LEGISLATORS, 
1969-1986 
Seats Won Percentage Distribution 
of Votes Cast 
Total ByKMT By Non-KMT 
Year Seats Number% Number % KMT Non-KMT Total 
1969 11 8 72.7 3 27.3 76.0 24.0 100.0 
1972 28 22 78.6 6 21.4 70.2 29.8 100.0 
1975 29 23 79.3 6 20.7 78.7 21.3 100.0 
1980 52 41 78.8 11 21.2 72.1 27.9 100.0 
1983 53 44 83.0 9 27.0 70.7 29.3 100.0 
1986 73 59 80.0 14 19.2 69.9 30.1 100.0 
Source: "Democratization in the ROC," held in Taipei, Jan. 9-11, 1989. 
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VOTES FOR KMT AND NON-KMT CANDIDATE 
IN RECENT ELECI'IONS IN TAIWAN 
Election For KMT Non-KMT Total 
Office Year Number % Number % Number % 
Taiwan Provincial 
Assemblymen 1985 4,464,812 69.8 1,928,728 30.2 6393540 100.0 
County Magistrate 
and City Mayor in 
Taiwan Province 1985 3,945,367 62.6 2,353,959 37.4 6229326 100.0 
County and City 
Councilor 1986 4,666,297 74.1 1,628,623 25.9 6294920 100.0 
Shih (City), Chen 
(Town), and 
Hsiang (Township) 
Chiefs 1986 4,449,954 83.2 896,334 16.8 5346297 100.0 
Source: Taiwan Provincial Election Commission, Report on the Election of the Eighth 
Provincial Assemblymen, the Tenth County Magistrates and City Mayors, the Eleventh 
County and City Councillors, and the Tenth Hsiang (Township), Chen (Town), and Shih 
(City) Chiefs. 
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